Changing the stride or digging in the heels?

The implementation of legally ruled concessions in territorial interstate disputes

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Why do some governments engaged in an interstate territorial dispute implement legally ruled territorial concessions, whereas others fail to do so? Previous quantitative research has shown that legal processes can create domestic political cover for conceding governments, which reduces the political cost of dispute termination. Scholars have provided theoretical rationales for how this political cover is produced and under what conditions it works but these ideas have never been investigated empirically. While legal solutions seem to be an attractive option in territorial disputes, we still do not know how and why they work. This paper addresses this research gap by analyzing two processes of legal dispute resolution, one which saw eventual implementation (Nigeria as the losing party in the dispute with Cameroon concerning Bakassi), and one where one party reneged on the verdict (Ethiopia as the losing party in the dispute with Eritrea concerning Badme). The analysis is based on a frame analysis of 640 news items. The findings suggest that while the current theories on domestic political cover seems to be supported on a general level, refinement is warranted regarding the driving mechanisms at play.

Domestic political discourse on the dispute and the legal process has a high impact on the government’s ability to end the dispute through implementation of legally ruled concessions. Legal dispute resolution facilitates concession-making by providing unique opportunities for governments’ to reframe the dispute. However, previous emphasis on domestic arguments regarding the procedural legitimacy of legal dispute resolution is poorly supported. Instead, international reputation arguments, as well as reframing of the territorial issue form being indivisible into being isolated and divisible serves as the main drivers.

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Introduction

No other form of disputes has such a high propensity to spawn violent interstate conflicts as territorial issues (Vasquez and Henehan 2001). Comparing different issue types of Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs), territorial MIDs are more prone to escalate to war (Hensel 1996) and produce more fatalities than any other kind of MIDs (Senese 1996). While proposed to cause a substantial part of interstate violent conflict, the successful resolution of territorial issues also seems to hold a promising key to peace. Findings indicate that once territorial disputes are settled and states mutually recognize their shared border the risk for future conflict drops substantially (Kocs 1995; Huth 1996). Even more, Gibler (2007) has proposed that the settlement of territorial disputes provides the peaceful environment that is required for states to be able to transform into democracies. Taken together, these propositions and results imply that the mapping of effective ways to successfully settle territorial disputes should be considered a top priority for academics and policymakers alike.

Statistical studies have repeatedly found that legal dispute resolution, i.e. international arbitration and adjudication, is an especially effective tool in settling interstate territorial disputes (Simmons 2002; Allee and Huth 2006; Gent and Shannon 2010). One central explanation to this empirical finding is that legal processes can overcome domestic political audience constraints that otherwise block negotiated concessions (Simmons 2002; Allee and Huth 2006; Beardsley and Lo 2014). However, no study has so far actually examined the causal process or the enabling conditions in depth. Specifically, the implementation process of territorial dispute resolution through legal processes remains a black box in theoretically guided comparative research. As such, while legal solutions seem to be an attractive option in territorial disputes, we still do not know how and why they work. This paper presents the first theoretically guided qualitative study of the domestic conditions enabling territorial concession-making with the help of legal dispute resolution.

The paper seeks to answer the question: why do some governments engaged in an interstate territorial dispute implement legally ruled territorial concessions, whereas others fail to do so?

To address this question, I draw on the literature on domestic political constraints to compromise solutions in territorial disputes (Huth 1996; Huth and Allee 2002; Simmons 2002; Allee and Huth 2006). Focusing on how the territorial issue is understood and described in domestic politics, I investigate whether government decisions of implementation or rejection of legally ruled concessions can be explained by to what extent the territorial dispute has been
reframed in the domestic political discourse. I argue that the key factor that determines whether governments implement legally ruled concessions is whether the domestic political discourse on the territorial dispute experiences a shift from being dominated by hardline framing into a problem definition that encourages or allows for the implementation of legally ruled territorial concessions. I outline two distinct avenues for issue reframing from the literature on domestic political cover; procedural legitimacy and international reputation reframing, and present a third avenue based on the more general literature on issue salience in territorial disputes; issue isolation reframing. This study compares the domestic political discourses related to the legal resolution processes in Nigeria 1994-2008 in its dispute with Cameroon regarding Bakassi and Ethiopia 1998-2009 in its dispute with Eritrea regarding Badme. The analysis spans the entire dispute process, starting at the escalation of a military dispute over the territory in question, covering the adoption of the legal process, the issuing of the verdict and the period thereafter during which the domestic discourses regarding implementation plays out until a final decision to implement or renege is established. Based on a frame analysis (Goffman 1974; Benford and Snow 2000; Entman 2004) of 640 media items and secondary source literature I find that while the current theories on domestic political cover seems to be supported on a general level, refinement is warranted regarding the driving mechanisms at play. Domestic political discourse on the dispute and the legal process has a high impact on the government’s ability to end the dispute through implementation of legally ruled concessions. Legal dispute resolution facilitates concession-making by providing unique opportunities for governments’ to reframe the dispute. However, previous emphasis on domestic arguments regarding the procedural legitimacy of legal dispute resolution is poorly supported. Instead, international reputation arguments, as well as reframing of the territorial issue form being indivisible into being isolated and divisible serves as the main drivers.

The paper is structured as follows. The next section covers previous research on legal dispute resolution to interstate territorial disputes, defines key concepts and highlights the research gap. The third section presents the theoretical framework applied in the paper. It provides an argument for importance of issue framing and identifies three ways in which legal dispute resolution can enable implementation of legally ruled concessions by dispute reframing. The fourth section explains the research design. Section five presents the analysis of the two frame processes examined. The last section highlights the conclusions.
Domestic obstacles to territorial concessions

This paper seeks to explain the process driving the effect of legal dispute resolution on the termination of interstate territorial disputes. Legal dispute resolution is defined as the use of either a formal and permanent legal institution with a fixed set of rules of procedure (e.g. the International Court of Justice), also known as adjudication, or as the use of an ad hoc body of arbiters that use international law as the basis for their decision but who rely on a mandate and rules of procedure that are agreed upon for the specific case in question (e.g. bodies formed from the Permanent Court of Arbitration), also known as arbitration. The key aspect of legal dispute resolution is arguably the willingness of the disputants to transfer the power of decision on the disputed issue to a third party and the formal obligation to respect the verdict. While recognizing the potential technical differences between adjudication and arbitration, recent studies in peace and conflict research have argued that these differences have diminished and that the two practices nowadays mostly share procedures. It is thus warranted to treat them as two versions of the same dispute resolution mechanism (Allee and Huth 2006; Beardsley and Lo 2014; Gent and Shannon 2014; Simmons 1999; Simmons 2002). A territorial dispute is defined as a situation in which two governments have competing public claims to a territory. The dispute does not require the parties to take any actions other than disagreeing over the ownership of the land.

Research on territorial disputes has established that this subset of conflicts are more salient and more prone to intractability than other types of disputes. Territory can have symbolic as well as religious qualities (Hassner 2003; Hassner 2006; Kaufman 2009); play central roles in the formation of national myths and identity (Vasquez 1995) or form part of a more general zero-sum-relationship with a rival state (Mitchell and Thies 2011; Dreyer 2010; 2012; Lektzian, Prins and Souva 2010; Toft 2006). Territory is often imbued with a psychological and social value that motivates indivisibility and this makes concessions unthinkable or very costly (Forsberg 1996; Hensel, 2000; Toft 2003; Vasquez, 2009:355). Gibler (2007) has argued that territorial issues are easily used as security threats to motivate centralization of state power and hardline politics. In states faced with territorial threats or challenges from neighbors, political actors favoring hardline politics have an advantage in mobilizing political support. Concession-making is thus rarely offered as a solution to territorial disputes; instead standing your ground is the dominant policy (Simmons 2002; Huth and Allee 2002; Allee and Huth 2006), to protect territorial integrity, national identity and security (Gibler 2007). In order to find viable solutions
to these salient issues, dispute resolution mechanisms must have the capacity to circumvent or transform a domestic political environment favoring hardline policies.

Recent research on territorial disputes and dispute resolution has found that international law and legal processes might provide a promising remedy to the problem of intransigence. This approach centers on the domestic audience cost for governments that make territorial concessions in interstate disputes. It is argued that by mandating a judicial third party to decide on a territorial dispute, governments can reduce the domestic audience cost of concession-making and as such facilitate dispute resolution (Allee and Huth 2006; Beardsley and Lo 2014; Huth, Croco and Appel 2011; Simmons 2002). Legal decisions are implemented because they allow governments to make territorial concessions that domestic actors would otherwise prevent by reducing political support for the government (Allee and Huth 2006).

The domestic political constraints approach relies on a series of assumptions regarding states, governments, interstate territorial disputes and legal dispute resolution. First, states are disaggregated into governments and domestic audiences (Putnam 1988). The government is assumed to favor dispute resolution, even through concession-making, predominantly in order to allow for budget reallocation away from defense spending and to tap the unrealized positive benefits of cross-border trade and cooperation with the adversary (Simmons 2006). However, due to the high salience of territorial disputes, (Huth 1996; Hensel 2001; Vasquez and Henehan 2011) domestic audiences are assumed to favor hardline stances and discourage territorial concession-making since they interpret concessions as foreign policy failures (Allee and Huth 2006).

Simmons has proposed that legal dispute resolution reduces the domestic audience cost of concession-making because domestic audiences care about how the state makes concessions. While negotiated concessions are a sign of weakness, legal concessions are a sign of cooperative and rule bound behavior (Simmons 2002:834). Subsequent research has proposed that legal dispute resolution reduces the domestic political cost of concession-making by increasing the legitimacy of a concession and reducing the government responsibility for the

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2 Another strain of research has approached territorial dispute resolution as a commitment problem, focusing on international audience costs and focal point effects as main drivers of the effectiveness of legal dispute resolution. See Fisher 1981; Garrett and Weingast 1993; Weingast 1997; Abbott and Snidal 1998; Abbott and Snidal 2000; Simmons 2000; Simmons 2002; Mitchell and Hensel 2007; Fang 2010; Gent and Shannon 2010; Beardsley and Lo 2014; Gent and Shannon 2014.
same (Allee and Huth 2006; Gent and Shannon 2010; Huth, Croco and Appel 2011; Beardsley and Lo 2014).

Recent studies have found statistical support for the domestic political constraints argument by linking domestically weak governments and high salience issues to the adoption of legal dispute resolution (Simmons 2002; Allee and Huth 2006; Huth, Croco and Appel 2011; Beardsley and Lo 2014) and international reputational and domestic institutional factors to compliance with legally ruled concessions (Simmons 2002). However, no study has so far supplied qualitative evidence for the domestic political constraints mechanisms of legal dispute resolution, in particular concerning the legitimacy inducing effect hypothesized to reduce the domestic political costs of concession-making. As such, there is a research gap concerning the establishment of the proposed legitimacy mechanism in the domestic arena.

**The argument – legal processes as opportunities for issue reframing**

In order to understand how this process of domestic political constraints works, it is critical to study how the government can reduce the political costs of territorial concession-making by influencing their domestic audience. This paper champions the understanding of legal solution to territorial disputes as a process that revolves around domestic framing. This perspective assumes that when governments engage in a legal dispute resolution with another government they engage in a parallel domestic framing act in which they describe and frame this legal process to their domestic audiences. While the legal process is the main tool for addressing the substantial territorial dispute, the framing act is the main tool for the government through which they can reduce the political costs of territorial concession-making. The framing act enables the government to change both elite and public perceptions of the territorial dispute and make territorial concessions more attractive and less of a foreign policy failure. The adoption of a legal process is a scope condition for this study, and my explanatory focus is on the implementation or rejection of a legally ruled territorial concession. In this section I develop an argument concerning why the domestic perceptions of territorial concession-making is important as an explanation to government decisions to implement territorial concessions. The independent variable is the degree to which the domestic political discourse on the territorial dispute, in terms of issue framing, has been transformed from depicting implementation as a foreign policy failure into describing implementation as desirable, or at least as less of a foreign
policy failure. In developing my argument I will specify what frames are theoretically expected to depict implementation of legally ruled concessions as a foreign policy failure, as well as what frames are expected to provide domestic political cover for implementation.

The suggested theoretical framework rests on three core assumptions. First, all governments are assumed to rely on elite and public support for their capacity to pursue preferred policies and their continued political survival (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow 2003). These are their domestic audiences. Elite political groups, e.g. ruling party organizations, government coalitions, members of legislatures, and regional government institutions have the capacity to serve as gatekeepers to policy implementation as well as constituting the selectorate of a government, i.e. the political elite that directly controls who remains in power. Pursuing policies that antagonize one or several of these groups risks direct backlash in the form of having policies blocked or governments being put out of office. In addition to elite support, all governments also rely on the direct or indirect support of the people. While democracies likely are more directly accountable to and potentially restricted by their general populations than autocracies, the latter are assumed to still be sensitive to public perceptions and support as an unsatisfied public provide a breeding ground for popular uprisings and challenges to the government (Allee and Huth 2006). Research on autocracies have also shown that while the general public might not serve the function of an electorate in non-democratic regimes they still retain political importance as a potential ejectorate, i.e. they might rise up and challenge an unpopular regime (Zimmerman 2014). The general public is thus considered a relevant audience for all public actions and policies. A second assumption is that foreign policy failure is costly to all governments, especially regarding issues of high salience such as territorial sovereignty, since it provides a source for dissatisfaction of the public and an opportunity for political opposition to mobilize around (Allee and Huth 2006). A third assumption is that the perception of foreign policy failures are socially constructed and not naturally given, i.e. a policy might be either a success or a failure depending on what aspects are emphasized (Stone 1989:282). Added together, these three assumptions amounts to the importance of public frames of dispute resolution, i.e. what public description are used to understand foreign policy actions, in this case the implementation of legally ruled territorial concessions.

Frames are understood to be descriptions of reality that includes four related aspects: identifying a problem, attributing the cause of the problem, suggesting a solution to the problem and motivating the adoption of the solution (Snow and Benford 1988). Drawing on the theoretical and methodological approach of frame analysis that focuses on framing as a conscious and
strategic act (Benford and Snow 2000:624), governments and other framing agents are understood as rational and strategic actors that promote public frames intended to facilitate the implementation of their preferred policies. While governments are more or less required to act as a framing agent when presenting and motivating polices they are not the only potential framing agents. Other framing agents concerned with the territorial issue can include, for example, local politicians and representatives, the political opposition and media agencies.

I expect territorial disputes to be prone to hardline framing in the domestic political discourse (Simmons 2002; Allee and Huth 2006; Gibler 2007). I define a hardline frame as a depiction of the territorial dispute where the framing agent:

- describe the issue as indivisible (e.g. in terms of territorial integrity, sacred territory, or territory as part of the national identity) (Hassner 2003; Hassner 2006; Kaufman 2009)
- attributes cause for the dispute on the adversary (e.g. an adversary that is a rival, aggressor or incapable of respecting the sovereignty principle) (Mitchell and Thies 2011; Dreyer 2010; 2012; Lektzian, Prins and Souva 2010; Toft 2006)
- propose solutions that are outcome oriented in that they are tools to assure one’s own ownership
- motivate solutions based on identity or security arguments (e.g. sacred right, historical right, or as proper in the face of aggression and insecurity) (Vasquez 1995)

In the presence of hardline frames, implementation of legally ruled territorial concessions is expected to be costly for the conceding government and thus not a viable option. As such, implementation depends on whether hardline frames have been replaced by alternative dispute frames that reduce the costliness of territorial concession-making.

I propose that legal dispute resolution provides three avenues for dispute reframing that can reduce the costliness of territorial concession-making and allow for implementation of legally ruled concessions. The first and second avenues are adoptions of previously theorized mechanisms, while the third avenue is a novel contribution.

1. **Procedural legitimacy.** Procedural legitimacy framing shifts the focus regarding responsibility for the outcome from the contending governments to the arbiters/adjudicators. It motivates their mandate to decide on the issue by emphasizing their impartiality and expert competence on the issue, as well as the fairness and appropriateness of the legal procedure (Allee and Huth 2006). This serves to shift the focus away from substantial outcomes and onto
procedural appropriateness. Once the verdict is handed down implementation can be motivated based on the respect for the rule of law. Implementation is thus framed as primarily cooperative, responsible and rule-bound behavior, rather than a foreign policy failure of losing territorial control of the disputed area (Simmons 2002).

2. International reputation. Once a legal process has been initiated and the adjudicator or arbiters have produced a verdict that entails concessions, the international perceptions and costs associated with non-implementation of the verdict is affected (Allee and Huth 2006; Simmons 2002). A state that fails to honor its international obligations risks having its international reputation tarnished, and might even possibly face material repercussions in the form of weakened or severed relations, less opportunities for economic relationships as well as becoming the target of international sanctions. Governments called on to make such concessions find themselves in a situation where they have to choose between two bad options, but can be understood to be less responsible for conceding the issue given that they did not produce the verdict themselves (Abbott and Snidal 2000; Allee and Huth 2006; Simmons 2002).

Under international reputation reframing, outside actors are responsible for the verdict as well as for punishment for non-implementation. Arguably, conceding an issue is less of a foreign policy failure when failure to comply entails international repercussions, and governments lack control over the process. As such, international reputation reframing produce cover by diverting blame and by highlighting the more severe foreign policy failure associated with non-implementation.

3. Issue isolation. Bilateral negotiations and mediation provides freedom for the disputing parties to formulate their grievances and claims, conditions for concessions, and motivations for their bargaining behavior. Legal dispute resolution however has a very strict format as to what can be brought under the jurisdiction of the legal body and what rationales are accepted as legitimate in defense of one’s territorial claim. Once legal dispute resolution is applied the mandate of the court, the rules of procedure, international law and legal precedence motivates a legalistic and delimited focus in understanding the territorial dispute (Abbott and Snidal 2000). I propose that by putting territorial disputes on hold during the deliberation of the legal process, paired with the delimited and legalistic perspective introduced by the legal process, framing agents are given the time and opportunity to reframe the dispute from more urgent to less urgent, to portray the issue as more isolated and divisible as compared to general and indivisible, and to portray the opposing disputing party as legitimate, equal and less threatening as opposed to illegitimate, unreasonable and aggressive. As such, issue isolation reframing
reduces the perception of foreign policy failure when implementing legally ruled concessions by reframing the issue itself as well as the cause or the source of the issue. In essence, issue isolation turn on reducing issue salience. Less urgent issues should more easily be reframed. More isolated and divisible issues should be more easily conceded. Concessions to an equal and less threatening opposing actor should be less of a foreign policy failure than concessions made to a threatening adversary.

The key process that explains implementation is here theorized to be the move from hardline frames to the introduction of pro-implementation reframing in the domestic political discourse on the territorial dispute. Previous research provides no theoretical expectations as to which of the three avenues for reframing that should be driving or necessary. However, in cases where no issue reframing has taken place, implementation is not expected. Issue reframing is expected to be spearheaded by the government, starting just before the adoption of the legal process or during the deliberations. If no hardline frames are championed in response by other framing agents, implementation is expected to ensue. If hardline counter-framing is used by other framing agents a qualitative judgment is needed to determine how successful that agent is in creating domestic costs for implementation. If the agents is of significant importance for the governments selectorate, or if it holds the power to sway the general public, then implementation is conditional on them changing their position. If the government instead of winning over opposing hardline framing agents accommodates such counter-framing by themselves favoring hardline framing, implementation is not expected. As such, three conditions needs to be met in order for implementation to take place:

1. Governments must abandon potential hardline framing and adopt one or several of the avenues for issue reframing.
2. If hardline counter-framing is championed by other framing agents than the government then any such actor that is crucial for government survival must drop their hardline frame, or at best exchange it for one or several of the avenues for issue reframing.
3. Governments faced with hardline counter-framing must not accommodate by adopting hardline framing themselves.

To summarize, I argue that governments are better able to terminate territorial disputes when a public process of dispute reframing has paralleled the process of legal dispute resolution. Specifically, I argue that dispute reframing along the lines of procedural legitimacy, international reputation, and issue isolation create conditions conducive to the implementation
of legally ruled territorial concessions. However, in situations where hardline framing has been continually championed in the domestic political discourse on the territorial dispute, we should be less likely to see implementation.

Research design
This study compares the case of Nigeria (in the Bakassi dispute with Cameroon) 1994-2008 and Ethiopia (in the border dispute with Eritrea) 2000-2009. Both of these cases are governments involved in a territorial dispute with a neighboring state that are required to make territorial concessions following the completion of a legal dispute resolution process. The focus on cases where states “lost” in court is argued to be a critical case design in that legal cover is only relevant in cases of concession-making.

The dependent variable is implementation of the legal decision and concerns actions and not just statements. By actions concerning implementation I mean the actual act of implementing a decision, i.e. performing a handover of territory or physically demarcating a border in line with the legal verdict. Failing to implement a verdict constitutes a conscious act of non-implementation. This should be distinguished from making statements. Saying that you accept a verdict is not the same as implementing it, although it may indicate that you seek to do so. Instead, such a statement in itself might be a framing act, given that it contains an elaboration of what it is that you are accepting and why. Saying that you reject a verdict is also an indication of disfavoring implementation, but it is the inactivity or the outright action to stop implementation that encompasses the act of non-implementation. Nigeria implemented the territorial concession after initial hesitation and delay. Ethiopia has not implemented the territorial concession as to this day. 3

The independent variable examined is the framing of the territorial dispute as championed by the government and other framing agents. It is expected that the domestic political discourse drives the political costliness for implementation, and changes in discourse must take place before government actions on implementation in order to explain the outcome.

3 The decision to focus on case of delayed implementation and one case of non-implementation potentially limits the generalizability of the findings to cases of immediate implementation, but it nonetheless offers the possibility to observe within case variation in the Nigerian case.
The analysis focuses on potential changes in framing over time. The theory revolves around the initial presence of hardline frames as constraints to territorial concession-making and how legal dispute resolution allows for issue reframing. The cases are analyzed from the escalation of the territorial dispute, and thus include the peak of military engagements when hardline frames are likely to be most present. The framing process is then followed throughout the legal process, including attempts at dispute resolution, adoption of the legal solution, the publication of the legal decision, and up until implementation or stalemated non-implementation.

The unit of analysis in this study is the framing acts in the domestic political discourse concerning the territorial dispute and its resolution. By framing acts I mean a frame championed at a certain point in time by a framing agent, such as the government, a dissenting group within the government, political opposition actors, local political actors, or media actors. By domestic political discourse I mean framing acts primarily targeting the domestic audience or acts with the intent to influence the domestic political perception. A framing agent that addresses an international actor such as the opposing state in the dispute or a third party is thus not part of the domestic political discourse. An agent that however report the same speech act to the domestic audience, e.g. by explaining how and why it addressed an international actor, engages in a framing act in the domestic political discourse. The focus on the domestic discourse is warranted given that it is expected to be the primary arena where foreign policy failures are judged and domestic political costs are produced.

**Case selection**

The cases are comparable concerning several qualities of the territories in dispute, as well as dispute history prior to the introduction of the legal process. Differences in territorial qualities cannot as such explain the difference by allowing one of these aspects facilitating hardline framing, or vice versa. Both cases are disputes where ethnic kin to the losing state were present in the disputed territory; both governments had struck a hardline stance in previous rounds of negotiation; previous rounds of negotiation had failed, and the dispute had escalated to armed conflict. It should however be acknowledged that the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict saw a higher level of military escalation with a full-fledged border war taking place between 1998-2000 with tens of thousands of battle related deaths (UCDP, Ethiopia), while the Cameroonian-Nigerian border conflict peaked in 1996 with 56 reported deaths (UCDP, Nigeria). This difference in conflict intensity would motivate caution in that the Ethiopian case could be more amenable to hardline framing regarding the aspects of rival depictions of the opposing state Eritrea, as well
as zero sum framing of the issue. Also, while Badme is regarded as economically and strategically non-significant, ownership of Bakassi potentially had significant economic implications in that control of the landmass determined the maritime delimitation of areas of considerable oil reserves, and also determined control of waterways of military strategic importance for Nigeria. This difference motivates awareness regarding the Bakassi issue being more amenable to hardline framing concerning strategic and economic national interests.

In addition to control for territorial qualities and dispute history, previous research has found democracies more prone to adopt as well as implement legal dispute resolution decisions. This difference is attributed to the higher accountability of democratic governments (Beardsley and Lo 2014; Huth, Croco and Appel 2011). It is thus relevant to match cases with similarities in government accountability at the time of potential implementation. When the verdicts were delivered, both states had semi-democratic political environments marred by centralization of power, but allowed opposition parties and independent media. Ethiopia however saw a change toward a significantly stifled political and media environment following the popular protest in the wake of the 2005 elections.

**Research method – frame analysis**

The primary research method employed in this paper is a within-case over time frame analysis. Reports on the territorial disputes and legal dispute resolution process are examined and classified regarding what frames are employed in the description of the issue. Frames are classified on the basis of problem definition for the territorial dispute; the attribution of cause for the problem; what solutions are proposed, and how these solutions are motivated (Snow and Benford 1988). Methodologically, a qualitative text analysis program (Max QDA) was used to allow for coding and classification of texts. The hardline frame and the three avenues for dispute reframing presented in the theory section were examined using the following operationalizations:

**Hardline framing:** Did the framing act define the territorial dispute to revolve around the issue being indivisible, e.g. territorial integrity, sacred territory, or territory as part of the national identity? Was the cause for the dispute claimed to be the inability of the opposing party to recognize sovereignty over the territory and/or its indivisible character. Was the opposing state in the dispute depicted as an enemy, aggressor, or rival? Were the proposed solutions confrontational, intransigent or opportunistic as in that their sole purpose was to ensure control
of the disputed territory? Were the adoptions of the proposed solutions motivated with identity and/or security arguments?

**Procedural legitimacy reframing:** Did the motives supplied for problem solution change from focus on outcomes to focus on processes? Was the legal dispute resolution motivated as an appropriate solution based on procedural fairness, expert competence and/or the need for rule of law? Was implementation motivated on grounds of respect for the rule of law?

**International reputational reframing:** Were arguments presented after the publication of the legal decision, which motivated implementation of the territorial concession based on the need to preserve international reputation? Was blame for the concessions attributed to the arbiters/adjudicators and/or international pressure.

**Issue isolation reframing:** Was the territorial dispute diagnosed as a more isolated and divisible problem after the introduction of the legal process? Was the territorial issue separated from other issues following the introduction of the legal process? Was the cause of the dispute reframed from concerning adversary aggression and failure to recognize territorial sovereignty into a mutually legitimate claim and/or uncertainty regarding the border delimitation?

**Data**

The main data used was the digitalized version of the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), compiled and published by the BBC Monitoring Service. The source is a daily compilation and translation of the main news events in national media, with a global coverage. The source allows for a daily monitoring of national radio, TV, internet, press and news agencies in the examined countries, including reports originally in native languages but translated into English (Leetaru 2010). In addition to the SWB material, secondary source literature was used to provide overviews of the dispute resolution processes. This material includes regional academic digests and reports, media reporting from international news agencies and academic articles and books on the disputes. While the primary data provides a rich material on the domestic political discourse, the secondary material ensures that that domestic political discourse that might be muted in the public media is not missed.

The primary search string used for each case was created around the names of the disputed territories as well as names and acronyms for the legal bodies engaged in the dispute resolution process. The unit of data was thus media reports concerning the disputed territory and/or the legal mechanisms used to resolve the dispute.
Empirics and analysis

In the following section the evolution of the domestic political discourse concerning the territorial dispute resolution process are presented and analyzed in the two cases. Three frame phases are identified in the Ethiopian case and four frame phases are identified in the Nigerian case. In particular, I seek to explain how these changes came about and what impact the frames had on the subsequent implementation or non-implementation of the legally ruled territorial concessions.

Ethiopia – Non-implementation following an unsuccessful attempt at establishing procedural legitimacy reframing

The Eritrean-Ethiopian border war was sparked in May 6 1998 when disagreement concerning the administration of the border town Badme escalated into a full scale conventional war. Expanding from concerning the issue of Badme to concern large stretches of the shared border the war was fought in three rounds of spring and summer offensives in 1998, 1999 and 2000. Following an Ethiopian military breakthrough in April-May 2000 a cease fire was brokered on June 18 2000 by the OAU and witnessed by USA and EU, putting an end to the fighting and situating a UN peace keeping mission (UNMEE) between the parties. A final peace agreement was later signed in Algiers on 12 December 2000 which specified among other things that the border issue should be resolved through arbitration by the ad hoc Eritrean Ethiopian Boundary Commission (EEBC) set up in The Hague. The EEBC decided on the border on 13 April 2002, but since the EEBC had not specified the location of Badme in relation to the coordinates decided upon uncertainty reigned for some months before it was made clear that Ethiopia had lost this symbolical starting place of the dispute. As this was made clear, Ethiopian initial acceptance of the decision was then turned into rejection (UN, S2003/1186: Appendix 1), stalemate and non-implementation. Failing to demarcate the border on the ground, the EEBC dissolve itself in December 2007 (EIU 2007:3) and the UNMEE force was withdrawn in 2008, following severe and prolonged Eritrean restrictions of its operations (UCDP, Eritrea). The withdrawal of UNMEE marked the end of substantial international involvement in the dispute and the EEBC decision is still to be implemented through physical demarcation.

The Ethiopian domestic political discourse on the legal dispute resolution can be roughly divided into three phases: the defensive procedural, the outcome-oriented procedural and the
procedural in reverse. Procedural legitimacy accounts of legal dispute resolution was championed by the Ethiopian government throughout all phases. However, all phases also contained major elements of hardline problem definition, supplied by either the government, disputing internal government actors or opposition actors. Only minor aspects of international reputation reframing were supplied in the final phase. As such, the domestic political discourse on the border dispute in Ethiopia did not see the shift in dispute framing that has been theorized to facilitate implementation of legally ruled territorial concessions. Rather, costliness of implementation seems to have increased over time as the dispute narrative came to focus more and more on substantial territorial division and a procedural framing that undermined rather than increased the legitimacy of the EEBC verdict. The finding is thus in line with the non-implementation of the EEBC ruling.

The defensive procedural frame phase

In the first phase, covering the period of the end of the war and before the signing of the peace agreement, the Ethiopian government championed a defensive procedural frame. Consistently describing the war as steaming out of the aggressive behavior and the expansionist ambitions of the Eritrean government, the Ethiopian government portrayed itself as the champion of the principles of international law and peaceful dispute resolution (Office of the Government Spokesperson 2000-03-17; Walta Information Centre 2000-06-21; 2000-10-09). Having fought back the Eritrean occupation of the disputed territories that Ethiopia considered to be unquestionable parts of the Ethiopian sovereign state, the Ethiopian government claimed to have no territorial ambitions outside of its international border, and despite the military breakthrough that had allowed its forces to occupy large parts of the Eritrean territory, Ethiopia was content to withdraw and let international law solve the boundary dispute through arbitration (Office of the Government Spokesperson 2000-03-17; 2000-05-24; Walta Information Centre 2000-06-13; 2000-06-14; 2000-06-21; 2000-07-6; 2000-09-14; 2000-10-09; Radio Ethiopia 2000-06-22; ENA 2000-09-09; Radio Ethiopia 2000-12-20). While the problem definition in this initial government dispute narrative indicated issue indivisibility, procedural legitimacy framing was established early on. The frame clearly focused on the Eritrean aggression as the main problem, claiming the cause of the war to be Eritrean failure to respect international law and norms, and as such championed the use of international arbitration as the proper solution to the border dispute. While the disagreement concerned the exact position of the boundary, the Ethiopian government pre peace agreement frame nonetheless focused on the importance and legitimacy of a proper solution process based on international law. Arguably, if the Ethiopian
government had been able to establish the dominance of such a defensive procedural frame throughout the legal process and following the publication of the EEBC decision, implementation would have been facilitated. However, in 2001 two challenges to the government defensive procedural frame appeared and were followed by a partial shift in the government frame.

The first challenge appeared in the format of a frame dispute within the main political support base of the government - the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) – in March 2001. During this internal dispute concerning government policy, 12 members of the Central Committee of the TPLF were expelled based on their criticism (Africa Research Bulletin 2001 (9):14553f; Woodward 2013:57; Lyons 2006:13). Importantly, one of the main issues of contestation was the assessment of the war with Eritrea and the belief of the expelled “hardliners” that Eritrea should have been pushed harder and that the legal dispute resolution process was a bad solution to the dispute since it would not honor the sacrifices paid by Ethiopia to achieve the military victory (Woodward 213:57). Reportedly, this hardline faction championed the idea that Ethiopia should not remain landlocked but gain access to the Red Sea through the economically important port of Assab, currently situated in Eritrea (Woodward 2013:164). Recognizing that the EEBC would not address such a substantial change to the border, the hardline faction denounced the legal dispute resolution process on the grounds that it would fail to deliver the substantial territorial gains that it aspired to. The internal TPLF dispute is considered to be of major importance for perceptions of foreign policy failure and political costs for implementation of legally ruled concessions. The TPLF both constituted the primary support group for the government and the regional administration of the contested border areas. The TPLF hardliners were made up of influential regional administrators in Tigray and members of the party Central Committee (Milkias 2001:2-5). While the former group commanded superior access to the Tigrayan general population as a potential ejectorate that responded well to hardline framing given that the disputed land was part of their national and ethnic homeland, the latter group constituted part of the direct selectorate for the government.

While the main group of the 15 remaining committee members led by the Prime Minister managed to expel and mute the hardline group from the party, this internal frame dispute nonetheless seem to have voiced an internal alternative hardline expansionist frame that would remain in the party and to which the government would need to adapt.

The second challenge to the initial government defensive procedural frame appeared in the format of an opposition counter frame in mid-December 2001. This counter frame was first
voiced by Diaspora groups in USA through online newsletters, but was eventually adopted and propagated by the opposition Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP) in Ethiopia and reported on by opposition, independent and even government media (Radio Ethiopia 2002-02-10; Radio Ethiopia external service 2002-03-17). Partially mirroring the less widely publicized alternative frame offered by the March 2001 insider “hardline” group, this public opposition counter frame rested on two interrelated problems with separate yet related solutions. First, the counter frame criticized the Algiers Agreement and the mandate of the EEBC to run counter to Ethiopian interests in that it prevented Ethiopia from pursuing its historical and legitimate claim to the Red Sea through the port city of Assab. It claimed that if the EEBC was allowed to complete its mandate Ethiopia would become officially landlocked and economically “choked”. Instead the Ethiopian people should inform the UN, revoke the EEBC mandate, and find an alternative dispute resolution mechanism that allowed Ethiopia to regain control of the Afar Red Sea region in Eritrea (Mebrek 2001-12-20; 2002-02-21; Addis Tribune 2002-02-15; Addis Tribune 2001-12-21; 2002-03-08; 2002-03-15; Deki-Alula Ethiopian Online Newsletter 2002-01-17; 2002-01-30; 2002-02-10; 2002-02-24; 2002-03-21; 2002-04-8; Tobya 2002-02-21). A parallel aspect of this frame regarded the Ethiopian government not being truly representative of Ethiopian national interests. In its most extreme form the criticism went as far as identifying the Prime Minister and the ruling government to be Eritrean agents using the EEBC as a vehicle to knowingly relinquishing Ethiopian territories to Eritrea (Deki-Alula Ethiopian Online Newsletter 2002-01-14; 2002-01-17; 2002-03-09; 2002-03-12; 2002-03-23; 2002-04-03). In short, the opposition counter frame not only sought to shift focus to substantial territorial issue and division but it proposed a problem definition that went far beyond the mandate of the EEBC, ensuring that all potential decisions would fall short of satisfying the Ethiopian rightful claim, and furthermore defined the legal process as a vehicle for treachery. As such, it was a move completely opposite to the theorized issue isolation reframing. This opposition counter frame grew in intensity and was manifested in public meetings and protests organized by the EDP in the final months before the EEBC passed the decision in 13 April 2002 (Africa Research Bulletin 2002 (2):14736). While the opposition hardline counter framing had the potential to incur political costs for implementation by mobilizing a national popular perception of foreign policy failure, the direct threat of political costs through the legislative should be downplayed given that the EPRDF controlled 481 of the 547 seats in the politically important lower house, and that elections were not upcoming until 2005.
The outcome oriented procedural frame

Reacting to these two challenges the government frame is arguably adapted in December 2001 as the legal process is coming to an end. While retaining the core aspects of the initial defensive procedural frame (Radio Ethiopia 2002-02-10; 2002-04-2; 2002-04-08; Radio Ethiopia external service 2002-03-23; Walta Information Centre 2002-03-27; ENA 2002-04-01; 2002-04-09) the government starts introducing a parallel focus on the substantial territorial outcome and an expected victory in the upcoming legal decision in its reporting on the issue (Walta Information Centre 2001-12-14; Radio Ethiopia external service 2001-12-24; Radio Ethiopia 2002-01-18; 2002-03-26). In a possible adaption to the internal and external challenges the government starts linking expectations on a “just” and “non-political” ruling by the EEBC to statements of their assured expectations of the decision to be in line with Ethiopian national interests (ENA 2001-12-19; Radio Ethiopia 2002-01-18; 2002-01-29; 2002-02-10; Ethiopian TV 2002-02-19). This adaptation is argued to be crucial because it constituted a slide in government motivation towards an incorporation of a more outcome oriented focus that would theoretically provide less political cover in the face of a legal decision that demanded territorial concessions. In short, it was a move towards a more hardline depiction of the dispute and its solution.

The third critical obstacle to the Ethiopian government’s ability to eventually implement the EEBC decision under the political cover of a procedural legitimacy frame was the government self-entrapment following the decision by the EEBC. As the EEBC issued its decision on 13 April 2002 the Ethiopian government, still facing the full force of the opposition counter frame, declared itself the winner in the legal process. Apparently convinced that all contested areas of importance, including the symbolically important town of Badme, had been ruled in its favor, the government continued to champion the new outcome oriented frame which portrayed the claimed substantial territorial victory through the legitimate process of legal dispute resolution as a continuation of the military victory in the war (Walta Information Centre 2002-04-13; 2002-04-14; 2002-05-28; Ethiopian TV 2002-04-13; Radio Ethiopia 2002-05-27). In addition to the conflation of the substantive and the procedural values of the solution, the government was also quick to use the claimed victory as proof of the irresponsible nature of the opposition counter frame (Radio Ethiopia 2002-04-15; ENA 2002-04-17). In short, the Ethiopian government mistakenly vested the credibility of its legitimacy frame in a mistaken victory.

While the Ethiopian government seems to have realized their mistake regarding the interpretation of the decision as soon as May 2002 when it asked the EEBC for a clarification
of the verdict (Campbell 2014:53), it relied on silence in the domestic public sphere up until February 2003 before it finally acknowledges that Badme had been ruled to Eritrea.

Throughout 2002 reporting however indicate that the opposition counter framing continued in full force, and that the frame dispute within the TPLF once again picked up. Following the publication of the EEBC decision the opposition soon questioned the government claim regarding the ruling on Badme (Deki-Alula Ethiopian Online Newsletter 2002-04-14; 2002-05-03; Ethiop 2002-07-03) and instead continued to claim that the government had actually been using the legal process to ensure Eritrean annexation of indisputably Ethiopian territories (Deki-Alula Ethiopian Online Newsletter 2002-04-14a; 2002-04-14b). The counter frame also continued to focus on the importance of an alternative solution that would ensure Ethiopian access to the Red Sea through Assab (Deki-Alula Ethiopian Online Newsletter 2002-04-13; Addis Tribune 2002-04-19; Africa Research Bulletin 2004 (2):15644). In addition to this counter frame, opposition media reported on internal disputes within the TPLF in which the prime minister and his closest group in face of internal dissent tried to gather support for procedural legitimacy reframing and an unconditional implementation of the EEBC decision (Deki-Alula Ethiopian Online Newsletter 2002-03-09; 2003-06-26; Netsanet 2002-03-12; 2002-05-03; Ethiop 2002-07-03; Addis Admas 2002-09-07).

The procedural in reverse frame phase
It is here argued that the new frame adopted by the Ethiopian government, when it finally broke the public silence on the matter in February 2003, was an adaption to the three challenges that it faced in the format of the opposition counter frame, the internal frame dispute and the self-entrapment of its conflation of its initial procedural frame with the focus on a claimed substantial territorial victory as a continuation of the military victory in 2002. Given the presence of all these three factors it seems apparent that the government had not been able to establish the dominance of a procedural frame, and that the domestic political cover for a territorial concession in February 2003 was minimal. Although reportedly having tried to gather party support for the procedural frame, which is interpreted as willingness on part of Ethiopian government to actually implement the concessions given it could establish political cover, the Ethiopian government at this point faced a dual problem. It had minimal political cover for implementing the decision which by now was apparent to entail major Ethiopian concessions, and yet it had invested in a framing of the legal process as legitimate and just, a framing which risked creating political blowback if it chose to renege on the decision.
What followed was a government discourse of rejection of the decision that is best described as a procedural frame in reverse. In sum, the government reversed its stance on the competence and fairness of the EEBC, saying that while the legal process was the right way to address the dispute the EEBC had failed to consistently and correctly apply the legal principles that should have governed the issue, and that as long as the EEBC refused to correct its erroneous interpretation Ethiopia deemed the decision illegal an illegitimate (Walta Information Centre 2003-02-25; 2003-05-05; 2003-05-28; 2004-02-18; Ethiopian TV 2003-04-05; 2004-07-10; ENA 2003-04-04; 2004-01-20; 2004-01-19; 2004-01-25; 2004-04-22; Voice of the Tigray Revolution 2003-08-01). The frame is termed procedural in reverse because the argument basically said that Ethiopia sought a legitimate resolution based on international law, i.e. it focused on the process and the principles. At the same time it set the condition that the current decision by the EEBC did not fulfill those standards and as such would not be legitimate until it was corrected. In a complicated maneuver, the Ethiopian government sought to create consistency in its procedural frame, while condemning the actual decision. However, given the description of the current EEBC decision as illegitimate the new framing did not provide political cover for concession-making and implementation, but rather political cover for rejection.

Following a period of relative quiet, the government once again changed its frame in November 25 2004 when the prime minister explained to the Parliament, live covered by Ethiopian TV (2004-11-25) that while the decision by the EEBC was illegal and illegitimate, Ethiopia could accept it “in principle” as the better of two bad things. The prime minister further explained that the previous stance of rejection by Ethiopia had been understood as counterproductive by the international community and that this clarification of the Ethiopian stance might serve to garner increased international support and understanding for the position. This change is interpreted as an introduction of a short lived international reputational frame. Even so, the new Ethiopian frame still conditioned the implementation on being open to discussion on changes in the physical demarcation. As such, not much was substantially changed in the Ethiopian position, apart from the change in the frame towards the domestic and international public to which the decision was framed as conditionally acceptable, if not legally legitimate or desirable (Ethiopian TV 2004-11-26a; 2004-11-26b; 2004-12-03). Arguably, both the procedural legitimacy and international reputational augments were now mainly used to motivate the status quo, in between implementation and outright rejection.
The government initiative immediately rekindled the opposition counter framing. The “acceptance in principle” was dubbed a concession and betrayal of the Ethiopian national interests (The Reporter 2004-12-10) and the two main opposition coalitions united on the issue to reiterate their counter frame in rejection of the peace process through the Algiers Agreement (The Reporter web site 2005-01-02; Addis Tribune 2005-01-07) and arranged a protest against the peace plan that is reported to have gather thousands of people in Addis Ababa on January 2 2005 (Addis Tribune 2005-01-07; Africa Research Bulletin 2005 (1):16059; The Reporter web site 2005-01-08). Less politicized sources also questioned the new government position for its vagueness and instead asked for a clear policy either in favor or against the implementation of the EEBC decision (The Reporter web site 2005-01-16; 2005-01-21).

The government position on the EEBC verdict and the possibility for its implementation served as one of the top issues over which the opposition criticized the government in the 2005 elections, although admittedly trailing after economic mismanagement and ethnic favoritism (ICG 2005: 6). The 2005 elections provided an unwelcome wake up call for the government, as they had to give up several of their seats in the parliament. Most importantly, the elections and the subsequent riots in Addis Ababa, the capitol region in which the opposition moreover claimed all the regional council seats, signaled a widespread popular dissatisfaction with the government. While acknowledging that the government still maintained control of the legislature, the elections nonetheless indicated that the Ethiopian general political landscape had turned more critical of the incumbent government, a situation in which further policy failures such as implementation of an unpopular territorial concession could not be afforded.

In the final version that was to be kept for the rest of the deadlocked process the Ethiopian government settled for the procedural in reverse frame. The government continued to stress that the dispute could only be resolved through international law and that the legitimacy of such a resolution was the only thing that could ensure regional peace. However, the government continued to declare that the decision of the EEBC was not in line with those principles, and as such illegitimate and unlawful. Even so, the decision could be acceptable, as the better of two bad choices, to provide the starting point for a solution based on dialogue and corrections in the implementation of the decision (Ethiopian TV 2005-10-16; 2006-02-02; 2006-03-28; 2006-09-30; ENA 2005-11-07; 2006-02-02; 2007-02-14 ). In order for this implementation to be initiated and carried out Eritrea and the EEBC however had to show a greater degree of flexibility (MFA 2008-08-15; 2008-12-07). As such, the Ethiopian government had arrived at a frame which
rather provided political cover for non-implementation than for implementation of the EEBC decision.

Summary of the Ethiopian frame process
The failure of the Ethiopian government to implement the EEBC decision that entailed territorial concessions can be attributed to the failure of the government to establish the dominance of a procedural legitimacy frame. This failure has three principal reasons. First, an internal frame dispute in the ruling party of the Ethiopian government motivated a move away from the initially adopted procedural frame into a hybrid frame that combined the procedural fairness aspect with an increased focus on substantial territorial outcomes. Second, the emergence of a counter frame publicly championed by the political opposition in Ethiopia that criticized the legal process for sacrificing the national interests of Ethiopia. Both these challenges served to reinforce a hardline and indivisible problem definition that focused on territorial integrity or even aggrandizement. No issue isolation reframing was ever present in the Ethiopian case. Third, the partial self-entrapment of the Ethiopian government in the introduction of an outcome-oriented focus in the framing of the legal dispute resolution process also contributed to the failure. Despite reports of internal as well as external attempts by the government to emphasize and ensure the dominance of a procedural frame that allowed for the implementation of the decision, the government seems to have encountered such stiff counter framing, internal frame disputes and frame entrapment that the final version of the government frame rather legitimized stalemate and non-implementation than implementation.

Nigeria – Delayed implementation following the gradual decline of a hardline frame
The Bakassi dispute involved the governments of Nigeria and Cameroon throughout the period of 1994-2008. Following Nigerian independence from UK in 1960 and Cameroonian independence from France in 1961 the parties saw sporadic military incidents regarding their partially undemarcated border from the 1960s and onward. The Bakassi peninsula dispute escalated in January 1994 following the stationing of a major Nigerian military force in the area, resulting in some months of regular fighting, although leading to less than 25 casualties (UCDP, Nigeria). As a consequence of the militarized dispute, Cameroon filed a case to the ICJ on March 29th 1994, asking it to establish the Cameroonian/Nigerian border, as well as demanding Nigerian withdrawal from areas considered part of Cameroon. Nigeria disliked the
judicial process; instead favoring negotiated solutions to the dispute, but due to both countries having signed the optional clause 36 of the ICJ statute the case could be handled without Nigerian consent (Lukong, 2011:85-92). In 1996 the conflict reached its highest levels throughout the dispute, resulting in an estimated 56 casualties. Sporadic fighting occasionally resurfaced throughout the whole period of the dispute, but remained on low levels after 1996. At a tripartite meeting in Paris on September 5th 2002, less than a month prior to the issuing of the verdict, Kofi Annan managed to get the then Nigerian president Obasanjo to promise to respect the upcoming decision (Keesing’s record of world events, 2002:44968). However, as the ICJ issued its verdict on October 10th 2002, placing Bakassi in Cameroon, Nigeria backtracked on its commitment and criticized the verdict. Following a new UN tripartite meeting in November 2002, the parties agreed to set up the ad hoc Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC) to implement the verdict. Nigeria however remained contradictory in stating that it had neither accepted nor rejected the verdict (Lukong, 2011:119). Nigeria however accepted the CNMC timetable for the handover of Bakassi in 2003 (EIU 2004:9). While missing the first deadline, Nigeria thereafter referred to technical difficulties in explaining their failure to implement the verdict. Following a fifth and last tripartite meeting on June 12th 2006 the Greentree Agreement was signed between the parties, assuring Nigerian handover of Bakassi (Lukong, 2011:132f). Part of the peninsula was thereafter relinquished on August 14th 2006, resulting in one notion of implementation (EIU 2006:23), while the westernmost parts were handed over on August 14th 2008 as scheduled, resulting in the complete implementation (Keesing’s record of world events, 2008:48719).

Four distinct frame phases can be identified in Nigerian public discourse from the escalation of the conflict to the implementation of the agreement: the hardline phase, the mixed phase, the return of the hardline phase and the decline of the hardline phase. While having championed a hardline frame of the dispute resolution process up until the final months before the ICJ verdict, the Nigerian government reframed the dispute to limit the indivisibility of the issue and introduced both procedural legitimacy and international reputation motivations in support of implementation of the legally ruled territorial concession. Hardline counter framing from both national and local politicians, the free media and civil society actors discouraged implementation in the first years following the verdict, but gradual reduction of the hardline counter framing and increased support for the government reframing decreased the costliness
and allowed for implementation. The slow shift away from the hardline frame is thus in line with the delayed implementation of the ICJ ruling.

The hardline frame phase
Using the 1994-1996 years of height of military escalation as the baseline for the Nigerian public framing of the Bakassi border dispute with Cameroon, the Nigerian government established a clear hardline frame. Given the military rule during the initial period, both government and military actors portrayed the dispute as concerning Cameroonian inability to accept the Nigerian territorial integrity (Radio Nigeria-Lagos 1994-03-16; NTA TV 1995-06-21; 1996-10-22; 1998-05-29; Radio Nigeria 1996-09-21; 1996-09-22; 1996-09-23) and constituting a direct threat to the safety of Nigerians (NTA TV 1994-02-25; Radio Nigeria 1996-09-23). Problem definition thus revolved around indivisible issues such as territorial sovereignty and the cause of Cameroonian aggression (Radio Nigeria-Lagos 1994-03-18; NTA TV 1994-03-31; 1995-02-14; 1998-03-06; Radio Nigeria 1996-02-08). While intermittently tempering the rhetoric and calling for bilateral or third party supported dialogue and peaceful solutions to the issue (NTA TV 1994-03-03; 1994-03-05; 1996-03-08; 1996-10-01; Radio Nigeria 1994-12-06), the Nigerian government also favored military self-defense as the proposed solution at times of increased tension (NTA TV 1994-03-02; 1994-03-11; Radio Nigeria 1996-08-07).

Following several failed rounds of attempted dialogue or mediation Cameroon unilaterally requested the ICJ to rule on the dispute 29 March 1994 (Lukong 2011:85-92). Preferring a bilateral solution, the Nigerian government and the domestic media provided varied hardline approaches to the applicability, or lack thereof, of the legal dispute resolution. Accounts varied from framing it as belligerent strategizing driven by French involvement (NTA TV 1994-03-02; 1994-03-11; Radio Nigeria-Lagos 1994-03-06) to a counterproductive process that should be thrown out of court (Radio Nigeria 1995-12-21; NTA TV 1998-03-04); both proposed solutions that delegitimized the legal process. In alternative accounts, the government touched upon procedural legitimacy framing when explaining their reluctant participation in the proceedings because of how the legal process required them to defend their case (NTA TV 1994-09-02), but also provided hardline descriptions where Nigerian victory in the legal process was expected (Radio Nigeria 1996-03-18; NTA TV 1996-03-18). While disparate in their exact framing, the government descriptions of the legal process up until the change to civilian rule in 1999 lacked procedural legitimacy arguments in that focused on the appropriateness of a legal process and procedures. Combined with the dominance of hardline problem definition of the
territorial dispute, I argue that substantial changes to the domestic political discourse seemed warranted in order to provide political cover for a possible future implementation of a potential unfavorable legal ruling.

The mixed frame phase
In February 1999 Nigeria saw a change to civilian rule. Followed by a liberalization of the media this change in government and civil society opened up avenues for new framing agents to appear in the domestic political discourse. Having already seen a change for the better in relations with Cameroon in the final year of the military transition to civilian rule, the government started to more often describe the territorial issue as a dispute between two disagreeing and at times cooperating parties, rather than Cameroonian aggression and failure to recognize Nigerian indisputable sovereignty (Radio Nigeria 1999-05-18; Radio Nigeria-Lagos 2001-10-30; The Guardian 2002-01-04; 2002-09-11). Arguably, this shift in problem definition reduced the dominance of issue indivisibility in the public accounts of the dispute and constituted a first instance of issue isolation framing. However, as the free media entered the stage they provided both narratives echoing the old hardline and aggression frames (Vanguard web site 2002-01-09; The Guardian 2002-09-04; 2002-09-07) as well as the more recent dispute and cooperation frames (The Guardian 2000-04-03; BBC Monitoring quotes from the African press 2002-01-23). Also, as the ICJ moved closer to issuing a verdict on the dispute, government accounts of Cameroonian aggression reappeared (The Guardian 2002-03-17; Vanguard web site 2002-08-05), contributing to a fairly mixed domestic political discourse on the dispute and its character.

Concerning the appropriateness of the legal process, the delegitimizing or hardline-oriented accounts still dominated, despite the introduction of new framing agents. The government continued to either voice its preference for an alternative and more appropriate dispute resolution mechanism (The Guardian 2002-03-08), or described the legal process as a way to prove ownership (The Guardian on Sunday 2002-03-03; NTA TV 2002-03-10), rather than focusing on procedural framing in favor of the procedural competence, fairness or appropriateness of the use of international law. Both national and free media echoed these approaches in their own reporting (Voice of Nigeria external service 1999-05-17; NTA TV 1999-05-26; Vanguard web site 2002-08-05). It is thus striking that even though the Nigerian president, in a trilateral meeting with his Cameroonian counterpart and the UN Secretary General in Paris 5 September 2002, committed to respect the upcoming ICJ verdict, the Nigerian domestic political discourse had provided few accounts of the legal process that would
support the legitimacy of an implementation of an unfavorable ruling. The only exception appears just after the mentioned meeting when a military source castigates the Nigerian media for undue inflammatory reporting on the issue, stating that the government and the military canvasses for respect for the ICJ process (The Guardian on Sunday 2002-09-08). Arguably, this late and undeveloped attempt at procedural framing of the legal dispute resolution process was too little, too late to provide political cover for an unfavorable verdict.

Return of the hardline frame phase
The ICJ delivered its verdict 10 October 2002, ruling in favor of Cameroon on Bakassi, but dividing the rest of the less contentious border areas between the parties. The fate of Bakassi was immediately realized in Nigeria, but the government emphasized that it was inappropriate to talk about winners and losers in the current situation and stated that it would need to review the complete verdict and its implications before providing a more developed comment on the issue (NTA TV 2002-10-10; The Guardian 2002-10-11). While the government resorted to silence, the public media was quickly dominated with hardline framings of the unfavorable verdict. The free media, national assembly representatives, political opposition, local political representatives of the state containing Bakassi, youth groups and local inhabitants all expressed opposition to the verdict. The process was described as an extension and result of western colonial interests and domination (BBC Monitoring quotes from the African press 2002-10-17; 2002-10-18; NTA TV 2002-10-15; The Guardian 2002-10-20). Bakassi was once again framed as indivisibly Nigerian territory (Vanguard 2002-10-11), the verdict as a threat to the national identity of the locals (BBC Monitoring quotes from the African press 2002-10-18; 2002-10-23) and a tool for Cameroonian aggression (Vanguard 2002-10-11; BBC Monitoring quotes from the African press 2002-10-23). Regarding proposed solutions, the verdict was used as proof of the failure of Nigerian soft line international policy and a motivation for more hardline assertiveness (BBC Monitoring quotes from the African press 2002-10-23). Alternatively, the verdict had to be replaced by a referendum regarding national belonging to be held in Bakassi (The Guardian 2002-10-20; BBC Monitoring quotes from the African press 2002-10-18; 2002-10-22). In the most extreme version, representatives in the national assembly, under the name of Bakassi Peoples Self-determination Front (BPSF), framed Bakassi as the God given land of the Nigerian locals, dubbed the ICJ verdict as slavery and the result of colonialism, and expressed disgust for soft-liners who recommended implementation (The Guardian 2002-10-30). Voices in favor of implementation were limited to Nigerian lawyers who provided
procedural arguments in favor of respecting the legal process, despite the regrettable outcome (The Guardian on Sunday 2002-10-13; The Guardian 2002-10-14).

At the background of the dominant hardline framing of the process the government made a statement close to rejection of the verdict on 24 October 2002. In its statement the Nigerian government faulted the verdict both in form and process. Arguably coming close to a problem definition of indivisibility, the statement claimed that the issue could not be considered just merely concerning territory and oil, but that Nigeria had to protect the interests of its local citizens. Furthermore, the government applied a delegitimizing procedural framing in stating that the ICJ board had contained judges partial to the interests of several European states, as such impairing the impartiality of the body (The Guardian 2002-10-24; 2002-10-25). The government criticism was quickly supported by both the free media, national assembly representatives, NGOs and independent lawyers (BBC Monitoring quotes from the African press 2002-10-29; The Guardian 2002-10-26; NTA TV 2002-10-29; The Guardian 2002-11-03). However, while the Nigerian government seems to have adapted to the dominance of the hardline framing in the immediate aftermath of the ICJ verdict, it quickly tempered its rhetoric and started to back down less than a week later. First the President backed down on the procedural critique, instead saying that the judgement might be right in form, but that the human aspects and consequences of the verdict still needed to be considered (The Guardian 2002-10-30). Second, the Permanent representative of Nigeria to the UN emphasized that Nigeria had never rejected the verdict, but rather made comments on the ruling. He further expressed concern over irresponsible statements offered by some high level Nigerian politicians (The Guardian on Sunday 2002-11-03).

Observing the domestic political discourse of the territorial dispute and the legal process around and immediately after the ICJ verdict, it comes as no surprise that the Nigerian government failed to outright endorse the ruling and commit to implementation of the legally ruled concession. In sum, hardline and issue indivisible framing of both the issue at stake as well as the appropriateness of the legal process was championed by almost all framing agents, and dominated the domestic political discourse. The President and the executive were already in a perilous domestic situation at the time of the ICJ verdict. In August 2002 the lower house of parliament had endorsed an ultimatum to the President to either withdraw from office or face impeachment (The Guardian 2002-08-30). While this threat never materialized, it nonetheless signaled a lack of internal cohesion in the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) since the ultimatum received broad support even form the PDP legislators. This lack of internal party
discipline echoed in the Bakassi issue where several of the legislators and regional representatives that opposed the verdict came from the PDP. Implementation would arguably entail serious political cost under these conditions. However, in the coming years the government engaged in a UN supported process of gradual implementation of the ICJ verdict. While implementation on the Bakassi areas was especially contentious and delayed until 2006 and 2008 respectively, the government spearheaded a change in domestic political framing that would enable implementation under more favorable domestic political conditions. While the government reframing was challenged with counter frames from local and national political representatives throughout the whole process, these counter frames also changed in critical aspects that arguably reduced the political cost of implementation.

The decline of hardline frame phase

Three critical developments in the dispute process are identified as important in order to understand this gradual reframing of the territorial dispute and the legal solution: the UN-brokered bilateral agreement in 15 November 2002 where both parties agreed to handle the dispute peacefully, the 15 September 2004 failure of Nigeria to implement the verdict regarding handing over Bakassi in accordance with the established time frame, and the 12 June 2006 UN brokered Greentree agreement where Nigeria finally agreed to implement the final parts of the verdict, i.e. handing over Bakassi. The Greentree agreement was then implemented according to plan on 14 August 2006 and 14 August 2008.

Starting with the 15 November 2002 agreement, this deal signaled the change in dispute framing on part of the government for the future of the dispute resolution process. As an outcome of the meeting the parties agreed to establish the ad hoc Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC) to facilitate the peaceful implementation of the ICJ verdict. While the Nigerian government remained unclear regarding if it had unconditionally accepted the verdict it nonetheless agreed to the timetable for the handover of Bakassi, to be implemented 15 September 2004. While failing to adhere to the timetable, following the November agreement the government continuously described the issue as a dispute between two equal partners and mainly concerning how to ensure the interests of the local population (The Guardian 2002-11-18; 2003-02-05; 2003-08-11; NTA TV 2003-02-01; 2003-02-05; 2003-06-09; 2004-10-04; 2006-08-21; Radio Nigeria-Lagos Channel 1 2005-09-13; Radio Nigeria-Abuja 2005-10-14; 2005-09-13). Cameroon was no longer described as an aggressive party, the territory was not indivisible or indisputably Nigerian, and the interests of the locals were not directly tied to Nigerian control of the area. In short, when it came to problem definition, the territory was
diluted of symbolic value and Cameroon was not a threat to national security in the government discourse. This was arguably a clear case of issue isolation framing. Furthermore, the government started to apply both procedural and reputational arguments as motives in favor of implementation of the ICJ verdict. While the government never denied that the verdict was a serious emotional loss for Nigerians regarding Bakassi, it nonetheless argued that the Nigerian respect for the rule of law in general and international law in particular (The Guardian 2003-12-19; 2004-07-14; This Day 2004-07-11; 2006-06-15; Minaj Broadcast International TV 2005-07-06; Nigerian radio-Abuja 2006-06-15; 2006-06-23; 2006-07-22; 2007-05-19; NTA TV 2008-08-14) as well as the Nigerian international reputation concerning staying true to international commitments (The Guardian 2003-11-03; Radio Nigeria-Abuja 2004-11-14; 2007-05-19; 2007-11-30; This Day 2007-12-03; NTA TV 20071216; 2008-08-14) demanded respect for the ICJ ruling. While these arguments were first not applied regarding Bakassi, the government reframing was arguably helped by the fact that several of the less contentious areas of the border were delimited and demarcated in line with the ICJ verdict before the Bakassi issue was brought back to the center stage in 2004. By applying the procedural and reputational motives in support of implementation of the less salient border areas (The Guardian 2004-02-09; This Day 2004-07-11) these arguments could gain public traction before being extended to the more emotional Bakassi area. In fact, no counter frames were provided regarding these less contentious border areas.

Counter frames were instead provided in three waves; the first before the first planned implementation; the second after the signing of the Greentree agreement and the third ahead of the final implementation. As it became clear that the CNMC had actually set a timetable for implementation of the ICJ verdict regarding Bakassi, hardline counter framing of both the territorial dispute and the appropriateness of the legal verdict were again provided, this time by the traditional ruler of Bakassi and representatives in the Nigerian national House Assembly. Sharing the hardline framing, both actors stressed that implementation constituted a threat to territorial integrity and the national identity of the locals (Radio Nigeria-Lagos Channel 1 2004-09-02; 2004-09-14; This Day 2004-09-14). They further argued that the government had a constitutional obligation to protect these values (This Day 2004-07-14), demanded rejection of the ICJ verdict and proposed the arrangement of a local plebiscite to determine the fate of Bakassi (The Guardian 2004-05-21; BBC Monitoring Weekly Prospects 2004-09-07). This hardline framing once again emphasized the indivisible character of the dispute and delegitimized the legal process as a solution (The Guardian 2004-04-28). The potential traction
of this hardline framing was supported by the fact that even national media picked up on the counter framing (NTA TV 2004-09-14). The government and other framing agents offered few challenges to this hardline frame during 2004 and the government failure to meet the deadline for implementation on 15 September could thus be understood at the backdrop of a renewed upsurge in hardline framing of the Bakassi dispute. Even so, the government did not revert to hardline framing themselves this time, but instead offered technical explanations to the failure of implementation (NTA TV 2004-10-04; Radio Nigeria-Lagos Channel 1 2004-11-02).

Following a new tripartite meeting in Greentree, New York, 12 June 2005, Nigeria agreed to implement the ICJ verdict regarding Bakassi and 14 August 2006 and 2008 were set as deadlines for a two-step handover of the peninsula. This time the government sternly motivated the commitment to implementation with both procedural and reputational arguments (Nigerian radio-Abuja 2006-06-15; This Day 2006-06-15). Furthermore, the government was now supported in their pro-implementation framing by both local politicians and senators that had provided part of the hardline counter framing in 2002 (Nigerian radio-Abuja 2006-06-23; 2006-07-22), as well as by the military (Rhythm FM radio from Rivers State 2006-06-30; The Guardian 2006-08-13). This reduced the potential for a frame dispute within the government political support base. Even so, hardline counter frames were provided by the traditional ruler of Bakassi, selected senators, a former minister and local Bakassi students (Vanguard 2006-06-14; 2006-06-16; Rhythm FM radio 2006-06-24; The Guardian 2006-06-29). The hardline counter frames emphasized the same issues as previously. While the first implementation of the ICJ verdict on 14 August 2006 might be seen as problematic given the remaining presence of a hardline frame in the Nigerian domestic political discourse, it becomes more understandable when considered in relative terms. Compared to 2002 and 2004 the discourse had changed from dominant hardline to mixed concerning the legitimacy of the legal process. Furthermore, the problem definition regarding the dispute was now also contested. The government had succeeded in winning support for its issue isolation framing, focusing on the welfare of the locals rather than the symbolic connection between people, identity and territory. Concerning framing agents, 2006 saw an increase of actors supporting the government’s pro-implementation framing. All in all, the changes in domestic political discourse of the issue had reduced the costliness of implementation in 2006 as compared to the years earlier.

This change in the framing was reinforced in the last round of counter framing in subsequent years. Nigeria saw the first civilian to civilian transfer of power following the elections in 14 and 21 April 2007. As the Nigerian constitution did not allow President Obasanjo to compete
for a third term in power he was succeeded by Yar’ Adua from the same party. As Obasanjo relinquished power, the Nigerian Senate started to voice criticism of his handling of the Bakassi issue. In November 2007, 22 senators presented an acquired parliamentary approval for a motion to stop the planned handover of the final parts of Bakassi. However, as the critique was mainly directed towards outgoing President Obasanjo, the counter frame provided by these senators was less hardline regarding the territorial issue. Regarding problem definition, the critique mainly avoided arguments of territorial integrity or identity politics, as is seemed that the senators had accepted the issue isolation framing of the issue. Instead the main line of criticism regarded a procedural critique of the failure of due process in signing the Greentree agreement. Supported by some of the free media the senators claimed that the Nigerian constitution prevented handing over territory without the ratification of the National Assemblies (This Day 2007-11-30; 2007-12-07; The Guardian 2007-12-10). However, while some critics demanded an alternative solution rather than implementation of the ICJ verdict (The Guardian 2007-12-10; This Day 2007-12-17), most senators did not question eventual implementation but rather required ratification prior to handing over the territory (This Day website 2007-12-10; 2008-01-10; Vanguard website 2007-11-27; The Guardian website 2007-12-18; Radio Nigeria-Abuja 2008-01-17). Against this critique the government, other senators and legal experts as well as free media commentators argued that Nigeria had to honor its international commitments and international law (Radio Nigeria-Abuja 2007-11-15; 20071130; The Guardian 2008-01-19; This Day 2007-11-30; 2007-12-03; 2008-01-01; Vanguard 20071202; NTA TV 2007-12-16). As such, while still contested, the implementation on 14 August 2008 was now only in face of a predominantly non-hardline domestic procedural frame that emphasized the importance of internal due process, rather than a major hardline counter frame. This additional shift away from the hardline frame of both the territorial dispute and the appropriateness of a legal solution, as compared to previous year is thus in line with the proposed theory.

Summary of the Nigerian frame process
The Nigerian government initially championed a hardline frame of the territorial dispute and the legal process that provided minimal political cover for an implementation of the unfavorable ICJ ruling in 2002. The government nonetheless managed to gradually reframe the dispute and the perception of the legal verdict to a point where implementation could be carried out under less costly political conditions. While statements ahead of the ICJ verdict can be interpreted as a willingness to allow the legal process to end the territorial dispute, domestic political
discourse following the ruling seem to have made outright support for and implementation of the verdict too costly. However, the gradual change in Nigerian government behavior in the process following the ICJ verdict correlates well with a gradual change in dispute framing. Faced with massive hardline framing from local actors in the immediate aftermath of the verdict, the government resorted to a hardline frame themselves. However, following UN brokering, the government agreed to a continued peaceful dispute resolution process and changed its framing accordingly. Seeing gradually decreasing hardline counter frames offered at each critical step in the following implementation process, the government responded with delay and implementation in a manner that corresponds to a decrease in political cost for implementation. Encountering renewed hardline counter frames in 2004, the government delayed its implementation, but refrained from adapting the hardline framing themselves. Gaining support for its isolated problem definition and procedural and reputational arguments after the Greentree agreement from other framing agents, the government concluded a first round of implementation on 14 August 2006, despite some hardline counter framing. Seeing an additional shift away from hardline into limited procedural counter framing following the change in Presidential power, the new administration implemented the final parts of the legally ruled territorial concession on 14 August 2008.

Concluding discussion

The analysis suggests three findings that contribute to an improved understanding regarding legal dispute resolution and domestic political cover.

First, the findings support the overarching argument developed in the paper. Implementation of legally ruled territorial concessions are conducted under circumstances where the domestic political discourse have changed to decrease the political costliness of staying true to the verdict. While both cases saw initial hardline problem definition championed by both governments, Nigerian compliance was carried out in a situation of issue isolation, procedural and reputational reframing. Importantly, the Nigerian government had also succeeded in garnering support for their adjusted frame from other framing agents. While the Ethiopian government was arguably better positioned at the initiation of the legal process, having championed a procedural legitimacy argument from the start, they nonetheless moved towards an increased emphasis on the hardline aspect of their dispute frame, as an adaption to stern counter framing. The Nigerian delayed implementation and the Ethiopian non-implementation are both in line with the argument made.
Second, the findings suggest that the key differences between the two cases revolves around issue isolation and international reputation framing. While procedural legitimacy framing might be a theoretically attractive avenue for dispute reframing in favor of dispute termination through implementation of legally ruled concessions, the analysis shows that procedural framing is a double-edged sword. Both governments used procedural framing at times as a way to delegitimize the legal verdict, motivating rejection rather than implementation. This is especially apparent in the Ethiopian case where the procedural argument is conditioned by the hardline problem definition of the dispute. The Nigerian case also saw procedural framing used to delegitimize or at least to motivate stalling an implementation process when applied to the connection between domestic and international legal obligations. The final round of counter framing concerning the breach of constitutional due process is a case in point. It rather seems that issue isolation and reputational framing was the driving factors in the Nigerian case. As both of these aspects were predominantly missing in the Ethiopian case further inquiry might help to clarify if these aspects should be considered the main drivers in fostering conditions favorable to dispute termination through legally ruled concessions.

Third, the study shows the importance of treating the legal dispute resolution tool as an adaptive and transformative process and not just as a one shot solution. Looking at the time order in the two cases one finds that the reframing away from the hardline frame was enacted well after the legal process had been adopted in the Nigerian case, while the opposite was true for the Ethiopian case. If we had taken a snapshot of the domestic political discourses at the adoption of the legal processes the Ethiopian case would have seemed best suited for providing political cover for implementation. By examining this case over time it becomes apparent that the Ethiopian government engaged in both an external frame contest and an internal framing dispute that provided obstacles to government actions that otherwise seems to have shown a preference for using the legal dispute resolution process as a vehicle to end the territorial dispute through territorial concessions if necessary. As such the Ethiopian case seems to contribute to the theory development of the domestic political constraints approach by clarifying the conditions under which political cover can be denied governments aspiring for it.

Admittedly there are at least two alternative explanations that the research design of this study cannot adequately control for. Recognizing the other main theoretical strand in the research on legal dispute resolution the current case selection does not sufficiently control for international guarantees and pressure as an alternative explanation to implementation (Gent and Shannon 2010; 2014). Admittedly, the Ethiopian government faced no serious international pressure in
the format of sanctions as a consequence of its non-implementation (Lyons 2006:24). At the same time the Nigerian government was subjected to international pressure throughout the process (The Guardian 2006-06-18). Also, the perceived degree of foreign policy failure could be dependent on the outcome of the military actions before the legal verdict. As the Nigerian-Cameroonian dispute was of comparably low intensity and characterized by stalemate while the Ethiopian government was described as military winners, implementation in the Ethiopian case would arguably be more sensitive to a relative perception of foreign policy failure.

In conclusion, this paper has provided the first qualitative inquiry into the proposed political cover inducing effect of legal dispute resolution. Based on an in depth analysis of the legal dispute resolution processes involving Nigeria and Ethiopia it serves to bolster the importance of the domestic political discourse on territorial disputes as an explanation to decisions to implement legally ruled concessions. Implementation is only seem in cases where governments have abandoned hardline framing and managed to sway the domestic political discourse to mirror this change. It furthermore specifies that within this domestic political discourse, issue isolation reframing and international reputation arguments seem to be crucial for government aspirations of overcoming hardline depictions of the dispute and its appropriate solution. Previous proposals of procedural legitimacy arguments as a main driver in issue reframing is however not supported, as procedural arguments can be used in support of both hardline and accommodative policies. Acknowledging the inferential limitations of this two case setup, it is the hope of the author that additional case studies can further explore the proposed importance of dispute framing coupled to legal dispute resolution as a remedy to highly salient territorial disputes.
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Radio Ethiopia

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The Guardian web site
The Reporter
The Reporter web site
This Day website
Toby
Vanguard web site
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Voice of the Tigray Revolution
Walta Information Centre web site
Appendix 1.

Main components of questionnaire:

1. **Who is the framing agent?**

   Who is the framing agent? This could be government actors, news reporters, opposition representatives, international actors, etc.

2. **Problem definition**

   What is the problem at hand? What is threatened and why is it a problem?

3. **Cause identification**

   What is the cause and source of the problem? Is there someone to blame for the problem? Is there a causal process explaining the problem presented?

4. **Solution identification**

   What is the proposed solution to the problem? What is the purpose and goal of the proposed solution?

5. **Motives identification**

   Are there any motives or reasons presented as to why the proposed solution is appropriate and should be adopted/supported?
Appendix 2.

Search string used for Ethiopia:

badme OR eebc OR Ethiopia AND eritrea AND adjudication OR Ethiopia AND Eritrea AND arbitration OR ethiopia AND eritrea AND "international court" OR Ethiopia AND Eritrea AND "boundary commission" OR Ethiopia AND Eritrea AND "border commission" OR Ethiopia AND Eritrea AND "frontier commission" OR Ethiopia AND Eritrea AND “world court”

Search string used for Nigeria:

bakassi OR bakasi OR nigeria AND cameroon AND adjudication OR nigeria AND cameroon AND arbitration OR nigeria AND cameroon AND "international court" OR nigeria AND cameroon AND "boundary commission" OR nigeria AND cameroon AND "border commission" OR nigeria AND cameroon AND "frontier commission" OR nigeria AND cameroon AND “world court”