peace and conflict 2001

A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy

Ted Robert Gurr

Monty G. Marshall

Deepa Khosla

CIDCM
Center for International Development & Conflict Management

About CIDCM

THE CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) is an inter-disciplinary research center at the University of Maryland. Its team of scholar-practitioners address pressing problems of conflict, equity and human rights in countries around the world through basic and applied research, policy analysis and training. For more than fifteen years CIDCM faculty and associates have carefully balanced these activities in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, the Transcaucasus and Asia. Center associates work in close partnership with a wide range of international governmental and non-governmental organizations. CIDCM engages both the policy-making and research community in the U.S. and elsewhere. As part of its educational mission, the Center reaches out to faculty, undergraduate and graduate students, and post-doctoral fellows. CIDCM offers a full spectrum of services from analysis and problem-solving workshops to applied policy advice and publications. CIDCM promotes confidence-building, training and international dialogue at all levels of civic society. The Center focuses on all aspects of the conflict process — from root causes to its dynamics, termination and enduring legacies. A key focus is on issues of ethnic conflicts and minorities, state failure and repression, human rights and religious tolerance.

Founded by the late Edward Azar in 1981, the Center is one of the pioneers of "Second Track Diplomacy and Conflict Transformation". CIDCM's activities currently are organized around three main initiatives central to social change in the twenty-first century: (1) The Information Technology, Social Equity and Development (ITSED) Program which focuses on questions of the global digital divide particularly in Africa; (2) an Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR) which conducts empirical research on civil conflict and state failure trends, early warning and responses; and (3) the "Partners in Conflict" program which provides training in citizens' diplomacy and conflict resolution. The Center is also home to two endowed chairs: the Bahá'í Chair for World Peace and the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, which contribute to all three program clusters.

Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR)

THE INSCR PROGRAM, established in 2000 with support from the University of Maryland's College of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Department of Government and Politics, links databases relevant to the study of the dynamics of societal conflicts. The aim is to facilitate communication and enhance cross-disciplinary research among scholars and policy analysts concerned with all aspects of societal conflict and its international linkages. INSCR is developing incrementally a user-friendly web-based interface and dictionary for data sets on democracy and autocracy, minorities, ethnic and revolutionary conflict, social movements, human rights and repression, international crises, and negotiated settlements of wars within and among states. It also plans to build a research network of researchers from all the social sciences using summer workshops, research conferences, and seed grants for collaborative research on the origins, dynamics, and settlement of conflicts within states. The INSCR program is designed and directed by Ted Robert Gurr, Christian Davenport, Monty G. Marshall, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld.

CIDCM

Department of
Government and Politics

University of Maryland

0145 Tydings Hall

College Park, MD 20742

Tel.: (301) 314-7703

Fax: (301) 314-9256

E-mail: cidcm@cidcm.umd.edu

Http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm

Ernest J. Wilson III,
Director

Christian A. Davenport,
Research Director

Carola Weil,
Executive Director

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…a world more peaceful than at any time in the past century.

MOST REGIONS OF THE WORLD became more secure in the late 1990s. The turbulence that accompanied the end of the Cold War was largely contained by the end of 2000, although serious armed violence persists in parts of Africa and Asia. This report documents three positive trends which, if they continue in the first decade of the new century, will establish a world more peaceful than at any time in the past century.

- The number and magnitude of armed conflicts within and among states have lessened since the early 1990s by nearly half.
- Conflicts over self-determination are being settled with ever greater frequency, usually when ethnic groups gain greater autonomy and power-sharing within existing states.
- Democratic governments now outnumber autocratic governments two to one and continue to be more successful than autocracies in resolving violent societal conflicts.

The challenge is to sustain these positive trends. They result from concerted efforts to build and strengthen democratic institutions in post-Communist states and in the global South, and to negotiate settlements of revolutionary and ethnic conflicts. The end of the Cold War freed up political energies and material resources for institutional reform and constructive management of conflicts. But the energies and resources invested in peacemaking have limits. Any or all the positive trends could be checked and, in some places, reversed by these three obstacles.

- Virulent armed conflicts persist in parts of Eurasia and Africa and have the potential for metathesis into neighboring states.
- New and transitional democracies everywhere are at risk of reverting to autocracy.
- Lack of economic development undermines democratic institutions and breeds violent conflict.

The Peace and Conflict Ledger, which begins on p. 2, rates 160 countries on six positive and negative factors.

- Thirty-three red-flagged countries, most of them in Africa and Central Eurasia, are at serious risk of violent conflict and instability for the foreseeable future.
- The ledger shows that all Western and Latin America democracies except Peru and Guatemala have high capacities for managing societal conflicts and maintaining stable institutions.
- Most post-communist states also are likely to manage societal conflicts. The exceptions include Russia, Bosnia, and Croatia, each with a mix of stabilizing and destabilizing factors.
- Problem states in Asia and the Middle East include U.S. allies Pakistan and Egypt in addition to conflict-plagued states such as Afghanistan, Algeria, and Tajikistan.
- A half-dozen new democracies such as Bangladesh and Mozambique have good prospects for future stability despite their limited resources and bad neighborhoods.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Armed conflicts within states have been the main threats to civil peace and regional security since the Cold War ended in 1991. Ethnonationalists have sought independence. Revolutionary parties have fought for state power. Some authorities have responded to these challenges with state terror, repression, and political mass murder. On the positive side of the balance sheet of peace and conflict, many autocratic regimes are being replaced by transitional and fully democratic governments that are more likely to accommodate than fight their challengers.

This report documents the decline of armed conflicts within states and the increase in negotiated settlements since the mid-1990s. These trends are due mainly to democratic practices of conflict management and international support for peacebuilding in divided societies. But many new democracies are fragile and lack internal capacity for sustained peace-building. Some have reverted to autocracy and others, especially states at the bottom tier of development, are at high risk of doing so. Moreover the world is pockmarked with "bad neighborhoods" of persistent armed conflict and non-democratic governments strong enough to fight wars but not to carry out reforms.

This Center of International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) report surveys a half-century of global and regional trends in armed conflict and peacemaking. It uses data developed at the Center on wars among and within states, the settlement of self-determination conflicts, and democratization. The information is summarized in a Peace and Conflict Ledger that ranks countries of each world region according to their capacity to manage societal conflicts in ways that enhance peace, security, and social justice.

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2. THE PEACE AND CONFLICT LEDGER:
Country Rankings of Conflict and Peace-Building Capacity in 2001

The Peace and Conflict Ledger rates 160 countries according to their scores on six indicators of capacity for peace-building. As explained in the Ledger's notes, we judge a country's capacity for peace-building to be high insofar as it has avoided recent armed conflicts, managed movements for self-determination, maintained stable democratic institutions, has substantial material resources, and is free of serious threats from its external environment.

The Ledger lists countries by region, with the most challenged countries at the head of each regional list. The 33 red-flagged countries, those with a red icon in the "peace-building capacity" column, are at serious risk of armed conflict and political instability for the foreseeable future. Examples are Cambodia, Pakistan, and Burundi. The 46 yellow-flagged countries have a mix of positive and negative factors. India, for example, has stable democratic political institutions but, on the negative side, serious armed conflicts and limited resources. Russia, another yellow-flagged state, is positive on resources and neighborhood (its external environment) but has quasi democratic political institutions and a mixed record for containing armed conflict. Just over half of all countries are green-flagged including all the Western democracies and all of Latin America and the Caribbean except for yellow-flagged Peru and Guatemala.

The African Crisis Zone: African countries face the greatest challenges to peace and stability but there are important differences within the region. Almost every country across the broad middle belt of Africa—from Somalia in the east to Nigeria in the west, and from Sudan in the north to Angola in the south—has a volatile mix of armed conflict, unstable political institutions, limited resources, and, inevitably, a "bad neighborhood" of similar crisis-ridden states. In southern Africa, however, a half-dozen green-flagged states headed by South Africa have good prospects for avoiding serious conflicts and political instability. Most African states to the west of Nigeria have a mix of positive and negative factors. Most are poor and are negotiating risky transitions toward democracy, but have avoided or successfully managed armed conflicts. Senegal, Mali, Ghana, and Benin are exemplars in this region, Sierra Leone and Liberia are red-flagged exceptions. The outcome of Nigeria's transition to democracy is critical for the region. If democratic governance can be achieved and societal war headed off, Nigeria will help stabilize all of West Africa, as the Republic of South Africa has done in the southern continent.

The Central Asian Crisis Zone: The Asian heartland is a second serious crisis zone, with five red-flagged countries: Kyrghyzstan and Tajikistan in the north, Afghanistan in the middle, Pakistan in the south, Georgia to the west. Armed conflict is pervasive throughout the region and the profiles on the Peace and Conflict Ledger suggest that none of these countries has the institutional means or resources to deal effectively with it. The situation is only somewhat better around the perimeter of this region. Most countries immediately to the west of the Asian heartland, including Iran and Iraq, have yellow flags. So do countries to the north including Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia itself. Just to the east are China and India, then Bangladesh and Burma, all yellow-flagged because they have a mix of conflict-generating traits and conflict-

managing capacities. Green-flagged countries are scarce in greater Asia and situated mainly around the periphery, including Saudi Arabia to the west, Malaysia and Singapore in the southeast, and South Korea and Japan in the northeast.

Surprising Successes: A half-dozen new democracies in the Third world are success stories despite limited resources and bad neighborhoods. They are Bangladesh, Benin, the Central African Republic, Madagascar, Malawi, and Mozambique. Most new democracies in poor countries shift back toward autocracy within five years. These six countries have registered six or more years of democratic stability. Most poor countries in high-conflict regions also are challenged by armed conflicts. During the 1990s democratic governments in Bangladesh and Mozambique both negotiated endings to protracted armed conflicts and the other four have avoided such conflicts entirely. These countries' recent stability may be due to some combination of good institutional design, far-sighted policies, and appropriate external support—or it may prove to be ephemeral. Their governments deserve redoubled international encouragement and support. Equally important, they should be studied for lessons that can be applied elsewhere.

Risky Transitions: Fifteen to 20 countries, Russia and Lebanon among them, have high risks of political instability that are offset by positive ratings on indicators of peace-building capacity. We know that countries with a mix of autocratic and democratic features, red-flagged on the Regime Type indicator, are likely to shift either toward full democracy or back to autocracy. Such shifts often are prompted by or lead to violent internal conflicts.

The countries with the best chances of completing risky transition to democracies have fair to good resources, live in fair to good neighborhoods, and have a recent track record of avoiding or containing most armed societal conflicts.

The countries with the best chances of completing risky transition to democracies have fair to good resources, live in fair to good neighborhoods, and have a recent track record of avoiding or containing most armed societal conflicts. Three are post-communist states: Croatia, Bosnia, and Russia itself. Yugoslavia should be added to this group following the democratic ouster of the Milosovec regime. Five others are in the Middle East: Jordan, Yemen, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Egypt, all with regimes that mix autocratic and democratic features in ways that open up the possibility of eventual transition to full democracy. Three are in West Central Africa: Ghana, Senegal, and Gabon, with the possible addition of the Côte d'Ivoire. Peru also fits this pattern and so do Malaysia, and Singapore. Peru has been at serious risk of reverting to military-led autocracy but the odds are that democratic forces will prevail, not least because of regional pressures. Malaysia and Singapore are examples of "Asian democracy" with a mix of democratic institutions and autocratic leaders, countries whose stability is sustained by material prosperity and adroit political leadership.

The countries in risky transitions includes states in Europe and Middle East whose stability has been a major policy concern of the U.S. and Western European powers. Their armed conflicts have mostly been contained or settled, though sometimes at very high cost as in Bosnia. A number of these countries are likely to need substantial future political, economic, and—in some instances—peacekeeping investments to sustain political reforms and contain instability and violent conflict. The implication of their ratings in the Peace and Conflict Ledger is that the investments should be worth making.

Table 1. The Peace and Conflict Ledger 2001

Peace-building Capacity		Armed Conflict	Self-Determination	Regime Type	Regime Durability	Societal Capacity	Neighborhood
Western Democracies and Japan							
■	Spain	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	France	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	Portugal	●		●	●	●	●
■	Australia	●	●	●	●	●	
■	Austria	●		●	●	●	●
■	Belgium	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	Canada	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	Denmark	●		●	●	●	●
■	Finland	●		●	●	●	●
■	Germany	●		●	●	●	●
■	Greece	●		●	●	●	●
■	Iceland	●		●	●	●	●
■	Ireland	●		●	●	●	●
■	Italy	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	Japan	●		●	●	●	
■	Luxembourg	●		●	●	●	●
■	Netherlands	●		●	●	●	●
■	New Zealand	●		●	●	●	
■	Norway	●		●	●	●	●
■	Sweden	●		●	●	●	●
■	Switzerland	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	United Kingdom	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	USA	●	●	●	●	●	●
Socialist Bloc and Successor States							
■	Tajikistan	●	●	●	●		●
■	Georgia	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	Kyrgyzstan	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	Azerbaijan	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	Albania	●		●	●	●	●
■	Armenia	●		●	●	●	●
■	Yugoslavia	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	Croatia	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	Bosnia	●	●	●	●		●
■	Turkmenistan	●		●	●		●
■	Russia	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	Kazakhstan	●		●	●	●	●
■	Uzbekistan	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	Macedonia	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	Moldova	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	Belarus	●		●	●	●	●
■	Romania	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	Estonia	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	Bulgaria	●		●	●	●	●
■	Hungary	●		●	●	●	●
■	Latvia	●		●	●	●	●
■	Lithuania	●		●	●	●	●
■	Poland	●		●	●	●	●
■	Slovenia	●		●	●	●	●
■	Czech Republic	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	Slovakia	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	Ukraine	●	●	●	●	●	●

Notes for the Indicators in the Peace and Conflict Ledger

The Peace and Conflict Ledger lists the 160 larger countries in the world—all those with populations greater than 500,000—on six indicators of capacity for building peace and avoiding destabilizing political crises. We rate a country's peace-building capacity high insofar as it has avoided recent armed conflicts, successfully managed movements for self-determination, maintained stable democratic institutions, has substantial material resources, and is free of serious threats from its external environment. Countries are listed by world region, and within each region from lowest to highest capacity.

Column 1

Summary Ranking of Peace-Building Capacity

The indicator of peace-building capacity summarizes the six specific indicators described below and is used to rank countries within each region. Red and yellow icons on the six specific indicators are evidence of problems whereas green icons signal a capacity for managing conflict. Weights are assigned to icons on the six indicators (2 for red, 1 for yellow, -1.5 for green) and averaged. Countries with an average greater than 1 have red icons on the summary indicator of capacity, countries with an average less than 0 are given green icons. Yellow icons signal an average score between 0 and 1.

Column 2

Armed Conflict Indicator

The icons in this column are based on information on armed conflicts being fought in 1999-2000 as summarized in figure 1 and Appendix table 1. A red icon highlights countries with a medium to high magnitude of armed political or ethnic conflict; a yellow icon identifies countries with either a low level of armed conflict in 1999-2000 or an armed conflict that ended between 1996 and 1999. A green icon flags countries that have had no armed conflict between 1996 and 2000.

Column 3

Settling Conflicts over Self-Determination

The icons in this column take into account the success or failure of governments in settling self-determination conflicts from 1980 through 2000, based on information summarized in Appendix tables 2 and 3. Red icons signify countries challenged by armed conflicts over self-determination in 2000. Yellow icons flag countries with one of these two patterns: either (a) non-violent self-determination movements in 2000 but no track record of accommodating such movements in the past 20 years; or (b) violent self-determination movements in 2000 and a track record of accommodating other such movements in the past 20 years. Green icons signify countries that have successfully managed one or more self-determination conflicts since 1980, including countries with current non-violent self-determination movements. Countries with no self-determination movements since 1980 are blank in this column.

Column 4

Democracy, Transitional Regimes, and Autocracy

The icons in this column show the nature of a country's political institutions in 2000. Red icons are countries with governments in the transitional zone between autocracy and democracy. Yellow icons represent autocratic regimes. Green icons are full democracies.

Column 5

Capacity for Peace-Building: The Durability of Political Institutions

The icons in this column take into account the maturity of a country's system of government. New political systems are vulnerable to further change, especially during their first five years, with new democracies and transitional regimes being especially vulnerable. So are the governments of newly-independent countries. Red icons highlight countries whose political institutions in 2000 were established between 1995 and 1999. Yellow icons register countries whose polities were established during the 1985-94 decade. Green icons are used for countries whose polities were established before 1985.

Column 6

Capacity for Peace-Building: Societal Resources

The governments of rich societies are better able to maintain peace and security than are governments of poor societies. We use an indicator of societal energy consumption per capita (averaged over the last half-century) to rank countries on this indicator. Red icons signify countries in the lowest quintile (the bottom 20%) of energy consumption. Yellow icons flag countries in the second and third quintiles, green icons identify countries in the top 40% in energy consumption.

Column 7

Good and Bad Neighborhoods

We define ten politically relevant "neighborhoods": West Africa, North Africa, East Africa, South Africa, Middle East, South Asia, East Asia, South America, Central America, and Europe/North America. For each region we gauge the extent of armed conflicts in 1999/2000 and the prevailing type of regime, either democratic, autocratic, or transitional. Countries with green icons are in regions with relatively low armed conflict and mostly democratic governments. Countries with red icons are in "neighborhoods" with high armed conflict and many transitional regimes. Countries with yellow icons are in regions with middling armed conflict and mostly autocratic regimes. For countries that straddle regions, or are situated in regions with mixed traits, a final determination was made by reference to armed conflicts in bordering countries. For example, countries with two or more bordering countries engaged in armed conflicts are coded red on this indicator. Island states are blank on this indicator.





Countries For Triage? Some red-flagged countries are highly resistant to efforts either to contain conflict or to promote better governance. Afghanistan, Congo-Kinshasa, and Burundi are examples of countries with a syndrome of conflict-generating traits that could justify international decisions to disengage and impose sanctions and quarantines. Such triage is a bad idea for two reasons. For one, it violates post-Cold War international norms to ignore large-scale repression and suffering. Second, protracted armed conflicts have major spillover effects. The idea and evidence for our indicator of "bad neighborhoods" is that a conflict-ridden country exports refugees, armed conflict, and insecurity to surrounding countries.

The implication for international policy makers is that countries in crisis need low-key diplomatic and humanitarian engagement, not triage, and usually not military intervention either. They are not hospitable places for peace-making or nation-building. The short-term aim should be to contain the spillover effects of conflict wherever possible. This means cutting off support for war making, for example by embargoing trade in small arms and munitions. It also may mean providing packages of political, economic, and military assistance for countries on the margins of conflict zones, to contain the risks that they might be destabilized by warring neighbors.

In the longer run, international actors who have been engaged in crisis situations in these limited ways are positioned to take advantage of openings in which a cease fire may be brokered or political settlements attempted. Societal and regional conflicts in southern Africa, the Middle East, and Northern Ireland that once were thought to be intractable eventually moved toward settlement because international policy makers and members of civil society did not give up on efforts at peace-building.

How much warfare is there within and among states, and how has its magnitude changed over time? Figure 1 provides some answers to those questions. The total magnitude of violent conflict, represented by the total area under the graph, increased from the 1950s to the 1980s and then declined sharply after the Cold War ended in 1991. Interstate war, represented by the red band at the bottom of figure 1, surged in the 1980s because of major wars involving Vietnam and Cambodia, Israel and Lebanon, and Iran and Iraq. The main component of the trends is not international conflict, however, but a long-term rise and short-term fall in violent conflict within societies, represented by the broad yellow band on the figure. Colonial wars of independence, represented by the thin, green band at the top of the graph, were a small component of the long-term trends.

Figure 1. Global Trends in Violent Conflict 1946-1999



Societal conflict was roughly three times the magnitude of interstate war during most of the last half century and increased six-fold between the 1950s and the early 1990s. When societal conflict is divided into its political (green) and ethnic (blue) components, in figure 2, both trace a similar upward path until the 1980s, when violent political conflicts level off while ethnic wars explode. Both peaked in 1992 and subside thereafter, with ethnic wars registering the most dramatic decline.

Figure 2. Trends in Violent Political and Ethnic Conflict 1946-1999



These trends and comparisons are constructed from a catalog of every major episode of violent conflict from 1946 to 2000. Magnitudes are determined by rating each conflict on a 10-point scale that takes into account its deaths, dislocations, and physical damage.[1] The Rwandan genocide rates a 7 on this scale, ethnic war in Kosovo is rated 4, the U.S. and UK air campaign against Iraq in 1998-1999 rates a 1. The ratings are summed for each year and each type of conflict to provide the input for the trends and comparisons in figures 1 and 2.

1 The scale is described in the Appendix to this report. Armed conflicts of the late 1990s are described in Appendix table 1. A complete list of the conflicts and their magnitudes can be reviewed at http://members.aol.com/CSPmgm/war99.htm

Figure 3. States Experiencing Warfare, 1946-1999



The upward trend in conflict may be inflated by the long-term rise in number of independent countries, especially since new states tend to be unstable. To control for this effect, figure 3 shows the number and percentage of independent countries fighting conflicts (all types combined) in a given year. The red line shows the number of states with violent conflicts and the green line focuses on the number of states with more serious armed conflicts. The blue line traces the percentage of all independent states affected. The long-term trends are virtually identical, with a peak in 1991 when 51 states making up 33 per cent of all independent states were involved in serious conflicts of all kinds. The number and percentage of declined sharply by 1999, by nearly half.[2]

The extent of warfare among and within states lessened by nearly half in the first decade after the Cold War.

To summarize, the data on magnitudes and numbers of violent conflict tell the same story. The extent of warfare among and within states lessened by nearly half in the first decade after the Cold War. The trends differ among world regions, however. Figures 4a through f show the trends in political and ethnic conflicts for each world region. Green and blue lines indicate the changing magnitudes of political and ethnic warfare, respectively.

2 More precisely, the number of states with wars declined 45 percent between 1991 and 1999. These analyses include only states with populations greater than 500,000.

Figure 4: Regional Trends in Magnitudes of Violent Societal Conflict

a. Western Democracies and Japan



b. Socialist Bloc and Successor States



c. Latin America and the Caribbean



Political Warfare Ethnic Warfare

Few Western states had violent societal conflicts during the second half of the 20th century (figure 4a). The exceptions were mainly violent separatist movements, for example in Spain and Northern Ireland, most of which ended by 2000. Ethnic violence in the U.S. during the 1960s and early 1970s also registers here with a rating of 1 on the 10-category magnitude scale. The socialist states and their successors had virtually no violent societal conflict until the dissolution of the USSR and the Yugoslav Federation (figure 4b). Almost all ethnonational wars that began in the post-Communist states in the early 1990s were contained by 2000, except in Chechnya. Revolution dominates the long-term trends of societal conflict in Latin America and the Caribbean (figure 4c). Wars that reached their peak in the 1980s were mostly settled by the 1990s, for example through peace agreements that ended revolutionary conflicts in El Salvador and Guatemala. The only ethnic wars in this region involved the Miskitos and Creoles of Nicaragua and the indigenous people of the Mexican state of Chiapas.[3]

Asia has experienced greater magnitudes of societal conflict than any other world region (figure 4d). During the first half of the Cold War conflicts in Asia were mostly political and centered on IndoChina. Ethnic warfare increased throughout the Cold War to a peak in 1991 after which both ethnic and political war show a significant decline, parallel to the global decline seen in figures 1 and 2. Muslim Kashmiris and Sri Lankan Tamils are fighting the most intense ethnic wars in the region at the beginning of 2001. Civil war between the Taliban government and its Uzbek and Tajik opponents in northern Afghanistan was the most serious political conflict in Asia in 2000. The Taliban forces are close to victory. Similarly, the Philippines government has largely contained a 30-year insurgency by the Marxist New Peoples Army.

3 The distinction between political and ethnic war is difficult to draw precisely because some conflicts have elements of both. Insurgencies in Afghanistan, Guatemala, and Uganda have all drawn support from particular ethnic groups—the Pashtuns, Tajiks, and Uzbeks in Afghanistan, Mayans in Guatemala, the Acholi in Uganda—but since their leaders were fighting mainly to seize control of the state, we categorize them as political rather than ethnic wars. The leaders of Mexico's Chiapas uprising talked revolution but were mainly concerned about empowering indigenous communities, therefore we categorize this conflict as an ethnic war.

The experience of the Middle East and North Africa (figure 4e) tracks closely the long-term global trends in societal conflict. Much of the rise and fall in ethnic warfare in this region is attributable to Kurdish and Palestinian nationalism, whose violence was largely contained by the beginning of 2001. The most serious political conflict in the region is a terrorist war being fought by Islamic militants in Algeria, a war that has greatly diminished in the last several years.

Violent ethnic and political rivalries erupted in Africa south of the Sahara while colonial rule was ending in the 1960s (figure 4f). Some of these conflicts were contained by settlements implemented in the early 1990s, for example in Mozambique (1992) and South Africa (1996). Other major wars have continued despite regional and international efforts to contain them, notably in Sudan, Angola, Somalia, Burundi, the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sierra Leone. The magnitude of ethnic war in Africa fell by half between 1994 (the year of the Rwandan genocide) and 2000 but it is premature to think that there has been a decisive reversal in the trend. In Nigeria, for example, militant Yorubas and Ijaws are escalating their challenges to the government. The eastern Congo is in a state of near-anarchy with numerous armed bands, including military units from neighboring states, contending for local power and resources.

The global evidence shows that societal warfare has declined for much of the last decade. The end of the Cold War eliminated the superpower rivalry that fueled many societal conflicts. It also opened up opportunities for peacemaking by the UN, regional organizations, and political activists in war-torn societies. But the African experience shows that there have been limits to the effectiveness of post-Cold War policies for managing internal conflict.

We suggest three general reasons for the African exception. One is that relatively little international effort has been given to promoting the solution of African conflicts by comparison to the political and material resources devoted to conflict management in the post-Communist states, the Middle East, and Central America. The second is that most democratic transitions in Africa have failed, mainly because most African societies have very

d. East, South, and Central Asia



e. North Africa and the Middle East



f. Africa South of the Sahara



Political Warfare Ethnic Warfare

limited resources. Democratic governments are better able to accommodate ethnic and political demands for reform and more likely to negotiate settlements of societal wars, as we demonstrate in Part 3 of this report. Africa, however, has fewer fully democratic governments than any other world region except the Middle East.

Figure 5a. Global Warfare by Level of Societal Capacity, 1946-1999 (Top Quintiles)



The third factor is Africa's pervasive poverty. For the last half century at least, societies at low levels of development have suffered much more from societal warfare than prosperous societies. The link between violence and societal development is shown in figures 5a and 5b. These graphs break down the total magnitude of global warfare, from figure 1, into subtotals for five groups (quintiles) of states defined by their average energy consumption per capita, year by year since the late 1940s. The states in the top two quintiles have the highest energy consumption per capita and, therefore, the highest levels of development and on average the lowest magnitudes of conflict (figure 5a). Almost all Western democracies are in the top group, most post-Communist states are in the second group. The states in the bottom two groups have mirror-image liabilities: low development and high to very high magnitudes of conflict (figure 5b). Especially interesting is the evidence that the fourth, next-to-bottom group of countries has almost always had greater conflict than the countries at rock bottom. Evidently these fourth-quintile countries have more surplus for fighting wars, or have more to fight over, than the poorest of countries.

Figure 5b. Global Warfare by Level of Societal Capacity, 1946-1999 (Bottom Quintiles)



Magnitudes of warfare declined significantly during the 1990s in countries in the top four levels of development. In the bottom quintile, however, the trend is essentially flat. In these countries, which include most of Africa, high magnitudes of conflict during the last 20 years of the Cold War continued through the 1990s. This evidence suggests that Africa, along with very poor and non-democratic states elsewhere in the world, will continue to experience serious warfare in the future — and will pose a series of challenges to those responsible for maintaining regional security and preventing humanitarian disasters. Poor societies are at risk of falling into no-exit cycles of conflict in which ineffective governance, societal warfare, humanitarian crises, and lack of development perpetually chase one another.

Africa, along with very poor and non-democratic states elsewhere in the world, will continue to experience serious warfare in the future…

4. SELF-DETERMINATION MOVEMENTS AND THEIR OUTCOMES

The quest of national and indigenous peoples for self-governance has reshaped the political landscape in many countries during recent decades. Sixty-eight territorially-concentrated ethnic groups have waged armed conflicts for autonomy or independence at some time since the 1950s, not counting the peoples of former European colonies. More than a third of them continue to fight for greater self-determination at the beginning of 2001 including some Somalis and Oromo in Ethiopia, Tamils in Sri Lanka, and Chechens in Russia. Leaders of other movements, though, have agreed to ceasefires and negotiated settlements from which their peoples have gained some combination of political recognition, greater rights, and regional autonomy (see Appendix table 2).

We also have documented another 54 territorially-concentrated groups that currently are seeking greater self-determination by political means. Their tactics may include isolated acts of violence but thus far they have stopped short of serious armed conflict. Leaders of these groups rely mainly on building mass support, representing group interests, and carrying out electoral and protest campaigns. Some of them, like the Flemish and Walloons in Belgium and the Catalans in Spain, act through autonomous political institutions that were created to satisfy group demands for autonomy (see Appendix Table 3).

Phases of Self-determination Conflicts: Self-determination conflicts move through phases from conventional politics to war, settlement, and sometimes independent statehood. We developed a diagnostic scheme with ten phases to make it easier to track and compare these conflicts. Appendix Table 2 categorizes the current status of 68 conflicts—all those with an armed conflict phase sometime during the last 45 years — using the ten phases defined here.

1. Conventional politics (5 groups): Self-determination is sought by conventional political strategies including advocacy, representation of group interests to officials, and electoral politics. Groups with self-administered regions and power-sharing arrangements in existing states are also categorized here.

2. Militant politics (4 groups): Self-determination is sought by organizing and inciting group members to use disruptive strategies (mass protest, boycotts, resistance to authorities). These strategies may be accompanied by a few symbolic acts of violence. Groups using these strategies at present include Tibetans in China and Corsicans in France.

3. Low-level hostilities (11 groups): Self-determination is sought by localized use of violent strategies such as riots, local rebellions, bombings, and armed attacks against authorities, for example Kurds in Turkey, Shan in Burma, and Uighers in China.

4. High-level hostilities (10 groups): Self-determination is sought by widespread and organized armed violence against authorities. Wars of this kind are being fought by the Chechens, Tamils in Sri Lanka, and Kashmiris and Assamese in India.

5. Talk-fight (4 groups): Group representatives negotiate with authorities about settlement and implementation while substantial armed violence continues. Fighting may be done by the principals or by factions that reject efforts at settlement. Conflict between North and South in Sudan is currently in this phase, also conflict over autonomy for the Indonesian province of Aceh.

6. Cessation of open hostilities (10 groups): Most fighting is over but one or more principals are ready to resume armed violence if efforts at settlement fail. Conflicts where hostilities are checked by international peace-keeping forces, in the absence of agreements, also are coded here. This kind of tenuous peace held at the beginning of 2001 for the Kosovar Albanians, Kurds in Iraq, and Armenians in Ngorno-Karabakh.

7. Contested agreement (11 groups): An interim or final agreement for group autonomy within an existing state has been negotiated between the principals but some parties, within the group or the government or both, reject and attempt to subvert it. This is the current situation of the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia, the Chittagong Hill peoples of Bangladesh, and the Bougainvilleans in Papua New Guinea.

8. Uncontested agreement (7 groups): A final agreement for group autonomy is in place, is accepted in principal by all parties, and is being implemented. The 1980s conflict involving Miskitos in Nicaragua is at this stage, also the conflicts between Tuaregs and the governments of Mali and Niger.

9. Implemented agreement (2 groups): A final settlement or agreement for group autonomy has been largely or fully implemented, for example among the Mizos in India and the Gaguaz in Moldova.

10. Independence (4 groups): The group has its own internationally recognized state.

Self-determination conflicts do not move inevitably through all phases. Groups that have used conventional politics for a long period of time are very likely to continue to do so. But if a group signals its objectives through militant politics or low-level hostilities, the risks of further escalation are high. At the settlement end of the spectrum, we cannot be confident that a conflict has ended until agreements have been fully implemented. The Palestine-Israeli conflict progressed from agreements to partial implementation during the 1990s and the Palestinian Authority was close to independence when, in September 2000, the conflict shifted back to "talk-fight." In Bosnia it has been predicted that if peacekeeping forces withdraw, the Serbs and perhaps the Croats are likely to resume low-level fighting.

…only four internationally recognized states were born in armed separatist conflicts during the last 40 years.

Trends in the Onset and Settlement of Self-Determination Conflicts: Many observers fear that contemporary self-determination movements will continue the process of state breakdown signaled by the breakup of the Soviet Union and the Yugoslav Federation at the beginning of the 1990s. In fact only four internationally recognized states were born in armed separatist conflicts during the last 40 years. They are Bangladesh (1971), Slovenia (1991), Croatia (1991), and Eritrea (1993). One can expand this list by citing several de facto states established by separatist movements, political entities which are not recognized as such by the international community. Somaliland, which is dominated by the Isaaq clan, has an effective central government and few of

the crippling economic and security problems of the failed Somali state. Others are the TransDniester Republic which nominally is part of Moldova, and Abkhazia in Georgia.

…the most common outcome of self-determination conflicts is a settlement between governments and group representatives that acknowledges collective rights and gives them institutional means for pursuing collective interests within states.

These exceptions aside, the most common outcome of self-determination conflicts is a settlement between governments and group representatives that acknowledges collective rights and gives them institutional means for pursuing collective interests within states. Sometimes a group gains better access to decision-making in the central government, often it gains regional autonomy, and of course some settlements include both kinds of reforms. Thus the outcome of self-determination movements seldom is a redrawing of international boundaries, but rather devolution of central power and redrawing of boundaries within existing states.

Concerns sometimes are voiced that autonomy agreements are a prelude to all-out war for independence. This is an unlikely scenario. The more common scenario is that most people accept and work within the framework for autonomy while a few spoilers continue to fight in hopes of greater concessions. The greatest risk in autonomy agreements is not the eventual breakup of the state, rather it is that spoilers may block full implementation, thereby dragging out the conflict and wasting resources that might otherwise be used to strengthen autonomous institutions.

Armed conflicts over self-determination spiked sharply upward at the end of the Cold War, but they had been building in frequency since the late 1950s, doubling between 1970 and the early 1980s. Table 2 and figure 6 summarize the evidence. From five ongoing wars in the 1950s their numbers swelled to a maximum of 47 in 1991. But then they declined even more precipitously, to a current low of 25, a smaller number than at any time in the last quarter-century. Moreover fighting in most of these conflicts is low-level and de-escalating.

Table 2. Armed Conflicts for Self-Determination and their Outcomes, 1956-2000

Period	New Armed Conflicts	Ongoing at End of Period	Conflicts Contained	Conflicts Settled or Won
before 1956		4		
1956-60	4	8		
1961-65	5	12		1
1966-70	5	15	2	
1971-75	11	23		3
1976-80	10	30	2	1
1981-85	5	34		1
1986-90	10	40	2	2
1991-95	16	38	7	11
1996-2000	2	26	7	6
TOTALS	68		21	25

Note: Based on conflicts listed in Appendix Table 2. "Settled" conflicts include four that ended with the establishment of a new, internationally recognized state. Conflicts that ended in settlements which lasted five or more years before the outbreak of new fighting are counted twice, once as settlements (Nagas 1964, Tripuras 1972, southern Sudanese 1972), the second time according to their status in 2000. The Hmong of Laos are counted twice, once as a contained conflict (1979), second as an ongoing conflict (1985-present). The conflicts of Serbs and Croats in Bosnia are given a single listing in Appendix Table 2 but are counted separately here.

Figure 6. Trends in Armed Conflicts for Self Determination 1956-2000



Two-thirds of all terminations of separatist wars during the last half-century have occurred since 1990.

The immediate reason for the decline has been a marked increase in local, regional, and international efforts to contain and settle wars of self-determination. During the Cold War a half-dozen were contained, usually when the rebels were defeated militarily, and nine were settled or, in the case of Bangladesh, led to independence. Three of the negotiated settlements were in India, two of which—with Nagas (1963) and Tripuras (1972)—led to second-generation wars. During the 1990s another 14 wars were contained, often as a result of internationally-backed negotiations and peacekeeping, and another 17 were settled by negotiated agreements or— in Slovenia, Croatia, and Eritrea —internationally recognized independence for rebel nationalists. Two-thirds of all terminations of separatist wars during the last half-century have occurred since 1990.

Self-determination wars are easiest to settle in their early years. Between 1988 and 1994 eleven began in the USSR, Yugoslavia, and their successor states. By 2000 all had been contained or settled except in Chechnya, after an average of three years' fighting. During the same seven years, from 1988 to 1994, another 13 self-determination wars began in Africa and Asia. By 2000 five of the six new African wars were over and four of seven Asian wars were concluded, after an average of about seven years' fighting. International engagement helped end most of the separatist wars in the post-communist states, which helps account for their short durations. Asian and African separatist wars usually were contained or settled without international mediation or peacekeeping, which helps explain the fact that they persisted more than twice as long as those in post-communist states.

The longer self-determination wars drag on, the more resistant they are to either containment or settlement.

The longer self-determination wars drag on, the more resistant they are to either containment or settlement. The average duration of the 25 armed self-determination conflicts still being fought at end of 2000 was 22 years and their median duration 17 years. Two-thirds are being fought in Asia, most of the others in Africa. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been intermittently violent since 1968 despite extraordinary efforts to negotiate and implement an enduring settlement. A handful of new separatist wars began after 1995 and one of them, in Kosovo, has been contained. In Afghanistan we register the Tajiks and Uzbeks as protagonists of "new" separatist conflicts in 1996, though in fact this marks only a new, anti-Taliban phase in a protracted internal war that is obdurately resistant to outside influence. The Ijaw rebellion in Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta escalated in 1995 from protest against lack of development and political participation to rebellion, but is susceptible to settlement in a democratic Nigeria.

The most critical phases are "talk-fight" and "cessation of open hostilities." In the absence of final agreements any of the 14 conflicts in these two phases may revert to open warfare—and have done so recently, not just in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict but in Aceh, Abkhazia, and in Senegal's Casamançais, among others. Preventive action and efforts at mediation should be redoubled in these situations to keep them moving toward agreement.

Contested agreements also are worrisome because significant elements on one or both sides of a conflict reject them. Some rebel factions may continue fighting either to cut a better deal, like the Abu Sayyaf faction of Philippines Moros, or because they reject any compromise, like Chechen Islamicists who mounted a jihad against Russian influence in the Caucasus after the first Chechen war ended in a Russian withdrawal. On the other side, political opponents of a government may try to subvert an agreement between authorities and an autonomy movement. They may use legislative means to block implementation or stage provocative actions, like Likud leader Ariel Sharon's visit in the company of armed police to Jerusalem's Temple Mount in September 2000. However challenging it is to reach an initial agreement, it may be still more difficult, and require greater international engagement, to get from "yes, but" to "yes, let's implement the agreement."

However challenging it is to reach an initial agreement, it may be still more difficult, and require greater international engagement, to get from "yes, but" to "yes, let's implement the agreement."

Our survey has identified 46 groups using conventional political means to pursue self-determination and another 14 using militant strategies short of armed violence (see Appendix tables 2 and 3). Most are in democratic or quasi-democratic states and have little risk of escalating to armed conflict. The most worrisome of these conflicts involve the people of Western Cameroon, Tibetans and Mongols in China, Papuans and Dyaks in Indonesia, and Sindhis and Sarakis in Pakistan. None is a hot war at this writing (November 2000) but the protagonists are using or advocating provocative tactics against governments with a track record of repression. The Tibetans get lots of international attention, the others very little. International attention usually encourages autonomy-minded people to work for constructive solutions and discourages governments from cracking down on them. In the absence of international attention, the peoples flagged here are the most likely protagonists and victims of new separatist wars in the early years of the 21st century.

Many post-communist countries established democratic regimes in the early 1990s, continuing a global shift toward democracy that had begun in Spain, Portugal, and much of Latin America in the late 1970s. As recently as 1978 autocracies outnumbered democracies by more than two to one (counting only countries with populations greater than 500,000). By 1994 the ratio was reversed, with 80 democracies compared to less than 40 autocracies. Figure 7 shows the trends in numbers of democracies, autocracies, and transitional polities from 1946 through 1999.

Figure 7. Global Trends in Democratic, Autocratic, and Transitional Regimes 1946–1999



Defining Democracy and Autocracy: "Democracy" and "autocracy" are ambiguous words. We rated the level of democracy and autocracy for each country and year using zero-to-ten indicators created from coded information on political institutions.[4] A perfect "10" democracy like Canada and Costa Rica has institutionalized procedures for open and competitive political participation; chooses chief executives in competitive elections; and imposes substantial limits on the powers of the chief executive. Countries with democracy scores of 6 to 10 are counted as democracies in figure 8. Democracies that fall short of a perfect 10, like Bulgaria, Brazil, and Bangladesh, usually have fewer limits on executive power and some restrictions on political participation.

4 The Polity data set has annually coded information on the political institutions of all independent countries from 1800 through 1999 and is regularly updated by the second author of this report. The data set is available at http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscr/polity. The indicators are described and analyzed by Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr in "Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data," *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 31 No. 4,(1995), pp. 469-482. Civil and political rights are not built into the indicators, but — for years when they have been reported — are consistently correlated with them.

In a perfect "10" autocracy, by contrast, citizens' participation is sharply restricted or suppressed; chief executives are selected within the political elite; and, once in office, chief executives exercise power with few or no institutional constraints. Iraq, Cuba, and North Korea are near-perfect autocracies. Countries with autocracy scores of 6 to 10 are counted as autocracies in figure 7. China, Egypt, and Zimbabwe are examples of autocracies that allow some space for political participation, or impose some limits on executive authority.

Many polities have a mix of democratic and autocratic features, [but] few countries have stayed in the transition zone for long. Most can be expected to continue to shift either to full democracy or back toward full autocracy.

Many polities have a mix of democratic and autocratic features, for example holding competitive elections for a legislature that exercises no effective control on the executive branch. Some such countries are now in the middle of a staged transition from autocracy toward democracy, as in Jordan, Ghana, and Tanzania. Others tried democracy but then, often in response to crises, shifted partway back to autocracy, as in Malaysia, Congo-Brazzaville, and Peru. Figure 7 shows that 40 such transitional polities existed in 1999, a number that grew throughout the 1990s. Few countries have stayed in the transition zone for long. Most can be expected to continue to shift either to full democracy or back toward full autocracy. Some, like Turkey, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Thailand have oscillated back and forth. A handful have devised a stable mix of democratic and autocratic features—more than 20 years without instability — including Senegal, Malaysia, and Singapore.

Democracy and Peace-Building: Building and maintaining social peace and security depends fundamentally on the characteristics of polities. Autocratic governments manage societal conflicts mainly by coercion, with accommodation and reform playing secondary roles. Democratic governments manage societal conflicts mainly by channeling them into conventional politics. When divisive ethnic and political issues do surface in democracies, they usually are expressed in protest rather than rebellion and often culminate in reformist policies. Transitional polities are far more likely than autocracies or democracies to be challenged by armed conflict, and are less likely able either to repress or settle it.

Two kinds of evidence highlight the connection between type of polity and political security. First, we have calculated the average annual risk of armed political or ethnic conflict for each of the three types of polity from 1955 through 1999. We asked two questions. First, how common was ongoing violent conflict in a country with each type of polity? Second, what were the risks that a violent conflict would break out in a given year in these groups of countries?[5] These results show that democracies have had substantially less violent conflict than autocracies and that autocracies have been less violent than transitional regimes.

- Democratic polities had ongoing violent conflict in an average of 9 of every 100 years and less than one chance in 100 of a new outbreak of violent conflict in any given year.

- Autocratic polities had ongoing violent conflict in 15 of 100 years and two chances in 100 of a new outbreak of violent conflict in any given year.

- Transitional polities had ongoing violent conflicts in 21 of 100 years and 4 to 5 chances in 100 of a new outbreak of violent conflict in any given year.

The second set of evidence comes from analysis of the self-determination movements cataloged in Appendix tables 2 and 3. Democracies have a better track record at negotiating an end to wars of self-determination than autocracies.[6] Between 1955 and 2000 eight wars for self-determination began in and led to negotiated settlements in democracies, for example in the UK (Northern Ireland), Moldova, Papua-New Guinea, and India—which reached agreements with a number of groups. In addition, eleven self-determination wars began in autocracies and were settled by negotiations after the country transitioned to full or partial democracy, for example in Spain, Ethiopia, Mali, Philippines, and Bangladesh. By contrast, only six self-determination wars began in and were settled by autocratic governments, the examples here including Burma, Niger, and Djibouti.

Democracies are just as susceptible to self-determination movements as are other types of regimes. In the year 2000 one-third of all democracies (27 of 83) had active movements for self-determination, about the same proportion as the transitional and autocratic countries combined (22 of 73). However, self-determination movements in democracies are more likely to use conventional political strategies than rebellion. Only seven democracies had armed self-determination conflicts in 2000 compared with ten in transitional and autocratic countries.

…democracies have had substantially less violent conflict than autocracies and …autocracies have been less violent than transitional regimes.

5 The calculations use historical data from the State Failure Task Force's roster of major episodes of violent conflict (available at http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscr/stfail) and the Polity study's historical data on democratic, autocratic, and transitional polities (see note 4 above). All country years during 1955-1999 were pooled according to the type of regime. Then for each country year in each pool we determined (a) whether an ethnic or political war, or a genocide or politicide, was underway and (b) whether a new conflict of any of these types began. The text reports the proportion of country years in each pool with ongoing and new wars.

6 We count as negotiated settlements those listed in Appendix table 2 as having contested, uncontested, and implemented agreements plus six other conflicts in which negotiations contributed to de-escalation during the 1990s: Israel/Palestine, the Philippines (Igorots), Ethiopia (Somalis, Oromo), and India (Bodos, Nagas). Settlements that failed in the longer run, for example between southerners and the Sudanese government in 1972, and between Tripuras and the government of India (1972) are not counted.

6. POLICY IMPLICATIONS:
Toward a Sustainable World Order of Peaceful and Democratic Societies

The positive message is that the world is substantially more peaceful now than it was a decade ago. The cautionary message is that these positive trends can easily reverse.

This report has a double message for those who make and analyze international policies for building peaceful, prosperous, and democratic societies. The positive message is that the world is substantially more peaceful now than it was a decade ago. The evidence is consistent. Democracy and democratic settlements of separatist and other conflicts are up, numbers and magnitudes of armed conflicts are moving down. The world system has changed since the Cold War ended in ways that make all armed conflicts, and especially conflicts within states, more susceptible to management.

The cautionary message is that these positive trends can easily reverse. Clusters of protracted societal conflicts persist in Asia and Africa. The Peace and Conflict Ledger flags 33 countries, mostly in Africa and in Central and Southeast Asia, that have a volatile mix of high conflict risks and limited capacity to deal constructively with those risks. If the leaders of international organizations and influential states avoid or withdraw from engagement in these situations, conflicts are likely to persist and spread. Another 46 yellow-flagged countries are in transition, with a mix of positive and negative factors that could push them into crisis and instability.

This report provides general evidence of recent successes in democratization and the settlement of violent societal conflicts that should sustain future efforts at peace-making. But international engagement is no guarantee of successful conflict management. Most ongoing societal conflicts have been a long time underway—seventeen years is the median—and may endure many more years in spite of concerted efforts to contain them.

Three groups of countries are singled out for special attention based on their profiles in the Peace and Conflict Ledger. First are a half dozen "surprising successes." These are Third world states like Bangladesh and Benin which, despite limited resources and turbulent neighborhoods, are stable and conflict-free democracies. Their governments deserve redoubled international support to ensure that they continue to beat the odds.

Fifteen countries in "risky transitions" also are flagged. These are countries like Russia, Bosnia, Lebanon, Jordan, and Ghana whose high risks of political instability are offset by positive ratings on indicators of peace-building capacity. They have fair to good resources, live in so-so neighborhoods, and have contained or avoided most armed societal conflicts. The states in risky transition includes European and Middle Eastern countries whose stability has been a major policy concern for the U.S. and West European powers. As a group they need substantial future political, economic, and sometimes military investment to sustain gains already made. If the West disengages the risks increase that quasi-democratic governments will shift toward autocracy, armed societal conflicts will escalate, and regional security will deteriorate.

Some red-flagged countries are so resistant to efforts to contain conflict or to promote better governance that triage is an international policy option. Afghanistan, Congo-Kinshasha, and Burundi are examples of countries that might be written off, whatever the humanitarian and political costs. Instead of triage we propose a three-step mix of

containment to check war-making capacity, low-key diplomatic and humanitarian *engagement*, and *assistance to neighboring states* that helps protect them against spillover effects. In the longer run international actors who have engaged in crisis situations in these ways are positioned to seize advantage of openings in which a cease fire may be brokered or a political settlement promoted.

The global trends away from armed conflict, toward democratic governance, and the negotiated settlement of societal conflicts are the result of sustained and coordinated efforts to make them happen. The end of the Cold War freed up political energies and material resources that have been devoted to institutional reform and constructive management of conflicts. The United States is not the only or most indispensable player in this process. Democratization and conflict management begin with civil society, reinforced by political and material support from international and regional bodies, the U.S. and European states, and non-governmental organizations. Some 30 of the world's countries remain in crisis and more than 40 others are in transition. Continued international engagement and support is essential to sustain the positive trends and to keep transitional states from reverting to autocracy and armed conflict.

We propose a three-step mix of containment, engagement, and assistance to neighboring states.

Table 3. Major Armed Societal Conflicts 1995-2000

This table identifies all instances of major armed conflicts within states being fought at any time between 1995 and 2000. It is derived from the list of Major Episodes of Political Violence compiled by the Center for Systemic Peace (CSP), which provides general magnitude scores for all major armed conflicts since 1946 (the same magnitude scores used to construct global trends graphs in text figures 1, 2, 4 and 5). The full list can be referenced at the CSP Web page: http://members.aol.com/cspmgm/warlist.htm.

Conflict Type and Magnitude Scores: Armed conflicts are categorized as Ethnic, Political, and/or Interstate. The challenging group(s) in ethnic conflicts are identified in parentheses following Conflict Type. General magnitude scores are provided for each episode listed. The magnitude numbers listed represent a scaled, categorical indicator of the destructive impact of the violent episode on the directly-affected society, similar to that used to gauge the destructive potential of storms and earthquakes. The scale ranges from 1 (low damage and limited scope) to 10 (total destruction). Magnitude scores reflect the widest range of warfare's consequences to both short-term and long-term societal well-being, including direct and indirect deaths and injuries; sexual and economic predation; population dislocations; damage to cooperative social enterprises and networks; diminished environmental quality, general health, and quality of life; destruction of capital infrastructure; diversion of scarce resources; and loss of capacity, confidence, and future potential. The magnitude scores are considered to be consistently assigned across episodes and types of warfare and for all societies directly affected by the violence, thereby facilitating comparisons of war episodes. A detailed explanation of the categorical magnitude scores is provided on the CSP Web page: http://members.aol. com/cspmgm/warcode.htm. If a societal conflict is linked to an armed interstate conflict, that conflict and its magnitude are identified in italics at the end of the listing.

Current Status of the armed conflict was assessed as of November 7, 2000. **Ongoing** armed conflicts involve active, coordinated military operations and are further assessed as high, medium, or low intensity (in parentheses).[1] **Sporadic** indicates that occasional militant clashes or terrorist incidents occur but there is no evidence of sustained challenges. **Repressed** indicates that sufficient armed force has been deployed to contain serious challenges by the opposition despite the fact that the underlying source of the conflict remains serious and unresolved. **Suspended** indicates that serious armed conflict has been suspended for a substantial period due to stalemate, ceasefire, or peace settlement. Suspended status may be qualified as tenuous (in parentheses) if substantial numbers of armed fighters on either side have rejected or ignored the terms of the suspension but are not now openly challenging the peace with serious attacks.

SOCIALIST BLOC SUCCESSOR STATES

Albania — Political / *Magnitude: 2*

Suspended: Political turmoil largely ended in mid-1997 as the situation in Albania was over-shadowed by worsening conditions and warfare in neighboring Kosovo. Albania seized the opportunity presented by the war and the increased attention of the West to improve its meager prospects. Factionalism should remain defused as long as NATO forces remain in Kosovo.

Azerbaijan — Ethnic (Armenians) / *Magnitude: 3*

Suspended (Tenuous): A 1994 cease-fire with the ethnic-Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh led to a 1997 stalemate and resulted in de facto autonomy for the region (and a declaration of independence) that has not been accepted by Azerbaijan. Armenia retains control of territory linking it with the enclave; Azerbaijan (with support from Turkey) maintains an oil embargo and partial blockade of neighboring Armenia. *Interstate war (Armenia); magnitude: 3.*

Bosnia — Ethnic (Croats, Muslims, Serbs) / *Magnitude: 6*

Suspended: The war in Bosnia ended with the 1996 Dayton Accords and NATO enforcement of a de facto separation of ethnic enclaves; de facto arrangements contradict de jure expectations. There is some evidence that tensions are lessening but little evidence of a requisite, general acceptance of the terms for a permanent settlement. Future of Bosnia is linked with neighboring, unsettled situations in Kosovo, Croatia, Albania, the Montenegrin and Serbian regions of Yugoslavia.

Croatia — Ethnic (Serbs) / *Magnitude: 3*

Suspended: No major incidents since 1995 Croat offensive against Serbs in the Krajina region; the bulk of refugees are Serbs from Slavonia. A political transition following the December 1999 death of Croatia's fervent nationalist, President Tudjman, may help to lessen tensions in the area.

Georgia — Ethnic (Abkhaz) / *Magnitude: 1*

Suspended (Tenuous): Abkhazia enjoys a de facto autonomy that is tolerated, but not accepted by the Georgia regime. In May 1998, Abkhazians drove ethnic-Georgians out of disputed territories; the Georgian government chose not to respond militarily to the provocation at that time. A ceasefire was signed on May 30, 1998, but no peace accord has been formulated. The standoff remains unsettled.

Moldova — Ethnic (Trans-Dneister Slavs) / *Magnitude: 1*

Suspended: Fighting ended in 1997 with de facto autonomy for Trans-Dneister region. Subsequent negotiations have not resolved autonomy issues.

Russia — Ethnic (Chechens) / *Magnitude: 4*

Ongoing (Low): Attempts by Chechen guerrillas to extend their control into the neighboring Dagestan province in August 1999 rekindled serious warfare that had been suspended in a standoff

in 1996. Terrorist attacks in Moscow and other cities were linked to the fighting around Chechnya. Intense aerial bombardment and fighting by ground forces drives Chechen rebels into mountain strongholds. Russian forces occupy relatively flat terrain in northern areas and rely on a strong military presence to contain and subdue Chechen militants in mountain strongholds. Having been forced to retreat from urban areas, the fighters continue guerrilla tactics and terrorist attacks against authorities.

Tajikistan Political / *Magnitude: 3*

Suspended (Tenuous): Most of the fighting ended with the 1997 peace accord; some continuing spillover from fighting by ethnic Tajiks in neighboring Afghanistan. Although the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) is reported to have failed to comply with its promised disarmament there is no evidence of a concerted UTO challenge to the central regime; in 1999 an armed band crossed from Tajikistan into neighboring Kyrgyzstan and created a serious confrontation in that country. Russia has increased its support in the area and there is increased security cooperation among Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan in response to spillover effects from the worsening situation in neighboring Afghanistan.

Yugoslavia Ethnic (Kosovar Albanians) / *Magnitude: 4*

Suspended: NATO forces used air superiority to drive the Yugoslavian Army from Kosovo and force acceptance of a settlement. NATO/UN forces continue to monitor and enforce a transitional regime in Kosovo. No resolution of disputed sovereignty issues. Ongoing confrontations between ethnic-Serbs and Kosovar Albanians in Kosovo proper and between ethnic-Albanian insurgents and the Yugoslavian Army in border regions continue to challenge post-war settlement. The October 2000 electoral ouster of Milosevic and subsequent election of moderates in Kosovo may signal opportunities for defusing regional tensions. *Interstate war (NATO); magnitude: 3.*

EAST, SOUTH, AND CENTRAL ASIA

Afghanistan Ethnic (Non-Pushtuns) / *Magnitude: 7*

Ongoing (High): The Taliban regime has established control over 90% of the country's territory but has not yet suppressed resistance from enclaves in the north and east held Uzbek and Tajik-based movements—no attempts at reconciliation. Evidence of serious spillover effects, including armed clashes, in neighboring countries: Iran, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. International sanctions against the ultra-conservative Taliban regime have weakened the regime but have not lessened its grip on Afghan society.

Bangladesh Ethnic (Chittagong Hills) / *Magnitude: 2*

Suspended: December 1997 peace agreement with Shanti Bahini (Chakma) rebels ended armed conflict but has not redressed many of the issues that characterized the conflict, including adverse living conditions and encroachments by Bengali settlers in tribal areas.

Burma (Myanmar) Ethnic (Non-Burmans) / *Magnitude: 4*

Ongoing (Low): The State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) military regime has shown no sign of accepting either greater civilian rule, ethnic accommodation, or power-sharing. However armed opposition to the regime has weakened considerably since government offensives overran Karen strongholds in 1995 and forced the Shan-dominated Mong Tai Army to surrender in 1996. Confrontations are largely avoided, except when government forces enter ethnic enclaves (e.g., a preemptive attack on the Karenni in June 1999 and agovernment offensive against KNU in November 1999). Authorities have reneged on promises (e.g., execution of Karen hostages in March 1999; the forcible relocation of 300,000 Shan in May 1999) and have not restrained the drug trade (now controlled mainly by the United Wa State Army). Efforts to link ethnic opposition in the periphery with the (repressed) political opposition in the center have been unsuccessful.

Cambodia Political / *Magnitude: 2*

Suspended: Remnants of the Khmer Rouge have resisted UN-sponsored reconciliation; government forces have reestablished control over borderlands. A new coalition government involving the main rivals for state power, formed in November 1998 (following the 1997 coup), signals a willingness to stabilize the country in its recovery from years of devastating armed conflict and violence.

China Ethnic (Uighurs) / *Magnitude: 2*

Repressed: Tensions continue to run high in China's Xinjiang province since ethnic riots rocked the region in 1996-97. Strong repression prevents open conflict in the region; Amnesty International reports that about 200 have been executed for separatist activity over the past two years.

India Ethnic (Kashmiris) / *Magnitude: 3*

Ongoing (Medium): India appears to have regained the advantage in mid-1999 following a serious assault by Kashmiri insurgents and Pakistani supporters in the Kargil area. The Indian army's counter-offensive led to serious cross-border shelling and air incursions between Indian and Pakistan forces (May-September). International pressure to defuse the confrontation led to Pakistan's civilian government's withdrawal of military support for resistance in the Kargil area. The Pakistani Army's unwavering support for armed struggle in Kashmir contributed to an October 1999 coup in Pakistan and in November 1999 tensions once-again increased as Pakistan reiterated its support for the Kashmir conflict and clashed with Indian troops. *Interstate war (Pakistan); magnitude: 1.*

India Ethnic (NE Tribals) / *Magnitude: 2*

Sporadic: Assamese, Bodo, Santhal, Reang, Zomi/Paite, Kuki, Naga, Mizo, Chakma, Bengali, Naxalites, Nepali, Tripura, and Manipur peoples have, at various times, been identified with separatist activity and anti-regime or inter-communal violence in northeast India. The most active groups at present are the Tripura, Bodo, and Assamese who are fighting Bengali migration into their traditional territories. No evidence of coordination among ethnic factions; no sustained challenges in 2000.

Indonesia Ethnic (Moluccas) / *Magnitude: 1*

Ongoing (Low): Muslim-Christian communal rioting erupted in Ambon in January 1999. Local tensions escalated into communal warfare as (Muslim) Laskar Jihad militias converged on the Moluccas islands. President Wahid declared a civil emergency in June 1999 but the Indonesian Army forces failed to stop the rampages. Over 3,000 people have been killed since the fighting began.

Indonesia — Ethnic (Aceh) / *Magnitude: 1*

Sporadic: Separatist activity led by GAM in Aceh accompanied the general increase in anti-regime activity directed against the Suharto and successor Habibie regimes in 1998. The election of President Wahid led to a cease-fire and regional autonomy agreements with Aceh province. A negotiated truce enforced by some 30,000 Indonesian troops has been in place since May, 2000; regional autonomy is slated for implementation on January 1, 2001.

Indonesia — Ethnic (East Timor) / *Magnitude: 2*

Suspended (Tenuous): Rampages by local militias against pro-independence residents in East Timor focused on the August 30, 1999 independence referendum were tolerated by the Indonesian Army, prompting a UN Security Council mandate for an external peacemaking force in mid-September 1999. Although the Indonesian government and army acquiesced to international pressure and allowed the peacemakers entry to East Timor, pro-Indonesian militias originally formed in East Timor continue to operate and terrorize refugees in camps in neighboring West Timor. International peacekeepers found massive destruction of infrastructure but little direct evidence of mass killings. Reconstruction has been hampered by militia attacks from West Timor.

Nepal — Political / *Magnitude: 1*

Ongoing (Low): Militants associated with the United People's Front (UPF) lead a peasant-based insurgency, or "People's War," that began in February 1996 in the midwestern region and challenges the liberalizing regime of one of Asia's poorest countries.

Philippines — Ethnic (Moro) / *Magnitude: 3*

Ongoing (Low): A peace agreement between the government and the Moro National Liberation Front in September 1996 created an Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and largely ended the insurgency there. However, a splinter group calling itself the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) vowed to continue the fight for independence. Peace talks were scheduled for October 1999 but renewed demands for independence in the wake of the East Timor referendum have led to increased tensions and postponement of elections in the ARMM. A recent spate of kidnapping by the Abu Sayaff faction triggered a major government offensive in late 2000.

Philippines — Political / *Magnitude: 3*

Sporadic: Hostilities have been increasing between the New People's Army (NPA) and Philippines government since long-running peace talks were terminated in May 1999. Recent activity has been centered in northern Mindanao; since June 2000 there have been reports of cooperation between NPA and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

Pakistan — Ethnic (Sindhis; Muhajirs) / *Magnitude: 1*

Repressed: There are no reports of serious fighting between ethnic-Sindhis or Muhajirs with Pakistani authorities since federal rule was imposed on Sind province in November 1998. Very recent reports detail serious factional fighting within the Mutahida Qaumi Movement (Muhajir) centered in Karachi.

Papua New Guinea — Ethnic (Bougainville) / *Magnitude: 1*

Suspended: Residents of the island of Bougainville began a separatist rebellion in response to government encroachments in1989. A permanent ceasefire agreement was signed on April 30, 1998; a multinational peace monitoring group led by Australia was put in place to oversee the implementation of a plan for increased autonomy for the region.

Sri Lanka — Ethnic (Tamils) / *Magnitude: 5*

Ongoing (High): A peace proposal drafted in 1995 granting regional autonomy to Tamil controlled areas has been stymied by opposition within both the majority-Sinhala and minority-Tamil communities. Moderates in both camps have been targeted with violence by more radical elements for collaboration with the enemy leaving little prospect for peace initiatives arising from within the warring groups. Serious fighting continues; no places or persons are secure from military or terrorist attack. Late 2000 country-wide elections failed to provide a necessary majority for pro-autonomy politicians hoping to defuse the protracted conflict.

NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Algeria — Political / *Magnitude: 4*

Sporadic: Strong overtures by the military regime in conducting a referendum on the future of Algeria and a general amnesty for Islamic militants hopefully signal an end to the fighting. Large numbers of rebel fighters have accepted the amnesty offer; government offensives against holdouts have further reduced the activities of radical militants.

Egypt — Political / *Magnitude: 1*

Repressed: There were no reports of serious fighting between Islamicists and Egyptian authorities in 1999. Widespread arrests of activists in 1999 coincided with the March 1999 renunciation of violence by the Gamaat-i-Islamiya (Egypt's largest resistance group). The Islamic Jihad continues to resist but has been driven underground.

Iraq — Ethnic (Shi'i) / *Magnitude: 3*

Repressed: Tension remains high in the majority-Shi'i areas of southern Iraq where, following a brief uprising in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, strong and systematic Iraqi repression has managed to check Shi'i opposition since 1998.

Iraq — Ethnic (Kurds) / *Magnitude: 1*

Suspended (Tenuous): U.S. and British warplanes flying out of bases in Turkey continue to patrol the northern "no-fly zone" established in 1991 following Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War. The intervention has created a de facto autonomous Kurdistan in Iraq where episodic fighting has occurred between rival factions, including the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) vs. the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the KDP vs. the Turkish-based Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Iraqi government forces allied with the KDP against the PUK to control an outbreak of fighting in 1996. The status quo in northern Iraq depends on continued Western enforcement of the no-fly zone; recent Iraqi troop movements in the north signal the government's intent to reestablish its authority in the northern territories.

Israel/Palestine — Ethnic (Palestinians) / *Magnitude: 1*

Ongoing (Low): The 1998 Wye River accords provided an opportunity for defusing the long-standing dispute between

Palestinians and Israelis concerning territorial sovereignty issues regarding the (1967) Occupied Territories and stemming back to the 1948 UN mandate regarding the future of Palestine. Tensions have simmered over delays in implementation of the accords with the Palestine Liberation Organization threatening to declare independence for Palestine since May 2000. Tensions flared over the future of East Jerusalem and ignited with a high profile, symbolic gesture by Ariel Sharon on September 29, 2000 to assert Israeli sovereignty over Temple Mount. Subsequent riots combined widespread incidents of rock-throwing mobs and sporadic firefights in the Occupied Territories that spilled over to include demonstrations by Israeli Arabs within Israel proper, threatening to derail the broader Middle East peace process. Despite intense international pressures on the Israeli government and Palestinian authorities, the disturbances continue.

Turkey — Ethnic (Kurds) / *Magnitude: 3*

Ongoing (Low): Turkey has increased its pressure on the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) since capturing its leader Abdullah Ocalan in February 1999. The PKK unilaterally declared that it would abandon armed struggle in Turkey, lay down its arms, and withdraw its armed forces from Turkey on September 1, 1999. The PKK also called for an end to its armed rivalry with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of northern Iraq. The Turkish government rejected the initiative and has continued its attacks on PKK positions both within Turkey and in Iraq (there have also been reports of cross-border attacks by Turkey in Iran). There was no evidence through late 2000 that policies of cultural accommodation of the Kurdish population were being implemented.

AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA

Angola — Political / *Magnitude: 6*

Ongoing (High): Despite a UN brokered peace accord in 1997, UNITA forces under Jonas Savimbi renewed the war in Angola in late 1998, seizing a majority of the rural areas and mounting sporadic attacks on urban areas under the control of the MPLA. Government forces made substantial gains against rebel forces in 1999 and 2000, driving the rebels to border areas and causing spillover problems in neighboring countries.

Burundi — Ethnic (Hutu) / *Magnitude: 4*

Ongoing (Medium): An insurgency led by the Palipehutu and the CNDD-FDD, operating partly from base areas in neighboring Congo-Kinshasa, continues to plague Burundi despite concerted efforts to gain resolution. Intense international pressure to negotiate a settlement resulted in the August 28, 2000, Arusha Accords, but the refusal of the two main rebel groups to accept the terms leaves the settlement in doubt.

Chad — Political/Ethnic (Toubou) / *Magnitude: 4*

Sporadic: Peace concluded in 1996 continues to be hampered by a low-intensity insurgency by Goukouni and Weddeyye rebels and the ethnic-Toubou based Movement for Democracy and Justice.

Comoros — Political / *Magnitude: 1*

Sporadic: Fighting erupted in September 1999 in the capital city of the secessionist island of Anjouan. Leaders of Anjouan had declared their independence in August 1997 and their decision was backed by a October 1997 referendum. Previous clashes occurred in September 1997 and December 1998. On April 30, 1999, Army Chief of Staff Col. Assoumani Azzali seized power in a coup and dissolved the constitution and the government; a promised transition and new elections based on the Antananarivo agreement have not materialized.

Congo-Brazzaville — Political/Ethnic (Ninja) / *Magnitude: 3*

Suspended (Tenuous): Fighting began on June 5, 1997, as government forces attacked opposition leader Nguesso's residence. Nguesso's forces ousted President Lissouba in October 1997. Ninja rebels backing Lissouba renewed open warfare in late 1998; heavy fighting continued through September 1999. The Pointe-Noire Peace Agreement was signed on November 16, 1999, by Ninja, Cobra, and Southern Resistance groups. The negotiated cease-fire has been respected by all parties and national reconciliation talks are planned for late 2000 to seek a permanent settlement.

Congo-Kinshasa — Political/Ethnic/International / *Magnitude: 5*

Ongoing (High): Fighting continues in many areas of eastern Congo despite the August 31, 1999, signing of the Lusaka peace accord by the warring factions and their foreign supporters. Most issues of disagreement among the many factions remain unresolved. Negotiations continue; continued outbreaks of fighting are likely unless and until a substantive agreement is reached. Most serious fighting in 2000 involved Ugandan and Rwandan forces fighting for control of the Kisangani diamond trade. The territory under central government authority continues to dwindle.

Ethiopia — Ethnic (Oromo) / *Magnitude: 1*

Suspended (Tenuous): A simmering border dispute with Eritrea erupted in interstate warfare in May 1998 and intensified dramatically in early 1999 and again in May 2000. Ethiopia was also fighting with multiple Oromo ethnic factions, including the Oromo Liberation Front, the United Oromo Peoples Liberation Front or Tokuchuma, the Al Ittihad, and the Islamic Oromo Liberation Front. Oromo resistance escalated in February 1999 as fighters tried to take advantage of the Eritrean war and again in May 1999 as Oromo factions gained support from Eritrea channeled through the Aideed faction in Somalia. A brokered ceasefire in border war with Eritrea in June 2000 has held through October but may break down when the dry season begins. *Interstate (Eritrea); magnitude: 5.*

Guinea-Bissau — Political / *Magnitude: 2*

Suspended (Tenuous): A January 1999 ceasefire was broken in February. On May 7, President Vieira and his PAIGC government were ousted by rebel factions led by Gen. Mane. Serious clashes were reported in September 1999 but new elections proceeded in late 1999 without serious disruption. While no serious fighting has been reported in 2000, economic recovery presents a daunting challenge for newly elected President Iala.

Lesotho — Political / *Magnitude: 1*

Suspended (Tenuous): Mass protests in the wake of controversial elections in May 1998 were joined by government officials and military officers in September. Central authority failed and South African troops imposed order. New elections were proposed within 18 months but have been delayed due to strong disagreements over future arrangements.

Liberia Political/Ethnic (Krahn) / *Magnitude: 4*

Sporadic: The ECOWAS-brokered peace agreement of August 1997 largely ended the civil war in Liberia but has not led to reconciliation among all warring factions. Fighting erupted in Monrovia in 1998 and another outbreak was recorded in northern Lofa County in August 1999. Armed rebels of the ethnic-Krahn based Ulimo (United Liberation Movement) headed by Roosevelt Johnson continue to oppose the government led by Charles Taylor. Incursions by rebels based in Guinea have increased tensions between Liberia and Guinea.

Niger Ethnic (Tuareg) / *Magnitude: 1*

Suspended: The Peace Accord of April 1995 was augmented by a September 1997 peace agreement that ended the Tuareg rebellion.

Nigeria Communal / *Magnitude: 1*

Ongoing (Low): Nigeria is beset by inter-communal clashes, especially concerning oil revenues in the Delta region, the status of Islamic law in the north, and southern resentment against northerners. Among the more serious communal clashes reported through October 2000 were those pitting Ilaje with Ijaw, Chemba-Jukun with Kuteb, Yoruba with Hausa, and Ijaw and Urhobo with Itsekeri. Serious communal clashes involving Christian Yoruba and Muslim Hausa in and around Kaduna in October led to a declaration of a state of emergency and outlawing the Odua People's Congress.

Rwanda Ethnic (Hutu) / *Magnitude: 3*

Sporadic: Tutsi rebels seized control of the government in 1994 following a massive genocide aimed at ethnic-Tutsis and moderate Hutus. Hutu factions responsible for the 1994 genocide, the Interahamwe, were driven (and pursued) into neighboring regions, mainly Congo-Kinshasa and Uganda. A low-intensity insurgency led by the PALIR (Armed People for the Liberation of Rwanda) is manifest in sporadic attacks in the northwest province from cross-border havens.

Senegal Ethnic (Casamance) / *Magnitude: 1*

Sporadic: Talks opened in June 1999 among separatist factions in the Casamance region who sought to establish a united front before reopening negotiations with the Senegalese government following 17 years of conflict. Government talks with Movement of Casamance Democratic Forces (MFDC) produced a December 1999 ceasefire. Newly elected President Wade (March 2000) made peace in Casamance a priority. Minor clashes by rebels based in Guinea-Bissau were reported in April 2000.

Sierra Leone Political/Ethnic (Mandingo) / *Magnitude: 3*

Ongoing (Medium): The Lome Agreement was signed by the warring factions on July 7, 1999, but many Revolutionary United Front (RUF) forces refused to disarm and continue to control the interior, including diamond mines. Numerous clashes have been reported since the peace agreement was implemented; serious fighting was renewed in early 2000. Spillover effects have led to increased tensions in neighboring Guinea and clashes involving Guinean and Liberian forces.

Somalia Political / *Magnitude: 5*

Sporadic: While the autonomous northern regions enjoy relative tranquility, the south and central regions of Somalia continue to be torn by factional fighting among rival clans and war lords. There has been no central government since the collapse of the Barre regime in 1991, although stable governments have been established in Puntland and Somaliland. A new parliament was formed in September 2000 as a result of negotiations among Somali clan and political leaders held in neighboring Djibouti. Some clans have vowed to resist the reestablishment of central governance.

Sudan Ethnic (southern Africans) / *Magnitude: 6*

Ongoing (High): The government has made several overtures that, ostensibly, indicate a willingness to consider reconciliation. But its actions are overshadowed by a history of similar, unfulfilled promises. Direct confrontations between government and rebel forces are largely avoided, except in regard to security of the new 1,600 km oil pipeline carrying oil from the Helig area of central Sudan to the Red Sea port. Government forces continue their stranglehold on the well-being of the south, keeping most southerners in a perpetual humanitarian crisis.

Uganda Political/Ethnic (Langi and Acholi) / *Magnitude: 1*

Sporadic: Continuing insurgencies involving ethnic Langi and Acholi peoples are linked to armed conflicts in neighboring Sudan, Rwanda, and Congo-Kinshasa. The Sudanese government has long been accused of supporting the Lord's Resistance Army and Allied Democratic Forces in response to Uganda's support for the SPLA in Sudan. An agreement between Uganda and Sudan (the Nairobi Accords) in December 1999 lessened rebel activity on both sides of the border but tensions increased again in May 2000.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Colombia Political / *Magnitude: 4*

Ongoing (Medium): Paramilitary (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, AUC) and rebel factions (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC; National Liberation Army, ELN) continue to fight over control of the Colombian hinterland, and with it, the spoils of the very lucrative drug-trade. The regular Colombian Army has little chance of regaining control of these regions because, even with new U.S. assistance, it cannot compete with the resources available to the drug lords. President Pastrana persists in long-term negotiations to reach a political settlement with FARC despite opposition from the AUC.

Guatemala Political/Ethnic (Maya) / *Magnitude: 5*

Suspended: Armed conflict ended with a negotiated settlement in December 1996.

Peru Political/Ethnic (Indigenous) / *Magnitude: 3*

Repressed: Peruvian armed forces offensives greatly weakened the Sendero Luminoso revolutionary movement and it has not posed a serious challenge to the central government since mid-1997.

1 *The "intensity" designation of armed conflicts differs from the more general "magnitude" measures, both of which are listed in Table 3, and from the level of "hostilities" noted in Table 4 that follows.* ***Intensity*** *refers to the tenor of actual armed conflicts in late 2000;* ***magnitude*** *refers to the general societal effects of a armed conflict episode over its entire course;* ***hostilities*** *refer to the general, operational strategies of conflict interaction (see pp. 13-14).*

Table 4. Armed Self-Determination Conflicts and their Outcomes 1955-2000

Group and Country	Armed Conflict	Current Phase	Status in Fall 2000
Western Democracies and Japan			
Basques in Spain	1959-80	Contested agreement 1979	Settled: Basque parties control regional govenrment but ETA rebels end talks and year-old ceasefire in December 1999, resume violence.
Catholics in Northern Ireland	1969-94	Contested agreement 1998	Settled: Implementation of peace agreement proceeding; regional government created, initial reforms to police forces; key issues remaining include IRA disarmament.
Corsicans in France	1976-present	Militant politics since 1976	Ongoing: Some nationalists violently oppose limited autonomy proposal approved by the regional assembly in July 2000.
The Socialist Bloc and Successor States			
Armenians in Azerbaijan	1988-97	Cessation of open hostilities since 1997	Contained: OSCE-led negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan continue; de facto autonomy of Nagarno-Karabakh.
Croats in Yugoslavia	1991	Independence	Settled: Independent since 1991.
Slovenes in Yugoslavia	1991	Independence	Settled: Independent since 1991.
Gaguaz in Moldova	1991-92	Implemented agreement 1994	Settled: Autonomous region created in 1995; regional elections held and rebels join armed forces.
South Ossetians in Georgia	1991-93	Cessation of open hostilities since 1993	Contained: Some agreements reached on economic development and refugee return; region's political status still subject to negotiations.
Serbs in Croatia	1991-95	Conventional politics since 1996	Contained: Most Serbs who fled fighting in the early 1990s remain refugees; others participate in post-Tudjman democratic politics.
Trans-Dniester Slavs in Moldova	1991-97	Contested agreement 1997	Contained: Regional government opposes 1999 agreement for withdrawal of Russian troops by 2002; status of region still subject to negotiation.
Chechens in Russia	1991-present	High-level hostilities since 1999	Ongoing: Resumption of armed conflict in 1999 as Russia launches major offensive against Islamicists.
Serbs and Croats in Bosnia	1992-95	Contested agreement 1995	Both settled: Creation of confederal Bosnian state; local and national elections held 1996-2000; many refugees remain internally and externally displaced.
Abkhaz in Georgia	1992-93, 1998	Cessation of open hostilities since 1998	Contained: Negotiations continue on the region's political status and the return of Georgian refugees; UN and Russian peacekeepers remain in Abkhazia.
Kosovar Albanians in Serbia	1998-99	Cessation of open hostilities since 1999	Contained: UN administration with NATO peacekeepers since 1999; region's final status to be determined.
East, South, and Central Asia			
Hmong in Laos	1945-79 1985-96	Low-level hostilities resume in 2000	Ongoing: Long-running anti-communist insurgency re-ignites in mid-2000.
Karens in Burma	1945-present	High-level hostilities since 1949	Ongoing: Military junta rejects Karen offers to hold peace negotiations; Burmese military offensives in recent years seriously weaken Karen movement.
Karenni in Burma	1945-present	Low-level hostilities since 1995	Ongoing: Short-lived 1995 ceasefire agreement as the military resumes offensive against the Karenni.
Nagas in India 1972-96	1952-64	Cessation of open hostilities since 1997	Contained: Ceasefire and autonomy talks with major Naga factions underway since 1997. State of Nagaland created in 1963.
Tibetans in China	1959-67	Militant politics since 1996	Contained: Escalating Chinese repression in Tibet since the mid-1990s; an increasing number of Tibetan exiles favor a violent struggle.
Scheduled Tribes in India	1960-present	Low-level hostilities since 1960	Ongoing: Some tribals waging Marxist insurgency; others utilize conventional means to press for autonomy.
Kachins in Burma	1961-94	Uncontested agreement 1994	Settled: ceasefire agreement allows Kachins to retain weapons and control some areas; developmental assistance was promised.
Shan in Burma	1962-present	Low-level hostilities since 1996	Ongoing: Some Shan agreed to a 1996 ceasefire. Military junta refuses to hold talks with remaining rebel faction; major four-year suppression campaign in Shan areas continues.

Group and Country	Armed Conflict	Current Phase	Status in Fall 2000
Papuans in Indonesia	1964-96	Militant politics since 1998	Ongoing: Independence campaign — primarily in the form of protests and riots — re-ignites after Suharto's fall and East Timor referendum.
Mizos in India	1966-84	Implemented agreement 1986	Settled: Separate Mizoram state created in 1986; rebels join political process and win state elections the following year.
Tripuras in India	1967-72 1979-present	High-level hostilities since 1980	Ongoing: Separate state of Tripura created in 1972; tribal people agitating for greater autonomy as influxes of Bengali settlers reduce them to minority status.
Bengalis in Pakistan	1971	Independence	Settled: Independent since 1971.
Moros in the Philippines	1972-present	High-level hostilities since 2000	Ongoing: Former insurgents govern autonomous southern Muslim region; mid-2000 government offensive against rebel factions seeking an Islamic state deadlocks 3 years of negotiations.
Baluchis in Pakistan	1973-77	Conventional politics during periods of democratic rule	Contained: Separatist insurgency defeated; Baluchis continue to press for economic development and autonomy.
East Timorese in Indonesia	1974-99	Contested agreement 1999	Settled: UN-administered territory following 1999 pro-independence referendum and scorched-earth Indonesian withdrawal. Pro-Indonesian militias still active; many refugees remain in West Timor.
Chittagong Hill Peoples in Bangladesh	1975-96	Contested agreement 1997	Settled: Regional council created in tribal areas; former rebels join political process; development plans and withdrawal of soldiers remain key issues.
Mons in Burma	1975-97	Uncontested agreement 1995	Settled: Last rebel faction surrendered in 1997; 1995 ceasefire agreement allows Mons to retain weapons and control some areas; developmental assistance was promised.
Tamils in Sri Lanka	1975-present	High-level hostilities since 1983	Ongoing: Insurgents reject all power-sharing and autonomy proposals; rebels regain substantial northern areas lost to the government in 1995.
Igorots in the Philippines	1976-86	Conventional politics since 1994	Contained: A 1986 agreement largely ended fighting but failed ratification in a 1990 referendum.
Acehnese in Indonesia	1977-present	Talk-fight in 2000	Ongoing: Rebellion resumes in 1999 as the Acehnese demand an independence referendum modeled on East Timor; initial negotiations underway.
Sikhs in India	1978-93	Contested agreement1992	Settled: Insurgency contained by 1993; Punjabi moderates win state elections in 1992 and 1997.
Tajiks in Afghanistan	1979-92 1996-present	High-level hostilities since 1996	Ongoing: UN mediation unsuccessful as civil war against the Taliban regime persists.
Chin/Zomis in Burma	1985-93	Low-level hostilities since 1985	Ongoing: Repression reported in Chin areas; one of the few groups yet to reach a ceasefire with the junta.
Wa in Burma	1989	Contested agreement 1989	Settled: Largest Wa group continues to abide by 1989 ceasefire agreement; minor Wa factions engage in sporadic anti-state violence.
Bougainvilleans in Papua New Guinea	1989-98	Contested agreement 2000	Settled: Spring 2000 agreement provides greater autonomy along with possible future referendum on independence. Minor rebel faction remains opposed to accord.
Kashmiri Muslims in India	1989-present	High-level hostilities since 1989	Ongoing: Violence escalated in mid-1999 after India-Pakistan border clashes; Kashmiri moderates elected to regional government in 1996. Rebels and government offer to open talks in mid-2000.
Bodos in India	1989-present	Talk-fight in 2000	Contained: Limited implementation of 1993 accord that created an autonomous Bodo region within Assam. Ceasefire reached with one major rebel group extended through 2001.
Assamese in India	1990-present	High-level hostilities since 1990	Ongoing: Rebels continue campaign for independence after 1985 accord does not halt illegal immigration.
Uighers in China	1990-present	Low-level hostilities since 1990	Ongoing: Muslim Uighers want separate East Turkestan state. Widespread Chinese repression since the mid-1990s.
Rohingyas in Burma	1991-94	Contested agreement 1994	Contained: 1994 ceasefire agreement reached with major rebel faction; reports of widespread human rights abuses in Arakan province persist.

Group and Country	Armed Conflict	Current Phase	Status in Fall 2000
Muslims in Thailand	1995-98	Militant politics since 2000	Contained: Thai military crackdown, along with minor con cessions to reduce marginalization of southern Muslims, deflates movement.
Uzbeks in Afghanistan	1996-present	High-level hostilities since 1999	Ongoing: Civil war against Taliban regime continues.
North Africa and the Middle East			
Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza	1968-93	Talk-fight in 2000	Ongoing: Partial transfer of West Bank and Gaza to Palestinian control, following contested 1994 agreement. Key issues remaining include the return of Palestinian refugees, the status of Jerusalem, and Jewish settlements.
Saharawis in Morocco	1973-91	Cessation of open hostilities since 1991	Contained: UN referendum on independence repeatedly postponed by Morocco; no new date set.
Kurds in Iran	1979-94	Conventional politics since 1996	Contained: Armed rebellion suppressed in the mid-1990s; some Kurdish rebels based in northern Iraq.
Kurds in Iraq	1980-92	Cessation of open hostilities since 1997	Contained: Autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq protected by the West since 1991.
Kurds in Turkey	1984-present	Low-level hostilities since 1999	Ongoing: Arrest and trial of PKK leader Ocalan coupled with severe repression deescalate conflict.
Africa South of the Sahara			
Southerners in Sudan	1956-72 1983-present	Talk-fight in 2000	Ongoing: Rebellion which first began in 1956 resurfaces after the government abrogates a 1972 autonomy agreement and imposes Sharia law. Negotiations resume in September 2000.
Eritreans in Ethiopia	1961-91	Independence	Settled: Independent since 1993.
Somalis in Ethiopia	1963-present	Low-level hostilities since 1994	Ongoing: Some factions reject 1994 regional autonomy agreement, instead seek independence.
Ibos in Nigeria	1967-70	Conventional politics during periods of democratic rule	Contained: Secessionists defeated; reintegrated into Nigerian polity.
Oromos in Ethiopia	1973-present	Low-level hostilities since 1992	Ongoing: 1994 regional autonomy agreement rejected by some Oromo factions who seek an independent Oromia state.
Afars in Ethiopia	1975-1998	Cessation of open hostilities since 1998	Contained: Major factions declare ceasefire, agree to coop-erate with government in war against Eritrea.
Southerners in Chad	1979-86 1992-98	Uncontested agreement 1994-97	Settled: Agreements allow most factions to become political parties; some rebels integrated in army.
Nuba in Sudan	1985-present	High-level hostilities since 1985	Ongoing: Ethnic cleansing by government in Nuba areas in central Sudan; Nuba and southerners battle Islamic regime.
Isaaqs in Somalia	1986-90	Cessation of open hostilities since 1991	Contained: De facto regional independence of Somaliland since 1991.
Tuaregs in Niger	1988-97	Uncontested agreement 1995	Settled: Disarmament completed and social reintegration of former rebels underway.
Tuaregs in Mali	1990-95	Uncontested agreement 1995	Settled: Substantial implementation of peace agreement; rebels disarmed and integrated into army and most refugees returned.
Afars in Djibouti	1991-95	Uncontested agreement 2000	Settled: Remaining rebel faction signs autonomy agreement in February 2000; the major faction, which is part of the ruling government, negotiated a settlement in 1995.
Casamançais in Senegal	1991-99	Cessation of open hostilities since 1999	Contained: Ceasefire reached in December 1999; talks expected to continue toward a final settlement.
Cabindans in Angola	1991-present	Low-level hostilities since 1991	Ongoing: Four-decade-long independence rebellion continues in the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda.
Ijaw in Nigeria	1995-present	Low-level hostilities since 1995	Ongoing: Niger Delta peoples' demands for sharing of oil revenues and greater participation have escalated from protest to rebellion and from calls for reform to autonomy.
Latin America and the Caribbean			
Indigenous Peoples and Creoles in Nicaragua	1981-88	Uncontested agreement 1988	Settled: Autonomy for two Atlantic Coast regions imperiled by lack of development and government infringement on indigenous lands and resources.

Table 5: Other Self-Determination Conflicts in 2000[1]

Group and Country	Politically Active Since (post-WWII)	Current Phase
Western Democracies and Japan		
South Tyrolans in Italy	Mid-1940s	Conventional politics
Aborigines in Australia	Late 1940s	Conventional politics
Bretons in France	Late 1940s	Militant politics
Catalans in Spain	Late 1940s	Conventional politics
Scots in the United Kingdom	Late 1940s	Conventional politics
Puerto Ricans in the United States	Early 1950s	Conventional politics
Flemings in Belgium	Late 1950s	Conventional politics
Walloons in Belgium	Late 1950s	Conventional politics
Basques in France	Late 1950s	Conventional politics
Indigenous Peoples in Canada	Early 1960s	Conventional politics
Quebecois in Canada	Early 1960s	Conventional politics
Indigenous Peoples in the United States	Mid-1960s	Conventional politics
Cornish in the United Kingdom	Late 1990s	Conventional politics
East Central Europe and the Soviet Successor States		
Albanians in Macedonia	Late 1940s	Conventional politics
Magyars (Hungarians) in Romania	Late 1940s	Conventional politics
Buryat in Russia	Late 1940s	Conventional politics
Tatars in Russia	Early 1960s	Conventional politics
Hungarians in Slovakia	Late 1960s	Conventional politics
Adzhars in Georgia	Late 1980s	Conventional politics
Tajiks in Uzbekistan	Late 1980s	Conventional politics
Lezgins in Russia	Early 1990s	Conventional politics
Yakut in Russia	Early 1990s	Conventional politics
Crimean Russians in the Ukraine	Early 1990s	Conventional politics
Hungarians in Yugoslavia	Early 1990s	Conventional politics
Montenegrins in Yugoslavia	Early 1990s	Conventional politics
Sandzak Muslims in Yugoslavia	Early 1990s	Conventional politics
East, South, and Central Asia		
Sindhis in Pakistan	Late 1940s	Conventional politics
Montagnards in Vietnam	Late 1940s	Conventional politics
Lhotshampas in Bhutan	Early 1950s	Militant politics
Pashtuns (Pathans) in Pakistan	Early 1950s	Conventional politics
Muslims in Sri Lanka	Mid-1980s	Conventional politics
Mongols in China	Late 1980s	Militant politics
Kashmiri Buddhist Ladakhis in India	Late 1980s	Conventional politics
Kashmiri Hindus in India	Early 1990s	Conventional politics
Dayaks in Indonesia	Mid-1990s	Militant politics
Sarakis in Pakistan	Mid-1990s	Conventional politics
Reang (Bru) in India	Late 1990s	Militant politics
North Africa and the Middle East		
Palestinians in Lebanon	Early 1960s	Militant politics
Africa South of the Sahara		
Lunda, Yeke in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Late 1940s	Conventional politics
Baganda in Uganda	Late 1940s	Conventional politics
Lozi in Zambia	Late 1940s	Militant politics
Ndebele in Zimbabwe	Early 1950s	Conventional politics
Westerners in Cameroon	Late 1950s	Militant politics
Zanzibaris in Tanzania	Early 1960s	Contested agreement
Bubis in Equatorial Guinea	Early 1990s	Militant politics
Anjouanese in Comoros	Late 1990s	Contested agreement
East Caprivians in Namibia	Late 1990s	Militant politics
Puntland Darods in Somalia	Late 1990s	Conventional politics
Latin America and the Caribbean		
Indigenous Peoples in Colombia	Late 1940s	Conventional politics
Nevisians in St. Kitts-Nevis	Early 1960s	Conventional politics
Indigenous Peoples in Brazil	Early 1970s	Conventional politics
Indigenous Peoples in Chile	Early 1970s	Conventional politics
Indigenous Peoples in Mexico	Early 1970s	Militant politics
Tobagonians in Trinidad & Tobago	Early 1970s	Conventional politics

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Authors

TED ROBERT GURR is Distinguished University Professor at the University of Maryland. He founded and directs the Minorities at Risk project which tracks the political status and activities of more than 300 politically active ethnic groups worldwide. This study provides data for his analyses of the causes and management of ethonopolitical protest and rebellion, most recently in *Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century* (United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000). Professor Gurr has written or edited twenty other books and monographs including the award-winning *Why Men Rebel* (1970) and *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics* (1994, with Barbara Harff).

MONTY G. MARSHALL is Faculty Research Scientist at the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland where he coordinates the Center's new Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research Program. He also directs the Polity IV project which provides annual assessments of autocracy, democracy, and democratic transitions in all countries. Dr. Marshall's theory and evidence on protracted conflict regions in the Third world are reported in *Third World War: System, Process, and Conflict Dynamics* (1999). He received his doctoral degree from The University of Iowa in 1996 and is a senior consultant with the United States government's State Failure Task Force.

DEEPA KHOSLA is Research Assistant for the Minorities at Risk project and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland. Results of her ongoing research on "Third World States as Intervenors in Ethnic Conflict" have been published in *Third World Quarterly* (1999). She also is coauthor with T. R. Gurr of a forthcoming chapter on "Domestic and Transnational Strategies for Managing Separatist Conflicts: Four Asian Cases."

CIDCM

Department of
Government and Politics

University of Maryland

0145 Tydings Hall

College Park, MD 20742

Tel.: (301) 314-7703

Fax: (301) 314-9256

E-mail: cidcm@cidcm.umd.edu

Http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm