




J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld,
and Ted Robert Gurr



PEACE AND CONFLICT 2008

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



About CIDCM

The Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) is an interdisciplinary research center at the University of Maryland. CIDCM seeks to prevent and transform conflict, to understand the interplay between conflict and development, and to help societies create sustainable futures for themselves. Using the insights of researchers, practitioners, and policy makers, CIDCM devises effective tools and culturally appropriate pathways to constructive change.

For more than twenty years, scholars and practitioners at the Center have sought ways to understand and address conflicts over security, identity, and distributive justice. CIDCM's programs are based on the belief that "peace building and development-with-justice are two sides of the same coin" (Edward Azar, CIDCM founding director). CIDCM's accomplished scholars, its expertise in data collection and analysis, and its direct involvement in regional conflict management efforts make the Center a unique resource for discovering enduring solutions to the world's most intractable conflicts.

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CIDCM collects, analyzes and links data relevant to the study of the dynamics of societal conflicts. The aim is to expand data capabilities to facilitate cross-disciplinary research among scholars and policy analysts concerned with aspects of societal conflict, state failure, and minority rights. The Center hosts several major international databases on societal conflict, including Minorities at Risk, Polity, and International Crisis Behavior.

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The Center provides on-the-ground training for parties to specific conflicts, as well as programs that feature conflict resolution training for students and government officials. The Partners in Conflict program has provided training in

citizens' diplomacy and conflict resolution in more than 15 countries, and the ICONS Project creates interactive tools for teaching and training in negotiation, leadership, and conflict management techniques. CIDCM also offers an undergraduate Minor in International Development and Conflict Management.

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Strategically located at the nexus of theory and practice, CIDCM seeks to foster a conversation among scholars and policy makers, and to use global analyses as a basis for concrete recommendations for the policy community. Extensive field experience, subject matter expertise, and command of both quantitative and qualitative methods provide CIDCM researchers with a strong foundation for advancing cutting edge policy analysis. In this regard, its biennial publication *Peace and Conflict* reports major global and regional trends in societal conflict, development, and governance issues. Other recent examples of analyses offered by the center's researchers include assessments of policy regarding the use of information technology in development, democratization, strategies for conflict mitigation and resolution, and approaches for sustainable development and peace.

In addition, two CIDCM endowed chairs, the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development and the Baha'i Chair for World Peace, seek to bridge the gap between the academic and policy worlds and develop alternatives to violent conflict.

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A Note on the 2008 Publication

Peace and Conflict is the flagship publication of the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland. Readers of this fourth volume in the series will note changes in authorship, approach, data resources, substantive scope, and mission. The first three volumes (2001, 2003, and 2005) were prepared and written by Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr. Monty Marshall is now Director of Research, Center for Global Policy, School of Public Policy, George Mason University. Joseph Hewitt and Jonathan Wilkenfeld have joined Ted Robert Gurr in the preparation of the 2008 volume.

Beginning with this volume, all analyses will use data sources that have been released to the public and are available for further analysis and replication. This publication continues coverage of several topics that appeared in earlier ones: the Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger, trends in global conflict, the spread of democracy, and self-determination movements and their outcomes. It also includes five chapters on a special theme: "Challenges to the Stability of States."

The complete edition of *Peace and Conflict 2008* is available from Paradigm Publishers. The partnership between CIDCM and Paradigm will facilitate wider dissemination of *Peace and Conflict* to the academic and policy communities and provide the opportunity for students to understand, replicate, and extend our analyses.

This volume also introduces two new outlets for resources and research related to the contents of the book. The *Peace and Conflict* companion Web site features a suite of data analysis tools (www.cidcm.umd.edu/pc). Users will be able to explore data used for analyses reported in this issue by manipulating the data and making modifications to produce their own customized analyses. We are also launching the web-based Peace and Conflict Working Paper Series which will feature article-length papers that expand on issues related to the contents of *Peace and Conflict*.

This executive summary represents a part of CIDCM's commitment to make its findings available to the policy community. An electronic version of the summary can also be found on the CIDCM Web site (www.cidcm.umd.edu) and is available from the Center upon request (cidcm@cidcm.umd.edu).

During the transition to this new format and approach, we have been guided by the advice of our newly appointed Editorial Board, chaired by Ted Robert Gurr, a founding author of the *Peace and Conflict* publications. These specialists provided careful reviews of each of the substantive chapters in this volume. In the future they will participate in biennial consultations and advise on the content and shape of future volumes. We are very grateful for their valuable contributions to this book. The members are identified on the inside of the back cover of this summary.

1. INTRODUCTION TO PEACE AND CONFLICT 2008

The modern age demands that we think in terms of human security...a concept that acknowledges the inherent linkages between economic and social development, respect for human rights, and peace....Until we understand and act accordingly, we will not have either national or international security.

*Mohamed ElBaradei, October 24, 2006
Sadat Lecture for Peace, University of Maryland*

Previous editions of *Peace and Conflict* reported evidence of a sustained post-Cold War decline in armed conflicts within states and a growing capacity of states, acting singly and multilaterally, to avoid and end internal wars. This volume has no such clear story line. New evidence, and a closer look at old evidence, suggests that if there was a global movement toward peace in the 1990s and early years of the 21st century, it has stalled. Some positive trends are still evident but they are offset by new challenges. These challenges point to a *conflict syndrome*—a collection of factors that often operate concurrently to undermine the stability of states and erode the foundations of human security. Taken together, the essays in this volume explore aspects of these factors.

- Has the magnitude of armed conflict declined? The answer is yes when judged by falling numbers of internal wars and their average death-tolls across the last 20 years. But when we tabulate the number of states engaged in armed conflicts, either their own or multilateral wars as in Iraq and Afghanistan, the long-run trend is up. A larger portion of the global community of states is involved now than in any other time in the past six decades (see chapter 11). And the historic low of 19 ongoing armed conflicts in 2004 was followed by an increase to 25 in 2005.
- Are deadly conflicts more avoidable now than in the past? International crises, which in the past often led to armed conflict within and among states, have declined in number since the mid-1980s (see chapters 3 and 8). Many separatist conflicts have been contained, especially long-lasting ones like those in Northern Ireland and Indonesia's Aceh province (see chapter 5). But overall new armed conflicts have been erupting at roughly the same pace for the past 60 years. Moreover, an unusually large number of "new" conflicts began in 2005–06, and some were born from the failure of past peace processes, as in Sri Lanka and Azerbaijan.
- Has the "third wave" of democratization continued to rise? Full democracies have numbered about 80 since the mid-1990s (77 in 2006) compared with fewer than 40 autocratic regimes (34 in 2006). Democratic governance is the norm in the early 21st century but in recent years more regimes have edged into anocracy—a middling category of regimes with an incoherent mix of authoritarian and democratic features (chapter 4). The existence of 49 anocratic polities in 2005 is of particular concern because, as a group, they are much more susceptible than either full democracies or autocracies to political instability and armed conflict (chapter 2), to terrorist attacks (chapter 6), and to international crises (chapter 8).
- Is state failure merely a local concern? While the global community is increasingly aware of the dreadful conditions facing the populations of unstable and failing states, *Peace and Conflict* carefully traces the dangerous propensity for these states to host domestic and international terrorist organizations (see chapter 6). Equally alarming is the likelihood that these states will become participants in crises either on the regional or global stage. A staggering 77 percent of all international crises in the post-Cold War era have involved at least one unstable or failing state (see chapter 8). As Mohamed ElBaradei (2006) has recently observed, we must acknowledge the inherent linkages between economic and social development, respect for human rights, and peace.
- How is the international community responding to old and new conflict challenges? Since 2000, the number of active peacekeeping operations has been more than double the number at any point during the Cold War. They are about equally divided between UN operations and those by regional organizations. In one-fifth of all 126 missions undertaken since 1948 there was no "peace" to keep, and instead peacekeepers had to use force proactively. Success

rates have been about equally good for UN and regional missions, and substantially higher than alleged by skeptics (chapter 10).

- Are civilians more secure from armed conflict? The average lethality of war has declined for those caught up in combat, but not for civilians in guerrilla wars. Of 81 states that fought large-scale insurgencies from 1945 to 2000, one in three resorted to mass killing of civilians thought to support the rebels. The greater the civilian support for guerrillas and the greater the guerrilla's threat to the government, the more likely governments are to choose a deliberate policy of mass killing (chapter 9). Such a policy of genocidal violence and ethnic cleansing has caused at least a quarter-million deaths in Sudan's Darfur region in the last three years. A weak African Union peacekeeping force with a limited mandate can do little more than observe the suffering. Darfur is the worst failure of the international responsibility to protect civilians since the Rwandan genocide of 1994.

Local and regional threats to peace are of greater concern to most people than global patterns. From 1980 to 2005 there were no significant trends, up or down, in fatalities from warfare in either Asia (if the Afghan civil war of 1976–2003 is excluded) or the Middle East (excluding the Iran-Iraq war of 1980–88). Africa experienced an irregular decline, more pronounced if the Congo-centered wars of the late 1990s are excluded. In Europe the wars accompanying the breakup of Yugoslavia sent the trend sharply upward until 2001. Only the Americas show a steady and significant declining trend over the 25-year span (chapter 11).

Regional trends are of little help in anticipating specific future challenges to security. The *Peace and Conflict* Instability Ledger in chapter 2 assesses each country's risks of future political instability based on five factors as measured in 2004. They are regime anocracy, high infant mortality, lack of integration in the global economy, high levels of militarization, and warfare in neighboring states. Of the 25 countries with the highest risks for political instability and internal war—ten or more times greater than the average risks in the OECD democracies—19 are in Africa, two in the Middle East (Iraq and Lebanon), three in Asia (Afghanistan, India, and Bangladesh, with Cambodia just below the threshold), and only one in the Americas (Haiti, though Brazil and Bolivia are not far behind). Some of these countries, including India and Ethiopia as well as Iraq and Afghanistan, confront ongoing insurgencies. The risk factors used are background conditions, not predicated on armed conflict per se, so prospects for peace in these countries are not good irrespective of current events or conflict outcomes.

Country risks of instability do shift over time: Mozambique, Iran, and Peru were among the ten highest-risk countries as of 2000 but now have moved down to middle levels of risk—principally because of domestic political changes in Iran from anocracy toward autocracy, and in Peru from anocracy toward restoration of full democracy. Congo and Rwanda, both devastated by civil war and mass killings in the 1990s, also are now at middle levels of risk, appreciably lower than most of their neighbors (see chapter 2).

Terrorism, especially by Islamists, is an existential threat to security in all world regions. This issue of *Peace and Conflict* reports on two new data collection projects that have already yielded several important generalizations about global and regional patterns of terror. One analysis, in chapter 7, is specific to ethnic and religious minorities in the Middle East and reports two particularly striking findings. First, most of the 112 organizations representing minorities in this region did not use terrorism between 1980 and 2004—the period covered by the study. Those that do typically have alternated among electoral politics, protest, and violence—often pursuing several strategies simultaneously. Terrorism is used, avoided, or abandoned depending on political circumstances. Second, democratization in the Middle East has led to increases in *both* conventional politics and terrorism. It remains to be seen whether these patterns also will be observed in other world regions.

Chapter 6 reports a first-ever global study that includes all international and domestic terrorist events. Currently it covers 1970 to 1997 and is being extended to the present. One distinctive pattern can be seen—the principal locales of terrorism are shifting over time. In the 1970s terrorism was mainly a European problem, in the 1980s a serious threat in Latin America, in the 1990s an Asian and African challenge (chapter 6). When data collection is current it will no doubt confirm the perception that terrorism is now most common in, and likely to originate from, the Islamic world.

Let us revisit an issue raised by Monty Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr in their conclusions to the 2003 and 2005 editions of *Peace and Conflict*. What has been the impact of changing US policy on trends in global and regional security? This volume provides suggestive evidence. The US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq created or exacerbated international crises and pulled many allied states into combat operations in both countries. The lethality of conflict in Iraq has reached horrendous proportions for civilians. These wars also provide provocations and targets for terrorist attacks on the US and its allies. How far these attacks will spread and persist is beyond the current reach of our data and vision. Moreover the US promotion of democracy in these two countries provides space for partisan electoral politics by ethnic and religious groups but also, paradoxically, increases risks of terrorism. International efforts at peacekeeping continue apace, at the highest level of the past half-century, so it cannot be said that US invasions and unilateralism have dented the post-Cold War commitment of most international actors to contain and resolve local and regional conflicts. US policies may have exacerbated the problem but have not stopped the international community, or even US policymakers, from attempting to manage local wars and regional crises.

Peace and security are shifting targets. Armed conflicts declined to a historic low of 19 in 2004 only to increase in the following years. New conflicts begin, “settled” conflicts can reemerge or manifest themselves in new ways. Democratic regimes are generally more effective in containing conflicts and more likely to join international projects of conflict management, but new and partial democracies are potentially unstable. Their leaders may prove to be autocrats who, when tempted or challenged, will put aside democratic pretenses.

By itself, terrorism is not likely to be the most serious future challenge to international security. Rather, the most important threat to human security and state stability is the impact of a set of associated hazards, a *conflict syndrome*, that poses the gravest danger. The evidence presented in this volume leads us to conclude that high-risk states are simultaneously politically unstable, challenged by rebels and terrorists, tempted to resort to mass killings of civilians, and enmeshed in international crises. There are predictable pathways into these syndromes but no clearly marked exits.

Ted Robert Gurr
Joseph Hewitt
Jonathan Wilkenfeld

A conflict syndrome...poses the gravest danger...High-risk states are simultaneously politically unstable, challenged by rebels and terrorists, tempted to resort to mass killings of civilians, and enmeshed in international crises. There are predictable pathways into these syndromes but no clearly marked exits.

2. THE PEACE AND CONFLICT INSTABILITY LEDGER: RANKING STATES ON FUTURE RISKS

Which countries are at greatest risk of future civil conflict and instability? A definitive answer to that question would have great value to policy-makers. With reliable early warning about the states at greatest risk, scarce resources could be directed accordingly. Investment of preventive resources in high-risk states is preferable to managing the consequences of state failure. Those consequences are often enormous and catastrophic. In the wake of state failure, humanitarian crises and increased military violence can leave a gruesome human death toll. Failed states are more likely to provide havens for terrorist organizations. They may trigger international crises. Spillovers can destabilize nearby states and entire regions. The international costs to rebuild failed states are large, which can divert resources from other states at risk and contribute to conditions that may lead to a cascade of state collapses elsewhere. Effective early warning makes it more likely that these scenarios can be avoided or their harsh consequences mitigated.

Hewitt's chapter presents the new *Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger*—a ranking of 160 countries in terms of their *risk of future state instability*. The full listing of all states appears at the end of this section (see pp. 7–11). As we present details about the new ledger, we encourage readers to periodically consult it. The risk estimate for each country was obtained using a statistical model based on several variables known to be strongly related to the onset of instability events (or armed civil conflict). These include the incoherence of the governing regime, high infant mortality rates, lack of integration with the global economy, the militarization of society, and the presence of armed conflict in neighboring states. For each country, the ledger presents a single score that captures the overall risk of future instability. In addition, the ledger gives information about the level of statistical confidence corresponding to the risk estimate. This information can be just as important as the reporting of the estimate itself. A high level of confidence about an estimate for a state at risk can provide part of the basis for prioritizing resources for that state.

Fig. 2.1: Risk of Future Instability, 2007




Figure 2.1 presents a global map that summarizes the results of our analyses. Countries in the highest risk category are depicted in maroon, while countries with moderate risk are shown in gold. The low-risk countries are shaded in light blue. A cursory scan of the map reveals some well-known patterns about the regions most likely to be affected by political instability (and those that are not). For example, most African countries qualify for moderate or high risk. Not surprisingly, many countries with well-documented difficulties with past instability (e.g., Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan) have been found to have high-risk scores for future instability. And, of course, the analyses found that Western democracies with advanced, post-industrial economies tend to have a very low risk of instability. Clearly, it is worthwhile to note that the analysis confirms some of the broadest intuitions about political instability worldwide, but the findings from this research extend well beyond confirming what is already well-known. To explore some of the

more nuanced findings reported below, we turn first to a very brief description of how the analysis was constructed.

Hewitt's analysis focuses on a small set of factors representing four broad categories of state features and functions: the political domain, the economic domain, the security domain, and the social domain. Instability can emerge from factors in each of these domains, or—most likely—from combinations of them. Interested readers will find a detailed explanation of the quantitative indicators used to measure these five factors immediately following the full ledger at the end of the chapter summary.

The analysis draws from these four domains, identifying five factors that are closely related to the onset of political instability. From the political domain, the ledger accounts for the impact of *institutional consistency*. Regimes lacking institutional consistency—possessing a mix of both democratic and autocratic features—are more likely to experience instability. The ledger accounts for the impact of the economic domain by accounting for *economic openness*, which is the extent to which a country’s economy is integrated with the global economy. Countries that are more tightly connected to global markets have been found to experience less instability. For the social domain, the ledger examines the impact of *infant mortality rates*, an indicator that serves as a proxy for a country’s overall economic development and the level of advancement in social welfare policy. To account for the security domain, the ledger focuses on a country’s *level of militarization* and *neighborhood security*. Instability is most likely in countries with higher levels of militarization. Also, the likelihood of instability increases substantially when a neighboring state is currently experiencing armed conflict.

The ledger is based on the results of estimating a statistical model that accounts for the historical experiences of 160 countries with regard to episodes of political instability over the past six decades. The model estimates the statistical relationship between the future likelihood of instability and each of the five factors discussed above. Determinations about when a country experienced instability were based on a conceptualization of political instability developed through the work of the Political Instability Task Force (PITF). For more than a decade, the PITF has refined a broad definition of political instability that encompasses a wide variety of events that create significant challenges to the stability of states. These include revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, and genocides or politicides. The onset of any of these types of episodes for a state marks the beginning of an instability period. Using the model estimates for the causal weight assigned to each factor, we used data from 2004, the last year for which complete data are available for all five of our factors, to produce a three-year forecast indicating the risk of instability in 2007.

For each country, the ledger presents an array of information about the risks of future instability. The score for each country’s likelihood of future instability is presented as a *risk ratio*. The risk ratio gives the relative risk of instability in a country compared to the average estimated likelihood of instability for 28 member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). For example, Guatemala’s score of 7.3 should be interpreted as meaning that the risk of instability in that country is more than seven times greater than the average country in the OECD. Countries with scores in the top 25th percentile are categorized as high risk (denoted with a red circle in the ledger). Countries with scores falling below the global median are denoted as low risk (denoted with a green circle). The remaining countries are classified as moderate risk (denoted with a gold circle). Finally, the ledger reports a confidence range for every country’s estimate. Statistically speaking, the “true” risk of instability lies within this range with a 95 percent probability. Readers interested in more detail about the features of the ledger should consult the notes at the end of the country listings.

The analysis produced a rich and diverse set of findings that are too broad to summarize completely here. Accordingly, we offer only a snapshot of some of the most interesting results. Table 2.1 lists the 25 states with the highest estimated risk levels. Approximately three-fourths (19 of 25) of these states are African, an indication of the acute nature of the problems found in that region. No region rivals Africa in terms of the number of states at the highest level of risk for future instability. Of the 51 African states in the analysis, 28 are in the high risk category. Many others qualify for moderate risk, leaving just seven states on the entire continent qualifying at the lowest level of risk.

The methodology used to generate the rankings in the ledger can also be used to make assessments about progress over time. To illustrate, we produce risk ratios using data from 2000, creating an estimate for the likelihood of instability in 2003. Table 2.2 presents the 10

Table 2.1: Top 25 Highest Risk for Instability		
Rank	Country	Risk Ratio
1	Afghanistan	39.3
2	Iraq	29.9
3	Niger	29.7
4	Ethiopia	25.7
5	Liberia	21.1
6	Sierra Leone	20.9
7	Mali	20.7
8	Tanzania	18.9
9	Central African Republic	18.4
10	Djibouti	17.1
11	Ivory Coast	17.0
12	Zambia	14.8
13	Somalia	13.7
14	Nigeria	13.4
15	Bangladesh	13.1
16	Malawi	13.1
17	Benin	13.0
18	Kenya	12.9
19	Mozambique	12.7
20	Lebanon	12.1
21	Haiti	11.7
22	Chad	11.2
23	Burundi	11.1
24	India	10.7
25	Angola	10.5

Table 2.2: Top 10 Highest Risk Countries in 2003 and 2007

2003 Forecast			2007 Forecast	
Rank	Country	Risk Ratio	Country	Risk Ratio
1	Ethiopia	26.6	Afghanistan**	39.3
2	Niger	23.0	Iraq**	29.9
3	Tanzania	18.8	Niger	29.7
4	Central African Rep.	17.6	Ethiopia	25.7
5	Sierra Leone	16.4	Liberia**	21.1
6	Iran*	16.3	Sierra Leone	20.9
7	Djibouti	15.8	Mali**	20.7
8	Mozambique*	15.3	Tanzania	18.9
9	Peru*	14.9	Central African Rep.	18.4
10	Guinea-Bissau*	14.8	Djibouti	17.1

* Falls out of top 10 in 2007, ** New to top 10 in 2007

countries with the highest risk in 2003 alongside the 10 highest-risk countries from our current analysis. Since 2000, four countries (Peru, Iran, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau) have seen sufficient improvement in their circumstances to drop from the current top 10. Hewitt's chapter offers a description of developments in each of these countries to contextualize the shift in the estimated risk. We offer a brief outline here of how recent events in Peru led to changes in its forecasted risk.

The sharp drop in Peru's risk of instability is due in large measure to significant steps toward democratic consolidation, improvements in

social welfare policy, and increased integration with the global economy. In late 2000, amidst allegations of corruption and serious human rights abuses, President Alberto Fujimori fled his country and resigned his office. At the time of Fujimori's election in 1990, Peru had enjoyed a decade of relatively stable democratic rule. His election, however, was soon followed by a series of reversals to democratic governance as Fujimori relied on increasingly authoritarian measures to deal with guerrilla insurgency in the country. By 2000, mounting dissatisfaction contributed to pressures that led to his resignation. From 1990 to 2000, Peru's scores for regime consistency plummeted as it transitioned from a fairly stable, consolidated democracy to a regime with a combination of democratic and autocratic features, culminating in a risk ratio in 2000 of 14.9. Since Fujimori's departure and the elections of President Alejandro Toledo in 2001 and Alan Garcia in 2006, democratic attributes have strengthened considerably in Peru, leading to a restoration of high scores on regime consistency. Since 2000, Peru has also seen a 25 percent decline in its infant mortality rate, a reflection of greater governmental effectiveness in improving social welfare standards in the country. Also, Peru's total trade as a percentage of GDP increased modestly from 2000 to 2004, a reflection of growing integration with global markets and strong overall economic performance during this period. In all, positive developments in each of these three areas (regime consistency, infant mortality, and economic openness) lead to a dramatically lower estimated risk of instability for Peru (5.5). Peru ranked ninth in the world for risk of instability in 2000. Today, its ranking places it squarely in the middle of the pack among all Latin American countries.

To conclude, we note that the estimates listed in the following pages are based on measurements of large, structural forces that govern the possibilities for instability in any given country. This analysis should be complemented by other early-warning analyses that focus on more detailed information about high-risk countries that can be updated in weekly or monthly intervals. The ledger does more than simply highlight high-risk states. It provides information about the level of confidence attached to country assessments, which can serve as a basis for making distinctions among states with roughly equal risk levels. More important, the approach allows us to assess the progress of states as they move through periods of transition. This has great potential value because, for any given country, shifts in the constellation of key structural factors can alter future risks considerably. In the future, we will continue to monitor how changes in these structural factors affect assessments for high-risk states, as well as for states with borderline estimates. We will also be attentive to advances in identifying other indicators that are found to be effective predictors of future instability. This will serve to improve our underlying model by further reducing uncertainty about our predictions and strengthening the quality of forecasts.

The Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger

The Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger ranks states according to the forecasted risk of future instability. See notes on pp. 10–11 for a description of the color codes for each indicator and also a detailed explanation of the confidence range (note 10).

Recent Instability	Country	Regime Consistency	Infant Mortality	Economic Openness	Militarization	Neighborhood War	Risk Category	Risk Score	Confidence Range
Africa									
	Niger	●	●	●	●	●	●	29.7	17.7 44.4
	Ethiopia	●	●	●	●	●	●	25.7	16.1 39.5
	Liberia	●	●	●	●	●	●	21.1	11.4 36.9
	Sierra Leone	●	●	●	●	●	●	20.9	11.5 35.2
	Mali	●	●	●	●	●	●	20.7	11.8 32.5
	Tanzania	●	●	●	●	●	●	18.9	12.3 27.9
	Central African Rep.	●	●	●	●	●	●	18.4	10.4 29.1
	Djibouti	●	●	●	●	●	●	17.1	8.4 31.3
■	Ivory Coast	●	●	●	●	●	●	17.0	9.7 27.7
	Zambia	●	●	●	●	●	●	14.8	9.1 23.1
■	Somalia	●	●	●	●	●	●	13.7	8.6 21.6
	Nigeria	●	●	●	●	●	●	13.4	7.6 21.5
	Malawi	●	●	●	●	●	●	13.1	7.3 21.8
	Benin	●	●	●	●	●	●	13.0	8.4 19.3
	Kenya	●	●	●	●	●	●	12.9	7.4 20.7
	Mozambique	●	●	●	●	●	●	12.7	7.3 20.9
	Chad	●	●	●	●	●	●	11.2	5.4 20.7
	Burundi	●	●	●	●	●	●	11.1	6.5 18.0
	Angola	●	●	●	●	●	●	10.5	4.7 20.6
	Guinea-Bissau	●	●	●	●	●	●	9.3	4.8 16.6
	Botswana	●	●	●	●	●	●	9.1	4.7 15.1
	Madagascar	●	●	●	●	●	●	9.1	5.3 14.6
	Senegal	●	●	●	●	●	●	8.8	5.0 14.1
	Burkina Faso	●	●	●	●	●	●	8.3	5.0 12.9
	Guinea	●	●	●	●	●	●	8.1	4.6 12.8
	Lesotho	●	●	●	●	●	●	7.7	3.7 14.2
	Ghana	●	●	●	●	●	●	7.5	4.1 12.1
	Rwanda	●	●	●	●	●	●	7.5	4.5 11.6
	Namibia	●	●	●	●	●	●	7.3	4.4 11.3
■	Dem. Rep. of Congo	●	●	●	●	●	●	6.9	3.7 11.8
	Cameroon	●	●	●	●	●	●	6.8	4.2 10.5
	South Africa	●	●	●	●	●	●	6.5	3.8 10.3
	Togo	●	●	●	●	●	●	5.9	3.3 9.9
	Eritrea	●	●	●	●	●	●	5.2	2.3 9.9
	Mauritania	●	●	●	●	●	●	5.1	3.1 7.5
■	Uganda	●	●	●	●	●	●	4.9	2.8 8.1
	Equatorial Guinea	●	●	●	●	●	●	4.5	3.0 6.6
	Comoros	●	●	●	●	●	●	4.0	2.5 5.8
■	Sudan	●	●	●	●	●	●	3.7	2.2 5.6
	Gambia	●	●	●	●	●	●	2.8	1.6 4.5
	Congo	●	●	●	●	●	●	2.7	1.5 4.5
	Zimbabwe	●	●	●	●	●	●	2.5	1.6 3.9
	Gabon	●	●	●	●	●	●	2.3	1.3 3.8
	Swaziland	●	●	●	●	●	●	2.2	1.0 4.3
	Cape Verde	●	●	●	●	●	●	1.4	0.7 2.5
	Mauritius	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.8	0.4 1.5

Recent Instability	Country	Regime Consistency	Infant Mortality	Economic Openness	Militarization	Neighborhood War	Risk Category	Risk Score	Confidence Range
Asia									
■	Afghanistan	●	●	●	●	●	●	39.3	26.5 56.3
	Bangladesh	●	●	●	●	●	●	13.1	9.1 18.7
■	India	●	●	●	●	●	●	10.7	6.5 16.5
	Cambodia	●	●	●	●	●	●	7.9	3.8 14.0
	Tajikistan	●	●	●	●	●	●	7.3	3.6 13.4
	North Korea	●	●	●	●	●	●	7.2	2.6 16.0
■	Nepal	●	●	●	●	●	●	6.4	3.8 10.0
■	Myanmar (Burma)	●	●	●	●	●	●	6.2	3.9 9.3
■	Pakistan	●	●	●	●	●	●	5.2	3.3 7.9
	Papua New Guinea	●	●	●	●	●	●	5.1	2.5 9.3
	Indonesia	●	●	●	●	●	●	4.4	2.7 6.8
	Sri Lanka	●	●	●	●	●	●	4.4	2.3 7.8
	Fiji	●	●	●	●	●	●	3.6	1.9 6.0
■	Philippines	●	●	●	●	●	●	3.5	2.0 5.7
	Kyrgyzstan	●	●	●	●	●	●	3.5	1.7 6.2
	Kazakhstan	●	●	●	●	●	●	3.2	1.8 5.3
	Laos	●	●	●	●	●	●	3.2	1.9 4.8
	Malaysia	●	●	●	●	●	●	3.1	1.3 6.2
	Turkmenistan	●	●	●	●	●	●	2.8	1.5 4.9
	Bhutan	●	●	●	●	●	●	2.8	1.6 4.6
	Mongolia	●	●	●	●	●	●	2.7	1.2 5.2
■	Thailand	●	●	●	●	●	●	2.4	1.2 4.0
	Vietnam	●	●	●	●	●	●	2.3	0.6 5.8
	Uzbekistan	●	●	●	●	●	●	2.2	1.3 3.8
	China	●	●	●	●	●	●	1.5	0.8 2.8
	South Korea	●	●	●	●	●	●	1.3	0.5 2.5
	Singapore	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.9	0.3 2.6
	Taiwan	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.6	0.3 1.2
	Japan	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.5	0.2 1.1
	New Zealand	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.5	0.2 1.0
	Australia	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.5	0.2 1.0
Eastern Europe									
	Armenia	●	●	●	●	●	●	9.4	5.7 15.3
■	Georgia	●	●	●	●	●	●	8.2	4.7 12.9
	Russia	●	●	●	●	●	●	5.0	2.8 8.1
	Yugoslavia	●	●	●	●	●	●	4.5	2.4 8.0
	Albania	●	●	●	●	●	●	4.5	2.6 7.3
	Moldova	●	●	●	●	●	●	4.3	2.3 7.5
	Romania	●	●	●	●	●	●	3.8	2.2 6.1
	Ukraine	●	●	●	●	●	●	3.7	1.8 6.5
	Bosnia	●	●	●	●	●	●	3.6	1.6 6.9
	Azerbaijan	●	●	●	●	●	●	3.4	1.9 5.7
	Bulgaria	●	●	●	●	●	●	2.8	1.5 4.8
	Latvia	●	●	●	●	●	●	2.3	1.1 4.2
	Croatia	●	●	●	●	●	●	1.9	0.8 3.7
	Estonia	●	●	●	●	●	●	1.8	0.7 3.6
	Slovakia	●	●	●	●	●	●	1.4	0.6 2.8
	Lithuania	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.8	0.4 1.6
	Poland	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.7	0.4 1.4
	Belarus	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.7	0.3 1.6
	Hungary	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.7	0.3 1.4
	Slovenia	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.5	0.2 1.0
	Czech Republic	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.4	0.2 0.9

Recent Instability	Country	Regime Consistency	Infant Mortality	Economic Openness	Militarization	Neighborhood War	Risk Category	Risk Score	Confidence Range
Latin America and the Caribbean									
	Haiti	●	●	●	●	●	●	11.7	6.7 18.3
	Bolivia	●	●	●	●	●	●	7.6	4.5 12.1
	Brazil	●	●	●	●	●	●	7.5	5.1 10.9
	Guatemala	●	●	●	●	●	●	7.3	4.8 11.0
	Honduras	●	●	●	●	●	●	6.6	3.9 10.1
	Ecuador	●	●	●	●	●	●	6.3	3.8 10.0
	Guyana	●	●	●	●	●	●	6.0	2.9 10.4
	Nicaragua	●	●	●	●	●	●	5.9	3.4 9.5
	El Salvador	●	●	●	●	●	●	5.5	3.2 8.8
	Peru	●	●	●	●	●	●	5.5	3.4 8.4
	Mexico	●	●	●	●	●	●	4.9	3.0 7.9
	Venezuela	●	●	●	●	●	●	4.6	2.6 7.8
	Dominican Republic	●	●	●	●	●	●	3.8	2.3 6.2
■	Colombia	●	●	●	●	●	●	3.6	2.2 5.8
	Paraguay	●	●	●	●	●	●	3.2	1.9 5.1
	Argentina	●	●	●	●	●	●	2.9	1.6 4.9
	Jamaica	●	●	●	●	●	●	2.2	1.2 3.9
	Panama	●	●	●	●	●	●	1.6	0.8 2.8
	Chile	●	●	●	●	●	●	1.4	0.7 2.7
	Uruguay	●	●	●	●	●	●	1.1	0.6 1.8
	Costa Rica	●	●	●	●	●	●	1.0	0.4 1.8
	Trinidad and Tobago	●	●	●	●	●	●	1.0	0.5 1.6
	Cuba	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.5	0.2 1.2
Middle East and North Africa									
■	Iraq	●	●	●	●	●	●	29.9	20.0 43.2
	Lebanon	●	●	●	●	●	●	12.1	6.4 21.4
■	Turkey	●	●	●	●	●	●	7.2	4.6 11.0
■	Yemen	●	●	●	●	●	●	7.2	4.2 11.5
	Jordan	●	●	●	●	●	●	4.0	1.9 7.2
	Algeria	●	●	●	●	●	●	3.7	2.2 6.1
	Tunisia	●	●	●	●	●	●	2.8	1.4 5.1
	Morocco	●	●	●	●	●	●	2.4	1.3 4.0
	Iran	●	●	●	●	●	●	2.1	1.1 3.5
	Egypt	●	●	●	●	●	●	2.0	1.0 3.4
	Syria	●	●	●	●	●	●	1.4	0.7 2.5
	Libya	●	●	●	●	●	●	1.4	0.7 2.5
	Saudi Arabia	●	●	●	●	●	●	1.0	0.5 1.8
	Kuwait	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.7	0.3 1.6
	Bahrain	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.7	0.3 1.4
	Qatar	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.7	0.4 1.1
	Oman	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.6	0.3 1.1
■	Israel	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.5	0.2 1.1
	UAE	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.3	0.1 0.7
North Atlantic									
	Macedonia	●	●	●	●	●	●	2.9	1.5 5.0
	United States	●	●	●	●	●	●	1.0	0.4 1.9
	Cyprus	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.7	0.3 1.4
	Greece	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.7	0.3 1.3
	United Kingdom	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.7	0.3 1.3
	France	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.6	0.2 1.4
	Canada	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.6	0.3 1.2
	Italy	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.6	0.2 1.2
	Portugal	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.6	0.2 1.1
	Denmark	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.5	0.2 1.1
	Germany	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.5	0.2 1.1
	Netherlands	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.5	0.2 1.1
	Austria	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.5	0.2 1.0

Recent Instability	Country	Regime Consistency	Infant Mortality	Economic Openness	Militarization	Neighborhood War	Risk Category	Risk Score	Confidence Range
North Atlantic (cont.)									
	Ireland	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.5	0.2 1.0
	Switzerland	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.5	0.2 1.0
	Spain	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.5	0.2 1.0
	Norway	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.5	0.2 1.0
	Belgium	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.4	0.2 0.9
	Sweden	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.4	0.1 0.9
	Finland	●	●	●	●	●	●	0.4	0.1 0.9

Notes and Explanations for the Ledger

The ledger is based on a model that estimates the statistical relationship between the future likelihood of instability and each of the five factors in the chapter. We estimated the model based on data for the period 1950–2003 and found that each of the five factors were strongly related to the future risk of instability. Using the model estimates for the causal weight assigned to each factor, we used data from 2004, the last year for which complete data are available for all five of our factors, to produce a three-year forecast indicating the risk of instability in 2007. The color codes used in the ledger to present a country's standing on each of the five factors are based on the values in 2004. The notes below explain the various color codings.

(1) Recent Instability - This column indicates (with a red square) whether the country has been coded by the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) as being involved in an instability event as of the end of 2005. The country's risk score (see column 9) provides an assessment of the likelihood of the country's experiencing future instability. One might interpret the risk score for countries currently experiencing instability as the risk of continued instability, but we caution readers that the causal factors that drive the continuation of instability are likely not the same as the factors that drive the onset of instability.

(2) Country - The ledger examines only those countries with populations greater than 500,000 in 2004.

(3) Regime Consistency - The risk of future instability is strongly related to the extent to which the institutions comprising a country's political system are uniformly and consistently autocratic or democratic. Political institutions with a mix of democratic and autocratic features are deemed inconsistent, a common attribute of polities in the midst of a democratic transition (or a reversal from democratic rule to more autocratic governance). We expect regimes with inconsistent institutions to be more likely to experience political instability. In the ledger, highly consistent democracies (Polity score greater than or equal to 6) and autocracies (Polity score less than or equal to -6) receive a green marker. A red marker has been assigned to regimes with inconsistent characteristics that also qualify as partial democracies according to PITF. Regimes with these characteristics have been found to have the highest risk for instability. We assign a yellow marker to partial autocracies because the propensity for instability in these regimes is somewhat less than in partial democracies.

(4) Infant Mortality - Infant mortality rates serve as a proxy for overall governmental effectiveness in executing policies and

delivering services that improve social welfare in a country. High infant mortality rates are associated with an increased likelihood of future instability. The states with the best records are indicated with a green marker (scoring in the bottom 25th percentile of global infant mortality rates). States with the worst record (scoring in the highest 25th percentile) are indicated with a red marker. States in the middle 50th percentile are indicated with a yellow marker.

(5) Economic Openness - Closer integration with global markets reduces the potential likelihood of armed civil conflict and political instability. Policies that integrate global and domestic markets can produce higher growth rates and sometimes reduce inequality. To that extent, economic openness can remove or weaken common drivers for civil unrest related to economic grievances. We focus on the proportion of a country's GDP accounted for by the value of all trade (exports plus imports) as a measure for economic openness. The countries with the lowest score for economic openness are considered to be at the highest risk for instability. We designate these states with a red marker. The highest 25th percentile of states receive a green marker in the ledger. The middle 50th percentile receives a yellow marker.


(6) Militarization - Instability is most likely in countries where the opportunities for armed conflict are greatest. In societies where the infrastructure and capital for organized armed conflict are more plentiful and accessible, the likelihood for civil conflict increases. The ledger measures militarization as the number of individuals in a country's active armed forces as a percentage of the country's total population. Countries with militarization scores in the bottom 25th percentile are indicated with a green marker. Countries in the top 25th percentile are presented with a red marker. The middle 50th percentile is indicated with a yellow marker.

(7) Neighborhood War – The presence of an armed conflict in a neighboring state (internal or interstate) increases the risk of state instability. The contagion effects of regional armed conflict can heighten the risk of state instability, especially when ethnic or other communal groups span across borders. We use conflict data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Project at the International Peace Research Institute (Gleditsch et al. 2002) to determine the conflict status of states in 2004. For a neighbor to be considered involved in armed conflict, we further require that the conflict produces 25 or more battle-related fatalities per year. A red marker indicates when two or more neighbors are involved in armed conflict. A yellow marker indicates the presence of armed conflict in only one neighboring state. A green marker indicates the absence of armed conflict in all neighboring states.

(8) Risk Category - States have been placed in one of three categories corresponding to their risk score. Any state with a risk ratio in the top 25th percentile of all states qualifies for high risk (denoted with a red marker). A risk ratio greater than 7.3 places a state in the top 25th percentile. Any state with a risk ratio less than the global median (3.56) qualifies for the low-risk category (denoted with a green marker). Any state with a ratio between 3.56 and 7.3 qualifies for moderate risk (denoted with a yellow marker).

(9) Risk Score - The risk score gives a three-year forecast of the relative risk (compared to an average member of the OECD) of experiencing instability. The score is computed based on the results of estimating a statistical model using global data from the period 1950-2003. Then, using the model estimates, data from 2004 were used to obtain the three-year forecasts for each country for 2007.


(10) Confidence Range - The confidence range provides information about the degree of uncertainty corresponding to a country's estimated risk score. Statistically speaking, the "true" risk of instability lies within this range with a 95 percent probability. The width of the confidence range is drawn to scale. The widest confidence range observed in the data has been set to the width of the full column with all other confidence ranges drawn accordingly. When the bar is one color, the confidence range is confined to a single risk category. In cases where the confidence range spans multiple risk categories, the different colors of the bar reflect the extent of the overlap with those categories. Using a sample country (Ghana), the key below illustrates how to read the information contained in the graphic for each country's confidence range. The color green indicates the low-risk range, yellow indicates the moderate-risk range, and red indicates the high-risk range.



3. TRENDS IN GLOBAL CONFLICT, 1946–2005

This chapter provides a brief overview of trends in armed conflict. Hewitt's analyses reveal some troubling findings that suggest limits and potential reversals to the downward trend in conflict that began at the dawn of the post-Cold War era.

Fig. 3.1: Global Trends in Violent Conflict, 1946–2005



An analysis of the number of active armed conflicts worldwide (see Figure 3.1) shows a downward trend in the number of armed conflicts. That downward trend, which has been documented in previous volumes of *Peace and Conflict*, begins as the Cold War fades away. However, as the graph indicates, the number of active conflicts in the last year of complete data (2005) rose sharply from the previous total in 2004, a sobering reminder of the resiliency of human temptation to use force to resolve disputes.

A closer look at what happened in 2005 reveals that much of the “new” conflict in that year came from renewed hostility in conflicts that had seemingly terminated in previous years. For instance, in late 2005 violence broke out in Sri Lanka, rupturing a 2002 cease-fire agreement between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In Azerbaijan, sporadic clashes broke out over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, intensifying hostilities that had been relatively quiet for a number

of years. Similar renewals of violence occurred in Myanmar (Burma) and India. The resurgence of violence in these cases illustrates an important characteristic about the active conflict around the world. In any given year, most of the active conflicts have been ongoing for numerous years.

Fig. 3.2: Trends in Ongoing and New Conflict, 1946–2005




Hewitt builds on these observations by presenting some new analyses that indicate that the downward trend in conflict is not the result of effective prevention of new conflicts. Rather, the decline in active conflict worldwide is more the result of effective resolution of older conflicts that have been ongoing for several years. Figure 3.2 demonstrates why this is the case. Over the course of the post-Cold War period, the number of active conflicts that had been ongoing from previous years drops substantially. Over the same period, there is no discernible trend in the number of active conflicts that were newly initiated in that year. Indeed, for the past 60 years, the rate at which new armed conflicts emerge each year has been essentially unchanged.

One implication of these analyses is that efforts to prevent the outbreak of conflict lag behind efforts to resolve existing ones. That finding underlines the importance of continued effort by policymakers and researchers to develop better techniques for conflict early-warning and prevention.

4. TRENDS IN DEMOCRATIZATION: A FOCUS ON INSTABILITY IN ANOCRACIES

In 1950, the world was almost equally divided among autocracies, anocracies (or hybrid regimes), and democracies. In the following two decades, the departure of colonial powers from Africa and Asia resulted in an explosion in the number of independent countries. While newly independent colonies were almost as likely to adopt democratic constitutions as authoritarian structures, the institutional vacuums left by rapidly departing colonial powers most often resulted in a reversion to autocratic, frequently one-party, rule. By 1977, the year in which the number of autocratic regimes peaked, there were 89 autocracies, 16 anocracies and 35 democracies. Then, beginning in the late 1970s and accelerating through the 1980s, a wave of democratization took place. In 1991, shortly after the Cold War ended, there were more democracies (66) than either anocracies (47) or autocracies (44). The spread of democracy continued throughout the 1990s, and by 2006, there were 77 democratic countries, 49 anocracies, and only 34 autocracies in the world.

Fig. 4.1: Global Regimes by Type, 1950–2006



As Pate shows in Figure 4.1, democracy is clearly the norm in the twenty-first century. However, the majority of democracies today are relatively young, having had democratic institutions for less than a generation. Reflecting, perhaps, a lack of democratic consolidation in these younger democracies, the average Polity score for democracies in the post-Cold War era—a scale running from democracy through anocracy to autocracy—is significantly lower than the average during the Cold War era. So, while the continued spread of democracy is good news for the international community, the slow pace of democratic consolidation in younger democracies could be a concern. Also a matter of concern is the relatively large number of anocracies in the international system—a middle category of regimes having a mix of authoritarian and democratic institutional features.

Anocracies were more than twice as likely to experience genocide/politicide events and nearly two and a half times as likely to experience adverse regime change.


Multiple studies find a relationship between political instability and regime type. Data from the Political Instability Task Force, updated through 2005, show that as a category anocracies are more likely throughout the 1950–2005 time period to have experienced instability. Pate's analyses show that anocracies were more than twice as likely to experience genocide/politicide events and nearly two and a half times as likely to experience adverse regime change.

The outlook for political stability among different regime types is mixed. Democracies have seen radical improvement in terms of resistance to instability. This is despite the fact that the number of young democracies is relatively high. This is good news. Anocracies—although still more susceptible to instability than either autocracies or democracies—have seen gains in resistance to instability in the post-Cold War era. This is also good news. However, entrenched authoritarian regimes have not seen the same improvement and seem resistant to whatever factors are leading to improvements in democracies and anocracies.

5. SELF-DETERMINATION MOVEMENTS AND THEIR OUTCOMES

The quest of national and indigenous peoples for self-governance has reshaped the political landscape across many countries during recent decades. Some states and many autonomous regions within states have been formed as a result of such movements. Some of the worst humanitarian crises of the last 50 years have been associated with the struggles between ethnic groups and states over the legitimate sphere of state sovereignty.

Fig. 5.1: Trends in Conflicts for Self-Determination, 1956-2006



Quinn finds that as of late 2006, 26 armed self-determination conflicts were ongoing, including the Assamese, Kashmiri Muslims, Khasis/Jaintas, Meteis, Tripuras, and Scheduled Tribes in India; the Chin/Zomis Karens, Karenni, and Shan in Myanmar; the Palestinians in Israel; the Oromos and Somalis in Ethiopia; the Corsicans in France, and the Chechens in Russia. Despite instances of continuing warfare, the last two years have witnessed a continuation of a previously documented pattern: since the early 1990s there has been a sustained decline in the total number of armed self-determination conflicts and a countervailing shift toward containment and settlement (see Figure 5.1).

From 2001 to 2006, six violent self-determination conflicts were settled and 15 were contained. Settlements were reached to end the fighting of Afars in Djibouti; Albanians in Macedonia; and Easterners, Nuba, and non-Muslim Black Africans in southern Sudan. In addition, four conflicts were contained in 2005–2006 alone. Papuans in Indonesia and Basques

in Spain announced ceasefires in 2006 but have yet to engage in formal, meaningful peace negotiations. Acehese in Indonesia and Cabindans in Angola agreed to more extensive peace plans as part of their cessations of hostilities.

Self-determination movements may undergo a more or less linear progression from conventional politics to militancy, armed conflict, negotiation, settlement, and sometimes, independent statehood. More often, however, movements are neither linear nor necessarily progressive, as they may be thwarted by repressive policies, de-radicalized by government concessions, or induced to alter their tactics by new leadership, resource surpluses or deficiencies, or external influences. Armed conflicts that have been contained, even resolved, may resume.

The most common outcome of self-determination conflicts consists of a settlement between government and group representatives; sometimes a group gains better access to government decision-making or regional autonomy. Self-determination movements seldom result in a redrawing of international boundaries, but rather devolution of central power and redrawing of boundaries within existing states.

While the downward trend in the number of new and ongoing armed self-determination conflicts since the end of the Cold War is encouraging, relatively few post-World War II self-determination conflicts can be confidently considered ended.

While the downward trend in the number of new and ongoing armed self-determination conflicts since the end of the Cold War is encouraging, relatively few post-World War II self-determination conflicts can be confidently considered ended. In the absence of final agreements any of the 15 contained conflicts may revert to open warfare. In these situations, preventive actions and efforts at mediation and peacekeeping from international actors should be redoubled to keep the conflicting parties moving toward agreement (or a quick ceasefire) and away from hostilities. Such efforts are especially advisable during the early years of self-determination wars, when they are easiest to settle.

6. GLOBAL TERRORISM AND FAILED STATES

As international concern about terrorism has grown, researchers and policymakers have increasingly sought to understand terrorism by looking at the social, economic, and political characteristics of countries. LaFree, Dugan, and Fahey examine connections between a newly available measure of terrorist attacks—the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) covering the period between 1970 and 1997—and state failure, defined by the Political Instability Task Force as including “civil conflicts, political crises, and massive human rights violations that are typically associated with state breakdown.”

GTD comprises nearly 70,000 domestic and international events, and offers a broader definition of terrorism than is used in most open-source datasets.* It defines terrorism as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation. Neither the U.S. State Department nor the FBI definition of terrorism includes threats of force. Yet as Bruce Hoffman points out, “Terrorism is as much about the threat of violence as the violent act itself.”

The chapter offers a rich presentation of important patterns in the data, including yearly totals on terrorism events and on their lethality, on targets, types of attacks and weapons used, regional distributions over time, the top 25 most attacked countries, and top 25 terrorist groups by total activity.

Figure 6.1 presents yearly totals for regional terrorist activity. The graph illustrates how the geographic focus of terrorism has shifted over time. In the early years of the period, terrorism was largely a European problem. By the late 1970s, terrorist attacks in Latin America surpassed the totals in all other global regions. More recently, activity in Latin America has declined, while attacks in Asia have surged.

Not surprisingly, other analyses indicate that both total terrorist attacks and lethal attacks increased dramatically during this period. Latin America leads all other regions both in terms of total attacks and fatalities. While Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia are characterized by more fatalities than incidents, the reverse holds true for Europe and North America.

LaFree et al. find a clear and growing relationship between state failure and terrorism (Figure 6.2). Moreover, there is strong evidence that this relationship changes over time. During the 1970s, states that had never experienced failure had higher rates of attacks and fatalities; since then, states that had failed at least once have had higher rates of terrorist attacks. Differences are especially great with respect to numbers of fatalities. Terrorism risk appears to be a dynamic condition that is closely related to other forms of national crisis.

Fig. 6.1: Regional Terrorist Activity, 1970-1997





Fig. 6.2: State Failure and Terrorism, 1970-1997



* The data used to produce analyses in this chapter have been updated since publication. For information about the most recent data release, please contact the authors at the START Center (infostart@start.umd.edu) or visit <http://www.start.umd.edu>.

7. ETHNOPOLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Fig. 7.1: Strategies of Ethnopolitical Organizations, 1980–2004





Fig. 7.2: Shifts in Ideological Motivation, 1980–2004



right political continuum has remained fairly stable, the number of organizations motivated by *religion* (i.e., that advocate policies that incorporate religion into public life), *nationalism* (defined as desiring either independence or autonomy for a group of people), and *democracy* has risen dramatically (see Figure 7.2). The number of Middle East organizations that seek to incorporate religion into public life has risen from only 2 in 1980 to 23 in 2004. These preliminary findings show only moderate support for a relationship between religious orientation and violence and terrorism.

Potentially even more hopeful has been the rapid rise in organizations that support democracy, with an increase from 17 in 1980 to 62 in 2004. While some organizations that advocate democracy also use violence as a strategy, they are significantly less likely to use violence than those that do not claim to be committed to democracy.

In this chapter, Asal, Johnson, and Wilkenfeld focus on the identification of those factors that motivate some members of ethnic minorities to become radicalized, to form activist organizations, and to move from conventional means of politics and protest into violence and terrorism. Focusing initially on the Middle East, the Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) project provides information on the characteristics of those ethnopolitical groups and organizations most likely to employ violence and terrorism in the pursuit of their perceived grievances with local, national, or international authority structures.

This project has identified 102 organizations representing the interests of all 29 ethnopolitical groups in the Middle East and North Africa, operating between 1980 and 2004. While the majority of these organizations uses no violence at all in pursuing their goals, one-third did employ terrorism as a strategy at least once during this period.

The practice of ethnic politics in the Middle East has seen significant changes during this period (1980–2004). Interestingly, the proportion of organizations using violence as part of their repertoire has developed in two waves (see Figure 7.1), with the first peaking in 1986 when 5.2 percent of all organizations used violence, with a gradual decline through 1998 (1.6 percent used violence), followed by a second wave that peaked in 2001 (2.6 percent used violence), followed by another decline to 1.4 percent. This decline in the number of organizations using violence has occurred in the context of an overall increase in the number of organizations (39 in 1980; 96 in 2004). It should be noted, however, that these data, which currently end in 2004, do not fully capture the developments in Iraq since the U.S. invasion.

The analysis also shows a shift in ideological motivation: while the number of organizations on a traditional left-

8. UNSTABLE STATES AND INTERNATIONAL CRISES

At-risk states are not a new phenomenon, but their presence in the post-Cold War international structure has unleashed tensions that had heretofore been confined to the domestic realm. Wilkenfeld explores the potential ramifications of state instability for global system and regional subsystem security.

State instability is understood to include outbreaks of revolutionary or ethnic war, adverse regime change, and genocide. The occurrence of one or more of these deeply disruptive phenomena not only weakens the societies in which they flourish, but also makes the regional and global systems more insecure. Weak and unstable states might engage in diversionary tactics to distract the population from deteriorating conditions at home, while external forces, be they diaspora populations, external groups with ethnic or religious ties to the homeland, or other forces seeking strategic advantage in a vulnerable locale, can come together to create a dangerous system dynamic. The confluence of these conditions renders these unstable states particularly vulnerable to crisis involvement.

Seventy-seven percent of all international crises in the post-Cold War era (1990–2005) include one or more actors classified as unstable, fragile, or failed at the time of the crisis, up from 22 percent in the bipolar era following World War II, and 56 percent for the polycentric period (1963–1989). This is dramatic evidence that not only are these states extremely prone to destabilizing events internally, but they also possess an inordinate propensity to become involved in external destabilizing events, i.e., international crises.

This extension of the dangers of instability from the domestic to the international realm is indeed a defining characteristic of the current international system, and one that bears close scrutiny. And it points up the importance of establishing instability watch lists, so that the international community can anticipate these escalating situations while there is still time to marshal the regional and international resources needed to defuse them.


Seventy-seven percent of all international crises in the post-Cold War era (1990–2005) include one of more actors classified as unstable, fragile, or failed at the time of the crisis.

The chapter develops a set of indicators along which judgments can be made about states' instability and the consequences for the system stability, i.e., a way to identify those unstable and fragile situations that have serious potential to escalate to international crises. This *Crisis Vulnerability Index* accounts for a state's past experience with political instability and involvement in international crisis. The index places states in one of four categories depending on whether the state experienced instability and/or crisis involvement at any point during the 2000–2005 period (see Figure 8.1).

Fortunately, the majority of members of the international community—107 or 66 percent of the total—are both stable domestically and not currently or recently involved in international crises. Spread across all regions of the globe, these states constitute the basis for the continued stability of the international system and its regional subsystems. They create neighborhoods of stability—much of Europe and the Western Hemisphere—where institutional and informal arrangements exist to deal with potential fragility and with conflict before they interact to form a lethal dynamic.

But the world will not be a secure environment until the cycle of instability and crisis, linking human security with international security, becomes a priority for the entire international system.

Fig. 8.1: Crisis Vulnerability Index, Geographic Distribution



9. MASS KILLING OF CIVILIANS IN TIME OF WAR, 1945–2000

Table 9.1: Mass Killing in Wars, 1945–2000

Guerrilla War	Civil Wars	Start Year	End Year
●	China-Communists	1946	1949
●	Colombia	1948	1962
●	China-Tibet	1956	1959
●	Vietnam, Rep. of	1960	1975
●	Iraq-Kurds	1961	1975
●	Sudan	1963	1971
	Nigeria-Biafra	1967	1969
	China-Cultural Revolution	1967	1969
●	Cambodia	1970	1975
●	Pakistan-Bangladesh	1971	1971
	Burundi	1972	1973
●	Guatemala	1974	1984
●	Ethiopia (Eritrea)	1974	1991
●	Ethiopia (Tigre-Ideology)	1974	1991
●	Angola	1975	1991
●	Indonesia-East Timor	1975	1982
●	Ethiopia (Ogaden)	1977	1982
●	Afghanistan	1978	1992
●	El Salvador	1979	1991
●	Uganda	1981	1986
●	Sudan	1983	1999
●	Iraq-Kurds	1985	1988
●	Somalia (Barre vs. SNM Isaacs and others)	1988	1991
	Rwanda	1990	1994
●	Burundi	1991	1999
	Yugoslavia-Bosnia	1992	1995
●	Russia-Chechnya	1994	1996
Guerrilla War	Extra-systemic Wars	Start Year	End Year
●	Franco-Indochinese of 1945	1945	1954
●	Franco-Algerian of 1954	1954	1962
Guerrilla War	International Wars	Start Year	End Year
	Korean War	1950	1953

The killing of civilians is a common consequence of armed conflict. Huth and Valentino estimate that between 18 and 25 million civilians have died in civil, international, and colonial wars since 1945 (see Table 9.1 for list of wars with the highest totals). They argue that frequently civilian deaths during war are not just the result of “collateral damage” but are part of a deliberate policy of targeting noncombatant populations. Why do some wars escalate to the massive, intentional killing of civilian populations?

The authors focus on the strategic incentives for targeting civilians created by certain forms of combat. They argue that the intentional killing of civilians during war is often a calculated military strategy designed to defeat powerful guerrilla insurgencies. Unlike more conventional combatants, guerrillas often rely directly on the civilian population for logistical support. Directly defeating a large, well-organized guerrilla army can be extremely difficult because guerrilla forces themselves usually seek to avoid decisive engagements with opposing forces. As a result, counterinsurgent forces often choose to target the guerrillas’ base of support in the population, which can in turn lead to the intentional killing of massive numbers of civilians.

The study examines 81 states that have faced large-scale guerrilla insurgencies between 1945 and 2000, finding a total of 27 cases of mass killings. Across all of the statistical models reported, the results strongly support the authors’ theory of guerrilla warfare and mass killing. Guerrilla warfare proved to have highly significant and powerful effects on the likelihood of mass killing. Expectations about the characteristics of guerrilla wars were also strongly supported. The guerrilla threat and civilian support factors were highly significant and demonstrated major substantive effects on the probability of mass killing in all stages of the analysis. Regime type also proved significant, supporting the argument about the impact of democratic government on reducing the risks of mass killing.

States are more likely to respond to guerrilla insurgencies with massive violence when the guerrillas pose a major military threat to the regime. Mass killing in counterinsurgency warfare is often a calculated government strategy intended to separate guerrilla forces from their support network in the population.

The costs and risks of mass killing, including its potential to provoke greater opposition, alienate supporters, and draw third parties into the conflict, often outweigh its value as a counterinsurgency strategy. Mass killing can keep guerrilla forces at bay, but even extreme levels of violence are often insufficient to decisively defeat mass-based insurgencies.

If this is so, why do states continue to employ this kind of strategy in guerrilla wars? The authors believe that states facing powerful and popular guerrilla opponents have continued to resort to mass killing because less violent strategies for counterinsurgency have proven equally costly and prone to failure. Regimes facing well-organized guerrilla opponents with strong civilian support have few options for meeting this threat. Few regimes possess the resources to provide lasting improvements in the lives of millions of disaffected citizens. For leaders unwilling to make major political concessions to the opposition, mass killing simply may appear the most attractive choice among a set of highly unattractive options.

10. INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING: THE UN VERSUS REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Which type of organization is best suited for international peacekeeping operations? Wallensteen and Heldt explore the empirical landscape of this old question, comparing trends and patterns among peacekeeping operations carried out by the UN and those conducted by regional organizations or ad hoc coalitions of states. The article also summarizes available evidence on success rates and offers some conclusions on the significance of the organizational framework for international action.

Global peacekeeping organizations generally have strong standing in international law, access to global resources (finances, troops, logistics), and competence, allowing them to act in an even-handed manner vis-à-vis the conflicting parties and in conflicts around the world. Thus, a global organization offers capacity and an element of protection, particularly for weaker regional or local actors.

Regional organizations and ad hoc coalitions have more local knowledge and are thus more capable of dealing with local conditions, have equipment adapted to local environments, are quicker to reach decisions on deployment, and are closer to the scene and can be deployed more quickly than the UN.

Given their respective advantages, it is not unexpected that the number of peacekeeping operations is virtually identical for each type of organizational frameworks: from 1948 to 2005 non-UN actors initiated 67 operations, while for the UN the corresponding number is 59. As of December 2005, there were 13 ongoing non-UN operations at a time when the UN was carrying out 15 operations. (See Figures 10.1 and 10.2)

Over the period, both types of missions have increased in numbers and significance, but regional initiatives and coalitions of states have almost exclusively carried out traditional peacekeeping missions even in intrastate conflicts, whereas the UN has become a provider of multidimensional operations with extensive mandates. Regional missions have often been deployed in early phases of conflict, what may amount to preventive actions. Hence, they may have an advantage in being able to act earlier than the UN, and at a point in time when resource demands are less restraining. UN missions, however, may more often be used at later stages of a conflict, when the difficulties are larger and the resource requirements higher. Considering the UN's larger pool of peacekeepers as well as financial resources, such a division of labor appears to be reasonable. Even so, the success rates do not differ between the organizational frameworks.

Fig. 10.1: Peacekeeping Operations-Interstate, 1948–2005





Fig. 10.2: Peacekeeping Operations-Intrastate, 1948–2005



11. UNPACKING GLOBAL TRENDS IN VIOLENT CONFLICT, 1946–2005

Fig. 11.1: Percentage of Countries Involved in Conflict, 1946–2005





Fig. 11.2: Battle Death Totals, 1946–2005



In this chapter, Hewitt offers a more detailed examination of trends in armed conflict. The chapter features many analyses that approach the assessment of trends from numerous perspectives. Two trends that supplement and clarify the overall understanding of international conflict emerge from this undertaking.

The share of countries with direct involvement in armed conflicts has risen slowly since the end of World War II (see Figure 11.1). In fact, the three years featuring the highest percentage of states involved in conflict were all recorded after the Cold War ended. The increased diffusion of conflict is partly the result of a recent string of large, multistate operations sanctioned by international bodies such as the UN or NATO (e.g., Kosovo and Afghanistan). Accordingly, there is an understandable temptation to dismiss the trend as a false indication of a worsening global condition. However, Hewitt cautions readers against this. The mobilization of troops to foreign territory is almost always a weighty national commitment. The financial and human costs of increased involvement in conflict, not to mention the concomitant political risks for leaders who send troops abroad, are nontrivial—even when the involvement occurs in a multistate operation.

The two graphs presented in Figure 11.2 help to illustrate the second main finding in the chapter. The upper graph shows that fatalities from armed conflict are going down. Annual totals for battle deaths have been declining steadily since the end of World War II. However, it is important to note that the downward trend in annual battle death totals is driven entirely by the impact of five particularly lethal conflicts representing just 2 percent of all the conflicts that have occurred since 1946. Those conflicts are: the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949), the Korean War (1950–1953), the Vietnam War (1955–1975), the Afghan Civil War (1978–2002), and the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988). As seen in the lower graph, in the other 98 percent of the conflicts, there is no discernible upward or downward trend.

The findings illustrate the difficulty in making unequivocal assertions about conflict-related fatalities because the data point to two fundamentally different conclusions. This distinction is important because it suggests that the explanation for the decline in fatalities has two parts: one that applies to major wars and another that applies to less intense, but more common, armed conflicts.

Hewitt's detailed presentation on conflict trends offers other results, as well. These include analyses of regional differences in conflict trends, analyses of patterns across different types of conflict, and analyses of changes in the average fatalities per conflict over time.

The findings presented in this chapter suggest cause for caution in interpreting trends in armed conflict that otherwise appear to be encouraging—a signal to policymakers and researchers that mitigating the causes and consequences of conflict should remain a priority.

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